Curves showing the annual aggregate tonnage of new shipping produced in the principal shipbuilding districts since 1860.

TABLE OF YEARLY TONNAGE
YearsClydeTyneWear
Ton’ageTon’ageTon’age
1860 47,80040,200
1861 66,80046,800
1862 69,90056,900
1863123,30070,000
1864178,50072,000
1865154,00073,100
1866124,50062,700
1867108,00052,200
1868169,60070,300
1869192,30072,400
1870180,40070,100
1871196,30081,900
1872230,300131,800
1873232,90099,400
1874262,40088,000
1875211,80079,900
1876174,80054,100
1877169,70087,600
1878222,300126,300109,900
1879174,800139,80092,200
1880248,700149,100116,200
1881341,000177,200148,000
1882391,900208,400212,500
1883419,600216,600212,300

With the year just spoken of a first and very considerable rise in the tonnage output set in and continued till the year 1864, in which year it amounted to 178,500 tons. Various causes of an exceptional nature, or at least, causes apart from the natural progress due to the growth of shipping, were at work in bringing about this increase in the output. The most prominent of these was the necessity which arose for filling up the gaps produced by the withdrawal of many swift steamers from the river and coasting trade to meet the requirements of individuals interested in running the blockade of the ports of the Southern States of America. Between Aprils 1862-3 alone, as many as 30 vessels actively connected in some way with the Clyde and coasting service, were sold for that purpose, and the replacement of these vessels went a considerable way in occasioning the briskness. Another and more abiding cause, however, was the demand for vessels for the cotton-carrying trade. This arose chiefly from the blockade of the American ports, causing cotton to come right from the East Indies and China; and in consequence of the longer voyage many more ships were necessary to carry on the trade. The fact that more than an average number of wrecks had occurred during the two previous winters, together with an increase of the trade between Britain and France as the result of Mr Cobden’s commercial treaty, were elements lending impetus to the briskness in the shipbuilding of the time.

In 1865 the output of tonnage was lessened considerably through what appears to have been but the natural course of commerce in its reactionary stage. This lessened activity was much aggravated when 1866 was reached, and in that year a serious interruption to the trade was caused by a lock-out of the workmen consequent on a partial strike made to enforce what the employers considered an unreasonable demand on the part of the men. In 1867 the output was as low as 108,000 tons, but thereafter it took an upward tendency, its rise to the previous level being sudden, but thereafter very gradual, and spread over a number of years. The output kept steadily improving each year, outreaching former totals, until in 1874 the curve, or, as it may be called, the output wave, formed a crest of exceptional altitude. For that year the aggregate output reached the unprecedented figure of 262,430 tons, a result which made natural all subsequent references to 1874 as the “big year.” The year 1875, although showing an increase in the number of vessels built, yet fell considerably short of 1874 in the matter of tonnage, thus giving to the output curve a decided downward turn. Matters continued to grow worse during 1876, and many of the Clyde firms had painful experiences of “bare poles” until about the beginning of the year 1877, when a slightly improved state of matters set in. Then there was a general desire amongst the workmen for an advance in wages, which ultimately resulted in the great shipwright strike of midsummer, 1877. This strike, it may be remembered, lasted twenty-four weeks, and was one of the most determined struggles which ever took place in this country, both parties having evidently made up their minds to hold out to the last. The strike culminated in the general lock-out of workmen in the autumn of the same year, which, when withdrawn in favour of arbitration as regards the shipwrights, settled down into a keen fight with the ironworkers. The shipwrights’ claim was settled by arbitration, the umpire (Lord Moncrieff) deciding in favour of the employers, and the men accordingly resumed work. The ironworkers’ dispute was likewise a difficult matter to decide, but ultimately the men resumed work on the understanding that their claim for an advance upon their wages of 10 per cent. would be considered six months subsequently. The struggles were exceedingly costly alike to masters and workmen, one of the results being seen pretty distinctly in the diminished output of tonnage during 1877.

About the spring of 1878 matters had not improved in any very material sense; and the ironworkers insisting on a settlement of their former claim for an advance, were met by the employers with a proposal to increase the working hours from 51 per week, as arranged in 1872, to 54 hours per week, or to reduce the then rate of wages. The men were not unnaturally averse to the increase of working hours, and signified their opposition. Subsequently a reduction in wages of 7½ per cent. was enforced, with the result that the ironworkers came out on strike for a time. Ultimately in the spring of 1879 a return to the 54 hours was made. The prevailing great depression continued well on into the autumn of 1879. In October of that year the shipbuilding industry experienced an unexpected but very welcome revival, and an unusually large amount of work came to the Clyde. The output which in 1879 had fallen to 174,800 tons, now took a sudden and remarkable jump, the figure for 1880 amounting to no less than 248,650 tons, affording ample grounds for the belief that the impetus at the close of 1879 was no mere temporary spurt, but a solid revival. Subsequent experience has more than justified this belief. In 1881 the output reached the aggregate of 341,000 tons, in 1882 it overstepped even this, and the output curve continued in the ascendant until for the year 1883 the stupendous aggregate of 419,600 tons was reached. Following the course which accepted theories regarding industrial activity and depression suggest, and which actual experience in the past exemplifies, the curve of output ought still to be in the ascendant, reaching its maximum in 1884, and thereafter declining. Although the close of the year is still some distance off, there is already ample reason to believe that this will not hold good for 1884. This result is after all only very natural when the most exceptional activity of the past four years, coupled with the present very unhealthy state of the shipping trade, are taken into consideration.


The history of iron shipbuilding on the North-East Coast district does not commence until the year 1840. In March of that year the John Garrow, of Liverpool, a vessel of 800 tons burthen, the first iron ship seen in the North-East Coast rivers, arrived at Shields, and caused considerable excitement. A shipbuilding firm at Walker commenced to use the new material almost immediately, and on the 23rd of September, 1842, the iron steamer Prince Albert glided from Walker Slipway into the waters of the Tyne.

During the next eight or ten years very little progress was made, the vessels mostly in demand being colliers, in the construction of which no one thought of applying iron. About the year 1850, the carriage of coal by railway began seriously to affect the sale of north country coal in the London market, and it became essential, in the interest of the coal-owners and others, to devise some means of conveying the staple produce of the North Country to London in an expeditious, regular, and, at the same time, economical manner. To accomplish this object, Mr C. M. Palmer caused an iron screw-steamer to be designed in such a manner as to secure the greatest possible capacity, with engines only sufficiently powerful to ensure her making her voyages with regularity. This vessel (the John Bowes), the first screw collier, was built to carry 650 tons, and to steam about nine miles an hour. On her first voyage, she was laden with 650 tons of coals in four hours; in forty-eight hours she arrived in London; in twenty-four hours she discharged her cargo; and in forty-eight hours more she was again in the Tyne; so that, in five days, she performed successfully an amount of work that would have taken two average-sized sailing colliers upwards of a month to accomplish. To the success of this experiment may be attributed, in great measure, the subsequent and rapid development of iron shipbuilding in the Tyne and East Coast district. The district has maintained by far the largest share—almost amounting to a monopoly—in the production of the heavy-carrying, slow-speed type of cargo steamers, of which the John Bowes may be said to have been the prototype.

Statistics for the Tyne, as already explained, are not available to any extent until within recent years,[33] but from a paper on “The Construction of Iron Ships and the Progress of Iron Shipbuilding on the Tyne, Wear, and Tees,” written by Mr C. M. Palmer, and forming part of the work, “The Industrial Resources of the Tyne, Wear, and Tees,” published in connection with the British Association’s visit to Newcastle in 1863, it appears that the tonnage of iron ships launched from the Tyne during 1862 amounted to 32,175 tons, and during 1863, to 51,236 tons. Comparing this with the output for 1883—twenty years later—it is found that the figures are more than quadrupled, for in that year the output of the Tyne reached as much as 216,600 tons.

In the year following the launch of the John Bowes, namely, in 1853, the first iron vessel built on the Wear, was released from its blocks. The Tees followed the example with great energy and considerable success, and on both these rivers trade in iron shipbuilding has been correspondingly developed.