49. If all good is pleasure, what is moral good? Ambiguity in Locke’s view.
50. Development of it by Clarke, which breaks down for want of true view of reason.
51. With Hume, moral good is pleasure excited in a particular way, viz.; in the spectator of the ‘good’ act and by the view of its tendency to produce pleasure.
53. Moral sense is thus sympathy with pleasure qualified by consideration of general tendencies.
54. In order to account for the facts it has to become sympathy with unfelt feelings.
55. Can the distinction between the ‘moral’ and ‘natural’ be maintained by Hume? What is ‘artificial virtue’?
56. No ground for such distinction in relation between motive and act.
57. Motive to artificial virtues.
58. How artificial virtues become moral.
59. Interest and sympathy account for all obligations civil and moral.