201. It only seems to do so by assuming the ‘fiction’ it has to account for; by assuming that impression represents a real world.
202. So the ‘Positivist’ juggles with ‘phenomena’.
203. Essential difference, however, between Hume and the ‘Positivist’.
204. He adopts Berkeley’s doctrine of ideas, but without Berkeley’s saving suppositions,
205. … in regard to ‘spirit’,
206. … in regard to relations. His account of these.
207. It corresponds to Locke’s account of the sorts of agreement between ideas.
208. Could Hume consistently admit idea of relation at all?
210. Only in regard to identity and causation that he sees any difficulty. These he treats as fictions resulting from ‘natural relations’ of ideas: i.e. from resemblance and contiguity.
212. Is resemblance then an impression?