[32] So great dupes are the generality of mankind, that notwithstanding such a violent shock to public credit as a voluntary bankruptcy in England would occasion, it would not probably be long ere credit would again revive in as flourishing a condition as before. The present King of France, during the late war, borrowed money at lower interest than ever his grandfather did, and as low as the British Parliament, comparing the natural rate of interest in both kingdoms. And though men are commonly more governed by what they have seen than by what they foresee, with whatever certainty, yet promises, protestations, fair appearances, with the allurements of present interest, have such powerful influence as few are able to resist. Mankind are, in all ages, caught by the same baits. The same tricks, played over and over again, still trepan them. The heights of popularity and patriotism are still the beaten road to power and tyranny; flattery to treachery; standing armies to arbitrary government; and the glory of God to the temporal interest of the clergy. The fear of an everlasting destruction of credit, allowing it to be an evil, is a needless bugbear. A prudent man, in reality, would rather lend to the public immediately after they had taken a sponge to their debts, than at present; as much as an opulent knave, even though one could not force him to pay, is a preferable debtor to an honest bankrupt; for the former, in order to carry on business, may find it his interest to discharge his debts, where they are not exorbitant. The latter has it not in his power. The reasoning of Tacitus (Hist. lib. 3), as it is eternally true, is very applicable to our present case: “Sed vulgus ad magnitudinem beneficiorum aderat: Stultissimus quisque pecuniis mercabatur: Apud sapientes cassa habebantur, quæ neque dari neque accipi, salva republica, poterant.” The public is a debtor, whom no man can oblige to pay. The only check which the creditors have on it is the interest of preserving credit; an interest which may easily be overbalanced by a very great debt, and by a difficult and extraordinary emergence, even supposing that credit irrecoverable. Not to mention that a present necessity often forces states into measures which are, strictly speaking, against their interest.
[33] I have heard it has been computed that all the creditors of the public, natives and foreigners, amount only to 17,000. These make a figure at present on their income; but in case of a public bankruptcy would in an instant become the lowest, as well as the most wretched of the people. The dignity and authority of the landed gentry and nobility is much better rooted, and would render the contention very unequal, if ever we come to that extremity. One would incline to assign to this event a very near period, such as half a century, had not our fathers’ prophecies of this kind been already found fallacious by the duration of our public credit so much beyond all reasonable expectation. When the astrologers in France were every year foretelling the death of Henry IV., “These fellows,” says he, “must be right at last.” We shall therefore be more cautious than to assign any precise date, and shall content ourselves with pointing out the event in general.
OF SOME REMARKABLE CUSTOMS.
I shall observe three remarkable customs in three celebrated governments, and shall conclude from the whole that all general maxims in politics ought to be established with great reserve, and that irregular and extraordinary appearances are frequently discovered in the moral as well {p99} as in the physical world. The former perhaps can we better account for after they happen, from springs and principles of which every one has within himself, or from obvious observation, the strongest assurance and conviction; but it is often fully as impossible for human prudence beforehand to foresee and foretell them.
I. One would think it essential to every supreme council or assembly which debates, that entire liberty of speech should be granted to every member, and that all motions or reasonings should be received which can any way tend to illustrate the point under deliberation. One would conclude, with still greater assurance, that after a motion was made, which was voted and approved by that assembly in which the legislative power is lodged, the member who made the motion must for ever be exempted from further trial or inquiry. But no political maxim can at first sight appear more undisputable than that he must at least be secured from all inferior jurisdiction, and that nothing less than the same supreme legislative assembly, in their subsequent meetings, could render him accountable for those motions and harangues which they had before approved of. But these axioms, however irrefragable they may appear, have all failed in the Athenian government, from causes, and principles too, which appear almost inevitable.
By the γραφη παρανομων, or “indictment of illegality” (though it has not been remarked by antiquaries or commentators), any man was tried and punished by any common court of judicature for any law which had passed upon his motion in the assembly of the people, if that law appeared to the court unjust or prejudicial to the public. Thus Demosthenes, finding that ship-money was levied irregularly, and that the poor bore the same burden as the rich in equipping the galleys, corrected this inequality by a very useful law, which proportioned the expense to the revenue and income of each individual. He moved for this law in the assembly, he proved its advantages,[34] he {p100} convinced the people, the only legislature in Athens, the law passed and was carried into execution; and yet he was tried in a criminal court for that law upon the complaint of the rich, who resented the alteration he had introduced into the finances. He was indeed acquitted upon proving anew the usefulness of his law.
Ctesiphon moved in the assembly of the people that particular honours should be conferred on Demosthenes, as on a citizen affectionate and useful to the commonwealth. The people, convinced of this truth, voted those honours; yet was Ctesiphon tried by the γραφη παρανομων. It was asserted, among other topics, that Demosthenes was not a good citizen, nor affectionate to the commonwealth, and the orator was called upon to defend his friend, and consequently himself, which he executed by that sublime piece of eloquence that has ever since been the admiration of mankind.
After the battle of Chæronea a law was passed, upon the motion of Hyperides, giving liberty to slaves and enrolling them in the troops.[35] On account of this law the orator was afterwards tried by the indictment above mentioned, and defended himself, among other topics, by that stroke celebrated by Plutarch and Longinus. “It was not I,” said he, “that moved for this law: it was the necessities of war; it was the battle of Chæronea.” The orations of Demosthenes abound with many instances of trials of this nature, and prove clearly that nothing was more commonly practised.
The Athenian Democracy was such a tumultuary government as we can scarce form a notion of in the present age of the world. The whole collective body of the people voted in every law without any limitation of property, without any distinction of rank, without control of any {p101} magistracy or senate;[36] and consequently without regard to order, justice, or prudence. The Athenians soon became sensible of the mischiefs attending this constitution, but being averse to the checking themselves by any rule or restriction, they resolved at least to check their demagogues or counsellors by the fear of future punishment and inquiry. They accordingly instituted this remarkable law, a law esteemed so essential to their government that Æschines insists on it as a known truth, that were it abolished or neglected it were impossible for the Democracy to subsist.[37]
The people feared not any ill consequence to liberty from the authority of the criminal courts, because these were nothing but very numerous juries, chosen by lot from among the people; and they considered themselves justly as in a state of perpetual pupilage, where they had an authority, after they came to the use of reason, not only to retract and control whatever had been determined, but to punish any guardian for measures which they had embraced by his persuasion. The same law had place in Thebes, and for the same reason.