I would further add that the obligations I refer to are imperfect obligations in the sense that no sanctions are provided for against any party which shall have failed loyally and effectively to co-operate in protecting the Covenant and resisting every act of aggression. It should, however, be emphasised that such a State would have failed in the fulfilment of its duties and would be guilty of a violation of engagements entered into.
In view of the foregoing, the gist of Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2, might be expressed as follows: Each State is the judge of the manner in which it shall carry out its obligations but not of the existence of those obligations, that is to say, each State remains the judge of what it will do but no longer remains the judge of what it should do.
Now that the present Protocol has defined more precisely the origin, nature and extent of the obligations arising out of the Covenant, the functions of the Council, as provided in Articles 10 and 16, have become clearer and more definite.
Directly the Council has called upon the signatories to the Protocol to apply without delay the sanctions provided in Article 11, it becomes a regulating, or rather an advisory, body, but not an executive body. The nature of the acts of aggression may vary considerably; the means for their suppression will also vary. It would frequently be unnecessary to make use of all the means which, according to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 11, are, so to speak, available for resisting an act of aggression. It might even be dangerous if, from fear of failing in their duties, States made superfluous efforts. It will devolve upon the Council, which, under Article 13 can be put in possession of the necessary data, to give its opinion, should need occur, as to the best means of executing the obligations which arise directly it enjoins the application of sanctions, especially as to the sequence in which the sanctions must be applied.
The practical application of the sanctions would, however, always devolve upon the Governments; the real co-operation would ensue upon their getting into touch, through diplomatic channels—perhaps by conferences—and by direct relations between different General Staffs, as in the last war. The Council would, of course, be aware of all these negotiations, would be consulted and make recommendations.
The difference between the former state of affairs and the new will therefore be as follows:
According to the system laid down by the Covenant:
1. The dispute arises.
2. In cases where neither the arbitral procedure nor the judicial settlement provided for in Article 13 of the Covenant is applied, the Council meets and discusses the dispute, attempts to effect conciliation, mediation, etc.
3. If it be unsuccessful and war breaks out, the Council, if unanimous, has to express an opinion as to which party is guilty. The Members of the League then decide for themselves whether this opinion is justified and whether their obligations to apply economic sanctions become operative.