Art. XI. Consuls or agents of the United States to reside at Shimoda.
Art. XII. The ratification of this treaty to be exchanged within eighteen months.
As might have been expected, as soon as this treaty with the United States had been signed there was a rush of other nations to obtain similar terms. Admiral Sir John Sterling, acting in behalf of the government of Great Britain, negotiated a treaty which was signed at Nagasaki on the 15th of October, 1854. Admiral Pontiatine negotiated a similar treaty for Russia, which was signed at Shimoda on the 7th of February, 1855. A treaty with the Netherlands was signed on the 30th of January, 1856.
None of these were in any general sense commercial treaties, providing for trade and making regulations by which it might be conducted. They were rather preliminary conventions, making arrangements for vessels to obtain necessary provisions, and stipulating for the protection of those suffering shipwreck, and for vessels driven under stress of weather to take shelter in the harbors of Japan. They each provided for admission to two ports: The American treaty to Shimoda and Hakodate; the English treaty to Nagasaki and Hakodate; the Russian treaty to Shimoda and Hakodate.
All these treaties contained what is called “the most favored nation clause,” so that where the privileges granted to any one nation were in excess of those granted previously to others, these privileges were also without further negotiation extended to the nations that had already made treaties.
These dealings with foreign nations produced the most intense excitement throughout the empire. The old sentiment of hostility to foreign intercourse showed itself in unmistakable intensity. The song of the Black Ship, by which term the vessels of foreign nations were designated, was heard everywhere. Two distinct parties came into existence called the Jo-i party, who wished to expel the barbarians; and the Kai-koku party, who were in favor of opening the country.[272] The members of the latter party were principally connected with the shōgun's government, and had become impressed with the folly of trying to resist the pressure of the outside world. The Jo-i party was made up of the conservative elements in the country, who clung to the old traditions of Japan that had matured during the two centuries of the Tokugawa rule. Besides these conservatives there was also a party who nourished a traditional dislike to the Tokugawa family, and was glad to see it involved in difficulties which were sure to bring down upon it the vengeance of the nation. These were chiefly found among the southwestern daimiates such as Satsuma, Chōshū, Hizen, and Tosa. The daimyō of Mito[273] although connected with the shōgun's family was bitterly hostile to the policy of holding any friendly relations with foreigners. He was therefore regarded as the head of the Jo-i party, and many of the disaffected samurai rallied about him as their champion and leader.
It was charged against the shōgun that in making treaties with foreign nations he had transcended the powers[274] that rightly belonged to him. He was not the sovereign of Japan and never had been. He was only the chief executive under the emperor, and was not even next in rank to the emperor. It was impossible, therefore, that treaties made by the shōgun and not ratified by his sovereign should be regarded by the Japanese as legitimate and binding.
The question of the legality of the treaties which the shōgun had made was an important one, and interested not only the Japanese themselves but the foreigners whose privileges under these treaties were at stake. There is no doubt that Commodore Perry as well as all the subsequent negotiators, believed that in making treaties with the shōgun they were dealing with a competent authority. The precedents occurring in the history of Japan seemed all to bear in this direction. The Portuguese and the Spanish had dealt with the shōgun and never with the emperor. The Dutch had received from Ieyasu the privileges of trade and had ever since continued under the shōgun's protection. Captain Saris in his negotiations in 1614 received written assurances of protection and privileges of trade from the shōgun.
It was because the shōgun's power had become weakened, and there had grown up an active sentiment against him, that the question in reference to his legitimate authority arose. “Had the treaty” (with Perry) “been concluded when the power of Yedo was at its former height, it is probable that no questions would have been asked.”[275]