We shall only observe, before we conclude, that though an appeal to general opinion may justly, in the speculative sciences of metaphysics, natural philosophy, or astronomy, be esteemed unfair and inconclusive, yet in all questions with regard to morals, as well as criticism, there is really no standard by which any controversy can ever be decided. And nothing is a clearer proof that a theory of this kind is erroneous than to find that it leads to paradoxes which are repugnant to the common sentiments of mankind and to general practice and opinion. The doctrine which founds all lawful government on an original contract, or consent of {p192} the people, is plainly of this kind; nor has the ablest of its partisans in prosecution of it scrupled to affirm that absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all,[106] and that the supreme power in a state cannot take from any man by taxes and impositions any part of his property without his own consent or that of his representatives.[107] What authority any moral reasoning can have which leads to opinions so wide of the general practice of mankind in every place but this single kingdom it is easy to determine.[108]
NOTES, OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT.
[103] Henry IV. of France.
[104] It is remarkable that in the remonstrance of the Duke of Bourbon and the legitimate princes against this destination of Louis XIV., the doctrine of the original contract is insisted on, even in that absolute government. The French nation, say they, choosing Hugh Capet and his posterity to rule over them and their posterity, where the former line fails, there is a tacit right reserved to choose a new royal family; and this right is invaded by calling the bastard princes to the throne without the consent of the nation. But the Comte de Boulainvilliers, who wrote in defence of the bastard princes, ridicules this notion of an original contract, especially when applied to Hugh Capet; who mounted the throne, says he, by the same arts which have ever been employed by all conquerors and usurpers. He got his title, indeed, recognized by the states after he had put himself in possession. But is this a choice or contract? The Comte de Boulainvilliers, we may observe, was a noted republican; but being a man of learning, and very conversant in history, he knew the people were never almost consulted in these revolutions and new establishments, and that time alone bestowed right and authority on what was commonly at first founded on force and violence. (See État de la France, vol. iii.)
[105] The crime of rebellion amongst the ancients was commonly marked by the terms νεωτεριζειν, novas res moliri.
[106] See Locke on Government, chap. 7, § 90.
[107] Locke on Government, chap. 11, § 138, 139, 140.
[108] The only passage I meet with in antiquity where the obligation of obedience to government is ascribed to a promise is in Plato—in Critone, where Socrates refuses to escape from prison, because he had tacitly promised to obey the laws. Thus he builds a Tory consequence of passive obedience on a Whig foundation of the original contract.
New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters. If no man, till very lately, ever imagined that government was founded on contract, it is certain it cannot, in general, have any such foundation.