Forty Centuries of Ink / Or, A chronological narrative concerning ink and its backgrounds, introducing incidental observations and deductions, parallels of time and color phenomena, bibliography, chemistry, poetical effusions, citations, anecdotes and curiosa together with some evidence respecting the evanescent character of most inks of to-day and an epitome of chemico-legal ink.

by David Nunes Carvalho

"That the testator, on or about the 27th day of March, 1884, in the presence of the attesting witnesses, duly signed the instrument in writing, and duly published and declared the same to be his last will and testament, and requested said witnesses to witness the same, and pursuant to such request said attesting witnesses did subscribe said will as attesting witnesses. That at the time said Richard Tighe so signed, published and declared the said instrument to be his last will and testament, the said Richard Tighe was in all respects competent to execute the same, and was not under any restraint or undue influence. That the said instrument, so signed, published and declared by testator was and consisted of the identical sheets of paper and the identical writing now appearing upon the same as to all except pencil writing; the testator did not publish or declare the marks, words or figures written in or upon said instrument in pencil to be a part of his last will and testament, and it is not found that such marks, words or figures were upon said instrument at the time when said instrument was so published and declared to be the last will and testament of the testator. That the said last will and testament is written consecutively upon two sheets of legal cap paper.

"That the said last will and testament was originally prepared with blank spaces left for the insertion of the numbers of shares intended to be bequeathed and devised to the various beneficiaries named therein, and as so prepared was in the hand-writing of Caroline S. Tighe, the wife of testator, and that at some subsequent time and before the execution of the said instrument by the said Richard Tighe, the blank spaces hereinafter referred to as filled in in ink, were filled in by or under the direction of the testator. Upon said instrument as offered for probate there appears in the blanks originally left thereon, in some instances, pencil writings superimposed over other pencil writings, which have been either wholly or partially erased, and in other instances ink writing different from the body of the instrument in the material employed, appearing over pencil writings wholly or partially obliterated. . .

"That the said words written in ink filling such blanks as aforesaid expressed the final determination of the testator with regard to the beneficiaries to whom the same applied; and that the words and figures written in pencil filling such blanks as aforesaid were written only deliberately and tentatively and that as to those words and figures the testator had not at the time when he executed, published or declared said instrument to be his last will and testament determined as to whom or in what proportions he would give the several shares of his estate and property covered by said words and figures, but the testator attempted and intended to reserve to himself the power of making disposition of said shares thereafter, and intended the final disposition thereof to be in ink writing. . . ."

CHAPTER XXIV.

CHEMICO-LEGAL INK (CONTINUED).

FAMOUS CASE OF CRITTEN V. CHEMICAL NATIONAL BANK—STORY OF THE CASE INCLUDED IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AS WRITTEN BY JUSTICE EDGAR M. CULLEN—THE PINKERTON CASE OF "BECKER"—STORY OF HOW HE SECURED $20,000 THROUGH THE ALTERATION OF A $12 CHECK—BECKER'S COMMENTS ABOUT HIMSELF—A CRITICISM OF BECKER AND HIS WORK—NAMES OF SOME CASES IN WHICH CHEMICAL EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO COURTS AND JURIES.

THE books contain no clearer or more forcible exposition of "Chemico-legal" ink, in its relationship to facts adduced from illustrated scientific testimony, than is to be found in the final opinion written by that eminent jurist Hon. Edgar M. Cullen on behalf of the majority of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, in the case of De Frees Critten v. The Chemical National Bank. It was the author's privilege to be the expert employed in the lower court about whose testimony Judge Cullen remarks (N. Y. Rep., 171, p. 223) "The alteration of the checks by Davis was established beyond contradiction," and again, p. 227, "The skill of the criminal has kept pace with the advance in honest arts and a forgery may be made so skillfully as to deceive not only the bank but the drawer of the check as to the genuineness of his own signature." The main facts are included in the portion of the opinion cited:

"The plaintiffs kept a large and active account with the defendant, and this action is to recover an alleged balance of a deposit due to them from the bank. The plaintiffs had in their employ a clerk named Davis. It was the duty of Davis to fill up the checks which it might be necessary for the plaintiffs to give in the course of business, to make corresponding entries in the stubs of the check book and present the checks so prepared to Mr. Critten, one of the plaintiffs, for signature, together with the bills in payment of which they were drawn. After signing a check Critten would place it and the bill in an envelope addressed to the proper party, seal the envelope and put it in the mailing drawer. During the period from September, 1897, to October, 1899, in twenty-four separate instances Davis abstracted one of the envelopes from the mailing drawer, opened it, obliterated by acids the name of the payee and the amount specified in the check, then made the check payable to cash and raised its amount, in the majority of cases, by the sum of $100. He would draw the money on the check so altered from the defendant bank, pay the bill for which the check was drawn in cash and appropriate the excess. On one occasion Davis did not collect the altered check from the defendant, but deposited it to his own credit in another bank. When a check was presented to Critten for signature the number of dollars for which it was drawn would be cut in the check by a punching instrument. When Davis altered a check he would punch a new figure in front of those already appearing in the check. The checks so altered by Davis were charged to the account of the plaintiff s, which was balanced every two months and the vouchers returned to them from the bank. To Davis himself the plaintiffs, as a rule, intrusted the verification of the bank balance. This work having in the absence of Davis been committed to another person, the forgeries were discovered and Davis was arrested and punished. It is the amount of these forged checks, over and above the sums for which they were originally drawn, that this action is brought to recover. The defendant pleaded payment and charged negligence on plaintiff's part, both in the manner in which the checks were drawn and in the failure to discover the forgeries when the pass book was balanced and the vouchers surrendered. On the trial the alteration of the checks by Davis was established beyond contradiction and the substantial issue litigated was that of the plaintiff's negligence. The referee rendered a short decision in favor of the plaintiffs in which he states as the ground of his decision that the plaintiffs were not negligent either in signing the checks as drawn by Davis or in failing to discover the forgeries at an earlier date than that at which they were made known to them.

"The relation existing between a bank and a depositor being that of debtor and creditor, the bank can justify a payment on the depositor's account only upon the actual direction of the depositor. 'The question arising on such paper (checks) between drawee and drawer, however, always relate to what the one has authorized the other to do. They are not questions of negligence or of liability to parties upon commercial paper, but are those of authority solely. The question of negligence cannot arise unless the depositor has in drawing his cheek left blanks unfilled, or by some affirmative act of negligence has facilitated the commission of a fraud by those into whose hands the check may come.' (Crawford v. West Side Bank, 100 N. Y. 50.) Therefore, when the fraudulent alteration of the checks was proved, the liability of the bank for their amount was made out and it was incumbent upon the defendant to establish affirmatively negligence on the plaintiff's part to relieve it from the consequences of its fault or misfortune in paying forged orders. Now, while the drawer of a check may be liable where he draws the instrument ill such ill incomplete state as to facilitate or invite fraudulent alterations, it is not the law that he is bound so to prepare the cheek that nobody else call successfully tamper with it. (Societe Generale v. Metropolitan Bank, 27 L. T. [N. S.] 849; Belknap v. National Bank of North America, 100 Mass. 380) In the present case the fraudulent alteration of the checks was not merely in the perforation of the additional figure, but in the obliteration of the written name of the payee and the substitution therefor of the word 'Cash.' Against this latter change of the instrument the plaintiffs could not have been expected to guard, and without that alteration it would have no way profited the criminal to raise the amount. . . ."

A Pinkerton case of international repute, best known as the "Becker" case, included the successful "raising" of a check by chemical means from $12 to $22,000. The criminal author of this stupendous fraud was Charles Becker, "king of forgers," who as an all round imitator of any writing and manipulator of monetary instruments then stood at the head of his "profession." Arrested and taken to San Francisco he was brought to trial. Two of his "pals" turned state's evidence, and Becker was sentenced to a life term. Through an error on the part of the trial judge he secured a new trial on an appeal to the Supreme Court. The jury disagreed on a second trial, but on the third trial he was convicted. Becker pleaded for mercy, and as he was an old man and showed signs of physical break-down, the court was lenient with him. Seven years was his sentence.