Modern shipbuilding and the men engaged in it

by David Pollock

The foregoing indicates the way in which minute water-tight sub-division has come to be widely regarded. Much requires yet to be done to reach the end desirable, as there are many vessels built prior to the movement sadly deficient in the qualities concerned. The bulkhead near the bow—the “collision” bulkhead, as it is termed—has done noble service in many cases of collision, and it is with reason that its position and structural character in all vessels are subject to special supervision and made a condition of classification in the Registries. Recently it has been made imperative by Lloyd’s Society that vessels over 330 feet long should have two additional water-tight bulkheads extending to the upper deck, in the holds, forward and aft of the machinery compartment. The requirements of this Registry, it may be said, constitute at once an anticipation and a reflex of the needs of merchant ship construction. In water-tight sub-division, as in other matters, the Society and its large staff of able surveyors are “powers which make for” sterling efficiency.

The extended adoption of double bottoms is specially contributory to the safety of vessels in the event of their running over a reef into deep water, or in going ashore. Numerous instances are on record of steamships so constructed sustaining damage to the outer skin, and yet—because of the inner bottom remaining intact and perfectly water-tight—no serious damage resulting. The case of the Great Eastern is an early yet notable example. This great vessel in 1860 ran over a reef of rocks and tore a hole 80 feet long and 10 feet wide in her outer skin, yet, because of this feature in her construction, she was placed in no jeopardy.

In this connection it would seem that even the employment of steel as the constructive material affords safety to a vessel in circumstances which would almost prove fatal to a ship built of iron. The remarkable experience which befell the first steel ocean-going steamer—the Rotomahana, belonging to the Union Steamship Company of New Zealand—may here be recounted. While steaming between Auckland and the Great Barrier Island on New-Year’s-Day, 1880, this vessel struck upon and ran over a sunken rock. She had a large party of pleasure seekers on board, and but for the fact that she was built of such a ductile material as mild steel, the commencement of the year 1880 might have been clouded by a catastrophe which would have spread gloom and sorrow throughout New Zealand, if not over a wider circle. At the earliest possible moment the damaged vessel was docked for examination. The results are effectively summarised in an extract from a letter referring to the accident, written by the managing director of the Company. He says:—“This experience has clearly shown the immense superiority of steel over iron. There is no doubt that had the Rotomahana been of iron, such a rent would have been made in her, that she would have filled in a few minutes.” The starboard bilge for over 20 feet of its length was more or less indented, one plate especially being greatly misshapen between two frames. This plate was removed, hammered, rolled flat again, and replaced—after the frames which had been bent inwards by the force of the grounding had been straightened. No new material except rivets were required for the execution of the repairs. The Rotomahana, as if to show her ability to “laugh at all disasters,” has grounded twice subsequently on the rocky and treacherous coast along which she plies, yet has come out of the ordeal with immunity from positive danger. Her remarkable experience may safely be taken as most convincing evidence of the suitability of mild steel for shipbuilding. Other cases are not wanting, however, in which the same thing is exemplified. One which recently astonished everybody concerned with shipping was that of the Duke of Westminster, a vessel 400 feet in length, built of mild steel by the Barrow Shipbuilding Coy., which lay bumping for a week on stony ground near the Isle of Wight, without making a drop of water. The bottom plating of the Duke of Westminster, as she appeared in dry dock, was corrugated between the frames for more than half the length of the vessel, and yet not a single plate was cracked, nor a rivet started. Another case of an equally striking character is that of the British India Coy.’s steamer India, built by Messrs Denny, of Dumbarton, which went ashore near the mouth of the Thames in December, 1881, and was left high and dry at low water. Her bottom, although forced up about 3 inches over a length of about 40 feet amidships, did not give way, and the vessel, during the period she was aground, did not make a drop of water.

All these are instances of the enhanced safety of ships due to the employment of steel, which ought certainly to be recognised by underwriters in the way of reduced premiums for vessels constructed of this material. One consideration which, it is both curious and sad to say, militates against this result, and which, judging from views entertained by shipowners themselves, stands in the way of the employment of steel, is not its inability but its very efficiency to withstand the results of grounding or other catastrophe. It is argued that while the effects of grounding are less severe in the case of steel, and do not result in fracture or through-piercing because of its great ductility, yet the amount of damage requiring repair is invariably much greater than in the case of iron. This view of the matter—which virtually places pounds, shillings, and pence before the comfort, if not the very lives, of those on board ship—the author feels bound to say, is not, so far as he knows, shared by owners of ships engaged in mail and passenger service, and it cannot surely be entertained by underwriters of any proper discernment.

