In the absence of an Admiral-General, the control of the naval forces of the Low Countries was divided between five Boards of Admiralty,—that of the Maas, which sat at Rotterdam, that of Amsterdam, that of North Holland, and the Boards of Zeeland and Friesland. The States General, the only approach to a common government of the Confederacy, was a body in which each republic had one vote, though represented by a number of deputies. It was of more dignity than real strength, and exercised only the powers delegated to it by the different members of the Union. At a later period, the State of Holland, the most wealthy of the seven republics, was enabled to gain a supremacy which to some extent replaced the authority of the Stadtholder. It owed its success mainly to the statesmanship of the Grand Pensionary, John de Witt. But in the first Dutch war, De Witt was at the very beginning of his career, and the republics suffered from all the weaknesses of an ill-knit and jarring Confederacy. Even if all the inhabitants of the seven provinces had been united in sentiment, the defects in the construction of their government would have put them at a disadvantage in a conflict with England. But it is notorious that this was far from being the case. The victory of the Republicans had been the victory of the moneyed classes in the towns, of a very able, very patriotic, but also very narrow and jealous oligarchy. The majority of the nobles and the mass of the poorer classes were devoted in sentiment to the House of Orange Nassau, and would, if they had had their way, have seen the Stadtholdership conferred at once on the young prince, with a regent drawn from his own family to administer for him until he came of age. Many of the army and navy officers had the same wish, so that the States General were in constant fear of domestic sedition, while the party feelings of the officers of the fleet are believed to have interfered with the discharge of their duty.
The condition of England was very different. Those who ruled might be a revolutionary party, governing by force, but they claimed to have inherited all the rights of the Crown, and it is beyond doubt they had effective possession of them. Thus, while on the side of Holland there was continual need for the co-operation of independent if not always mutually hostile bodies, there was on the side of England one central authority acting according to its own motives, and rendering an account of its deeds to nobody. This Government, too, was composed of men steeled against all risks by years of conflict in which their heads had been at stake, and trained by long practice to the rapid transaction of public affairs. The predominance of the commercial element in Holland prevented the development of a high military spirit among its seamen. The Dutch were skilful mariners, and valiant in a stolid, enduring way, but their officers in many cases showed a very unofficerlike reluctance to face risks. In our fleet something of the same kind was found among the merchant captains left in command of the hired or pressed ships, and no doubt the war, which tried men as by fire, revealed the weakness of individuals. Yet the evil with us was less, and the power to remedy it was far greater.
Not the least cause of the superior strength of England is to be found in her geographical position. Her coasts stretched opposite those of Holland, while she herself was open to the west. Thus the Dutch trade, the very life-blood of the country, was compelled to flow either along the Channel, where it was subject to attack at every moment, or by the longer and stormier route round the north of Scotland, where also it was not safe, since the route ended in the North Sea opposite the naval station of Harwich.
On a general comparison, then, of the relative strength of the two countries, it will be seen that the advantage was on the side of England. There were numbers against her, and a somewhat greater experience. But she had unity of authority, better instruments of war, a more martial spirit, a stronger geographical position, and she was much less vulnerable. If, then, ability and energy were not wanted in the direction of her fleet, the probability was that she would win.
CHAPTER VII
THE FIRST DUTCH WAR
Authorities.—The Life of Penn is of the utmost value for this period, and is rivalled in worth by Brandt's Life of Michael de Ruyter. Admiral Colomb's Naval Warfare contains a very important critical examination of the war from the scientific point of view. Parliament began the practice, afterwards imitated by the Government of Charles II., of publishing official narratives of events. The best of these are given in the Life of Penn. The Calendars of State Papers for the years give the most important letters from the fleet in full, and the others in précis.
When in the beginning of 1652 war was seen to be inevitable, England had in hand a considerable force of ships already commissioned, manned by crews which had been long together. Ayscue had just returned from America, and Penn from the Mediterranean, where his place had been taken by Captain Badiley. The summer guard was being prepared in great strength under the sole command of Blake. Popham died about this time, and Deane was with the troops in Scotland. In March the Council of State was busy commissioning ships as fast as it could. It forbade the pressing of men from outward-bound merchant vessels, on the ground that this was a serious hindrance to trade, but it used every other available means to increase its naval force. The higher commands were filled by giving the place of Vice-Admiral to William Penn, and of Rear-Admiral to Nicholas Bourne, a soldier who was mainly employed during the course of the war as commissioner of the dockyard at Harwich. The States General made strenuous efforts to preserve peace, but the Council of State insisted on such terms as could not be accepted without the surrender of the national existence of the republics. The Grand Pensionary, Pauw de Heemstede, was sent over to reinforce the ambassadors, but, while they were negotiating, exertions were made to collect a competent naval force at sea. The need for one was great. The Dutch convoys were coming up the Channel, and, in the humour England was in, there was no small probability that they would be seized before they reached home. To afford them protection, Tromp was sent into the Straits of Dover with a fleet of some forty sail. He appeared there about the middle of May, and found Bourne at Dover with eight ships. Blake was at Rye with fifteen or sixteen. A conflict had already taken place in the Channel, arising out of the historic quarrel as to the right to the salute. On the 12th of May, Captain Young, on his way westward to take command of the west guard, met a dozen sail coming from the southward near the Start. He took them at first for the fleet of Sir George Ayscue. They turned out to be a convoy of Dutch ships from Genoa and Leghorn, accompanied by three men-of-war. Young at once insisted upon the salute. It was yielded by one of the Dutchmen, but resisted by the second, a 42-gun ship; and a hot conflict followed, all six vessels taking active part. Young reported that he finally compelled the recalcitrant Dutchman to strike, but that, when he also wanted to carry him prisoner to England, the Hollanders declared that they preferred fighting again. Upon this Young sheered off, by the advice of his fellow-captains, Reynolds and Chapman. The action would appear to have been somewhat indecisive, but Captain Young was well pleased with his share. "For my own part," he wrote, "I bless God for it, I am very well. I do believe I gave him his belly full of it; for he sent me word he had orders from the States that if he struck he should lose his head; but at length he did strike, which makes me conceive he had enough of it." The States were indeed well disposed to resist the claim to the salute, and, at the pitch things had got to, may well have thought that there was little use in rendering a mark of deference which seemed to do them no good.
While the convoy attacked by Captain Young was making its way up Channel, Tromp came into Dover Road, and there exchanged civilities with Admiral Bourne. The English were in a suspicious frame of mind, and disposed to see offence in all Tromp's acts. They may perhaps have remembered his high-handed attack on Oquendo at that very place fourteen years earlier. In any case, they knew that he was a loyal member of the Orange Party, that he had been knighted by Charles I., and that he was no friend to the English nation. Bourne sent word to Blake at Rye, and the English admiral at once got under way and came round to Dover. On the morning of the 19th he came in sight of Tromp at anchor in and near Dover Road. When Blake was within three leagues of him, Tromp weighed, and stood to the eastward with a north-easterly wind. The English did not come to an anchor, but continued lying to, watching Tromp, who held his course for some two hours. Then a small vessel was seen to speak to the Dutch admiral. Tromp immediately altered his course and bore down on Blake, he himself leading in his flagship, the Brederode. Blake also was at the head of his own ships. In this position he watched the Dutch admiral, whose action certainly indicated no unwillingness to provoke a collision. The right to the salute served to bring matters to an issue. When Tromp was within musket-shot, Blake gave orders to fire at his flag. At the third shot the Dutchman answered by a broadside, which may be considered as the effectual opening of perhaps the fiercest, though one of the shortest, of naval wars.