The work required, above all, important political negotiations. While the question of arbitration only required one political decision of principle, namely, the acceptance of compulsory arbitration, and the remainder was principally a matter of drafting—without question an extremely difficult task—of a scheme for the application of such arbitration, the questions of security and disarmament necessitated long and laborious political negotiations; for they involved fundamental interests, questions of vital importance to the States, engagements so far-reaching as radically to change the general situation of the various countries.
Although in the work of the First Committee the Assembly had distinctly indicated in its resolution of September 6th that there was a likelihood—indeed, a necessity—of amending the Covenant, the work of the Third Committee as regards questions of security and reduction of armaments had, in conformity with the debates of the Assembly, to remain within the framework of the Covenant. Above all, it was a question of developing and rendering more precise what is already laid down in the Covenant. All our discussions, all our labours, were guided by these principles, and a delicate task was thus imposed upon us. But the spirit of conciliation which pervaded all the discussions has permitted us to resolve the two problems which were placed before us. This is, indeed, an important result, and if the solution of the problem of arbitration which has been so happily arrived at by the First Committee be also taken into consideration, we are in the presence of a system the adoption of which may entirely modify our present political life.
This is the real import of the articles of the Protocol concerning the questions of security and reduction of armaments.
2.—THREAT OF AGGRESSION: PREVENTIVE MEASURES.
Article 7.
The pacific settlement of disputes being provided for in the present Protocol, the signatory States undertake, should any conflict arise between them, not to resort to preparations for the settlement of such dispute by war and, in general, to abstain from any act calculated to aggravate or extend the said dispute. This principle applies both to the period preceding the submission of the dispute to arbitration or conciliation and to the period in which the case is pending.
This provision is not unaccompanied by sanctions. Any appeal against the violation of the aforesaid undertakings may, in conformity with Article 11 of the Covenant, be brought before the Council. One might say that, in addition to such primary dispute as is or might be submitted to the Council or to some other competent organ, a second dispute arises, caused by the violation of the undertakings provided for in the first paragraph.
The Council, unless it be of opinion that the appeal is not worthy of consideration, will proceed with the necessary enquiries and investigations. Should it be established that an offence has been committed against the provisions of the first paragraph, it will be the duty of the Council, in the light of the results of such enquiries and investigations, to call upon any State guilty of the offence to put an end thereto. Any such State failing to comply will be declared by the Council to be guilty of violation of the Covenant (Article 11) or the Protocol.
The Council must, further, take the necessary measures to put an end, as soon as possible, to a situation calculated to threaten the peace of the world. The text does not define the nature of these preventive measures. Its elasticity permits the Council to take such measures as may be appropriate in each concrete case, as, for example, the evacuation of territories.
Any decisions which may be taken by the Council in virtue of this Article may be taken by a two-thirds majority, except in the case of decisions dealing with questions of procedure which still come under the general rule of Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. The following decisions, therefore, can be taken by a two-thirds majority: