By violation of provisional measures enjoined by the Council as contemplated by Article 7 of the Protocol;
Or by disregard of a decision recognising that the dispute arises out of a matter which lies exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the other party and by failure or by refusal to submit the question first to the Council or the Assembly.
In these cases, even if there is not absolute certainty, there exists at any rate a very strong presumption which should suffice for the application of sanctions unless proof to the contrary has been furnished by a unanimous decision of the Council.
It will be noticed that there is a characteristic difference between the first two cases and the third.
In the first two cases the presumption exists when, in addition to a state of war, the special condition referred to is also fulfilled.
In the third case, however, the presumption is dependent upon three conditions: disobedience to a decision, wilful failure to take advantage of the remedy provided in Article 11 of the Covenant, and the existence of a state of war.
This difference is due to the necessity of taking into account the provisions of Article 5 analysed above, which, by its reference to Article 11 of the Covenant, renders the application of paragraph 8 of Article 15 of the Covenant more flexible. After very careful consideration it appeared that it would be unreasonable and unjust to regard as ipso facto an aggressor a State which, being prevented through the operation of paragraph 8 of Article 15 from urging its claims by pacific methods and being thus left to its own resources, is in despair driven to war.
It was considered to be more in harmony with the requirements of justice and peace to give such a State which has been non-suited on the preliminary question of the domestic jurisdiction of its adversary, a last chance of arriving at an amicable agreement by offering it the final method of conciliation prescribed in Article 11 of the Covenant. It is only if, after rejecting this method, it has recourse to war that it will be presumed to be an aggressor.
This mitigation of the rigid character of paragraph 8 of Article 15 has been accepted, not only because it is just, but also because it opens no breach in the barrier set up by the Protocol against aggressive war: it in no way infringes the principle—which remains unshaken—that a war undertaken against a State whose exclusive jurisdiction has been formally recognised is an international crime to be avenged collectively by the signatories of the Protocol.