* D’Ewes, p. 167.
** D’Ewes, p. 158.
*** D’Ewes, p. 166.
**** D’Ewes, p. 166.
v D’Ewes, p. 167.
Matters would probably have rested here, had not the queen been so highly offended with Stricland’s presumption in moving the bill for reformation of the liturgy, that she summoned him before the council, and prohibited him thenceforth from appearing in the house of commons.[*] This act of power was too violent even for the submissive parliament to endure. Carleton took notice of the matter; complained that the liberties of the house were invaded; observed that Stricland was not a private man, but represented a multitude: and moved that he might be sent for, and if he were guilty of any offence, might answer for it at the bar of the house, which he insinuated to be the only competent tribunal.[**] Yelverton enforced the principles of liberty with still greater boldness. He said, that the precedent was dangerous; and though, in this happy time of lenity, among so many good and honorable personages as were at present invested with authority, nothing of extremity or injury was to be apprehended, yet the times might alter; what now is permitted, might hereafter be construed as duty, and might be enforced even on the ground of the present permission. He added, that all matters not treasonable, or which implied not “too much” derogation of the imperial crown, might, without offence, be introduced into parliament; where every question that concerned the community must be considered, and where even the right of the crown itself must finally be determined. He remarked, that men sat not in that house in their private capacities, but as elected by their country; and though it was proper that the prince should retain his prerogative, yet was that prerogative limited by law: as the sovereign could not of himself make laws, neither could he break them merely from his own authority.[***]
* D’Ewes, p. 175.
** D’Ewes, p. 175.
*** D’Ewes, p. 175, 176.
These principles were popular, and noble, and generous; but the open assertion of them was, at this time, somewhat new in England; and the courtiers were more warranted by present practice, when they advanced a contrary doctrine. The treasurer warned the house to be cautious in their proceedings; neither to venture further than their assured warrant might extend, nor hazard their good opinion with her majesty in any doubtful cause. The member, he said, whose attendance they required, was not restrained on account of any liberty of speech, but for his exhibiting a bill in the house against the prerogative of the queen; a temerity which was not to be tolerated. And he concluded with observing, that even speeches made in that house had been questioned and examined by the sovereign.[*] Cleere, another member, remarked, that the sovereign’s prerogative is not so much as disputable, and that the safety of the queen is the safety of the subject. He added, that in questions of divinity, every man was for his instruction to repair to his ordinary; and he seems to insinuate, that the bishops themselves, for their instruction, must repair to the queen.[**] Fleetwood observed, that in his memory, he knew a man who, in the fifth of the present queen, had been called to account for a speech in the house. But lest this example should be deemed too recent, he would inform them, from the parliament rolls, that, in the reign of Henry V., a bishop was committed to prison by the king’s command, on account of his freedom of speech; and the parliament presumed not to go further than to be humble suitors for him: in the subsequent reign, the speaker himself was committed, with another member; and the house found no other remedy than a like submissive application. He advised the house to have recourse to the same expedient, and not to presume either to send for their member, or demand him as of right.[***] During this speech, those members of the privy council who sat in the house whispered together; upon which the speaker moved that the house should make stay of all further proceedings: a motion which was immediately complied with. The queen, finding that the experiment which she had made was likely to excite a great ferment, saved her honor by this silence of the house; and lest the question might be resumed, she sent next day to Stricland her permission to give his attendance in parliament.[****]
* D’Ewes, p. 175.
** D’Ewes, p. 175.
*** D’Ewes, p. 176.
**** D’Ewes, p. 176.
Notwithstanding this rebuke from the throne, the zeal of the commons still engaged them to continue the discussion of those other bills which regarded religion; but they were interrupted by a still more arbitrary proceeding of the queen, in which the lords condescended to be her instruments. This house sent a message to the commons, desiring that a committee might attend them. Some members were appointed for that purpose; and the upper house informed them, that the queen’s majesty, being informed of the articles of reformation which they had canvassed, approved of them, intended to publish them, and to make the bishops execute them by virtue of her royal authority, as supreme head of the church of England; but that she would not permit them to be treated of in parliament.[*] The house, though they did not entirely stop proceedings on account of this injunction, seem to have been nowise offended at such haughty treatment; and in the issue, all the bills came to nothing.
A motion made by Robert Bell, a Puritan, against an exclusive patent granted to a company of merchants in Bristol,[**] gave also occasion to several remarkable incidents. The queen, some days after the motion was made, sent orders, by the mouth of the speaker, commanding the house to spend little time in motions, and to avoid long speeches. All the members understood that she had been offended, because a matter had been moved which seemed to touch her prerogative.[***] Fleetwood accordingly spoke of this delicate subject. He observed, that the queen had a prerogative of granting patents; that to question the validity of any patent was to invade the royal prerogative; that all foreign trade was entirely subjected to the pleasure of the sovereign; that even the statute which gave liberty of commerce, admitted of all prohibitions from the crown; and that the prince, when he granted an exclusive patent, only employed the power vested in him, and prohibited all others from dealing in any particular branch of commerce. He quoted the clerk of the parliament’s book to prove, that no man might speak in parliament of the statute of wills, unless the king first gave license; because the royal prerogative in the wards was thereby touched. He showed, likewise, the statutes of Edward I., Edward III., and Henry IV., with a saving of the prerogative. And in Edward VI.‘s time, the protector was applied to for his allowance to mention matters of prerogative.[****]
* D’Ewes, p. 180, 185.
** D’Ewes, p. 185.
*** D’Ewes, p. 159.
**** D’Ewes, p. 160.
Sir Humphrey Gilbert, the gallant and renowned sea adventurer, carried these topics still further. He endeavored to prove the motion made by Bell to be a vain device, and perilous to be treated of; since it tended to the derogation of the prerogative imperial, which whoever should attempt so much as in fancy, could not, he said, be otherwise accounted than an open enemy. For what difference is there between saying, that the queen is not to use the privilege of the crown and saying, that she is not queen? And though experience has shown so much clemency in her majesty, as might, perhaps, make subjects forget their duty, it is not good to sport or venture too much with princes. He reminded them of the fable of the hare, who, upon the proclamation that all horned beasts should depart the court, immediately fled, lest his ears should be construed to be horns; and by this apologue he seems to insinuate, that even those who heard or permitted such dangerous speeches, would not themselves be entirely free from danger. He desired them to beware, lest if they meddled further with these matters, the queen might look to her own power; and finding herself able to suppress their challenged liberty, and to exert an arbitrary authority, might imitate the example of Lewis XI. of France, who, as he termed it, delivered the crown from wardship.[*]
Though this speech gave some disgust, nobody, at the time, replied any thing, but that Sir Humphrey mistook the meaning of the house, and of the member who made the motion: they never had any other purpose, than to represent their grievances, in due and seemly form, unto her majesty. But in a subsequent debate, Peter Wentworth, a man of a superior free spirit, called that speech an insult on the house; noted Sir Humphrey’s disposition to flatter and fawn on the prince; compared him to the chameleon, which can change itself into all colors, except white; and recommended to the house a due care of liberty of speech, and of the privileges of parliament.[**]