Safety in ocean steamships, in so far as affected by design, has unquestionably received greater attention at the hands of designers within recent years than formerly. The particular directions in which this is evinced, as well as the causes at work in bringing it about, will be dealt with in the chapter on scientific progress, the object here being to indicate the extent to which the safety of ships is affected by the qualities of their construction and outfit. The general question of seaworthiness, affected as it is by matters almost beyond the province of the marine architect, is in great measure the care of others concerned. The underwriting or insurance societies looking to their own interests, the Board of Trade on behalf of the lieges, and shipowners on their own and their customers’ and servants’ account, are parties on whom responsibility devolves in this connection. The question whether they are duly, and at all times alive to such responsibility, is one very difficult to answer, and cannot be fully dealt with here. Apart from the question of remissness by these bodies, in what are clearly their special duties, there is great difficulty in apportioning the duties and responsibility aright. The Board of Trade have not infrequently received checks when with precautionary motives they have interfered with departments and in matters but little affecting a vessel’s seaworthiness. The conflict which has so long raged and still rages between the Board and the shipowners of Britain regarding the loading of vessels, illustrates, and is indeed the result of, both difficulties. The Merchant Shipping Bill, introduced by Mr Chamberlain, and in a modified form now before Parliament, will, it is hoped, furnish a satisfactory solution of the matter. Shipowners themselves have too often insisted on exercising functions and dictating in matters which only may be determined with propriety and safety by builders or by competent naval architects.

The amount of thorough supervision to which a vessel is subjected while under construction, renders the fear of unseaworthiness, from either defective construction or equipment, the least reasonable of all the fears with which ocean navigation is regarded. It is in later circumstances, and concerning matters of a more extraneous character, that the most justifiable fears may be entertained regarding a vessel’s safety. Overloading, improper stowage, bad management, under-manning, insufficient repair, besides the numerous inevitable and unforeseen circumstances incidental to sea-voyaging, may be instanced as the causes to which the greatest losses are attributable.[4] Few instances of loss from structural defects are adduceable, and even in these, causes of a more or less extraneous character are associated with the loss. On the other hand, instances could be multiplied where vessels sustaining the casualties which rough weather or rank carelessness make always imminent have come out of the ordeal with credit to the constructors. One notable case may be instanced. The Arizona, of the Guion Line, some time after being put on the Atlantic service, while steaming at a speed of 14 knots, and almost in mid-Atlantic, ran into an iceberg of gigantic dimensions, and notwithstanding that the force of the concussion smashed her bows for a length of 20 feet into an unrecognisable mass, she kept afloat, and reached a port of safety.

Where, as has already been indicated, there is such close oversight and thorough supervision—where, indeed, the real interests of every party honestly concerned lie so clearly in the high qualities of construction—nothing short of such results as the foregoing should be expected. The insurance companies, on whom the burden (monetary at least) of loss at sea ultimately falls, see it their interest to know that those registration societies, on whom they rely for guarantee as to a vessel’s structural and general efficiency, are themselves efficient and trustworthy authorities. These societies, known as Lloyd’s, Liverpool Underwriters, and Bureau Veritas, Registries, in spite of the dread as to business rivalry affecting injuriously their standards of classification, have still a high criterion, and enjoy the confidence of insurance societies and shipowners alike.

Shipowners themselves, notwithstanding some examples to the contrary, are, and have always been, anxious and painstaking seekers after thoroughness; not merely mercenary grubs, sacrificing considerations of safety to features promising exemption from tonnage or other registration dues, and perhaps the extinction of a rival. Some of the best British vessels, notably those of the Cunard Line, are unclassed at the registries, but have been built under private survey. The well known boast of the Cunard Company that not a single life has been lost by mishap at sea during their long and extensive service, is eloquent testimony to the care exercised in the construction and management of ships. It is the practice of some companies to effect classification in two, sometimes three, separate registries, and the number of inspectors employed to superintend the work of construction, over and above the surveyors of the registries and the overseers of the firms, is in some instances astonishing. The crowning case of all is that of the building firms themselves—many shipbuilders unquestionably being conscientious and thorough to a degree which simply mocks this great array of supervision.

In the outfit of vessels correspondingly close attention is paid to those features, fixed or portable, which contribute to the safety of the ship and the welfare of passengers. The universal adoption of steam winches for working cargo enables the pumps communicating with the holds to be wrought by steam, through levers attached to the barrel ends of the winches. Special donkey-engine pumps, in addition, are now employed in all the higher class vessels, and automatic means of registering the quantity of water in the holds are beginning to be introduced. Provision against outbreaks of fire, no less than against foundering, has been receiving greater attention than formerly. Many of the first-class mail steamships are fitted with fire-pipes leading to every compartment, and which convey at the turning of a valve a charge of steam sufficient to extinguish the most serious outbreak. Lowering and detaching gear for life-boats is now a necessary part of every first-class steamer’s equipment. Over a dozen different apparatuses for effecting this very important purpose are at present in the market, some of which are admirably adapted for safe and speedy working, even in the hurry and panic which too often accompanies cases of shipwreck.

Important as these devices are for saving life and property in event of casualty, the appliances which contribute to the prevention of casualty at all, are perhaps more so. This is a gradually increasing and improving element in ships’ outfit. Conspicuous among this class of articles are navigational instruments, and of these perhaps the most noteworthy are the instruments with which the name of Sir William Thomson is associated, although many others, in use or awaiting adoption, and designed for equally important purposes, might be referred to, did space permit.