McCulloch[213] has a short review of your book in the last Scotsman; it is chiefly on the subject of value; he differs from you but does so with the greatest civility and good humour. Torrens has an interest in (I believe he is editor of) the Traveller[214], and as his arguments are on my side, I of course think his criticism just....
Believe me, ever truly yours,
David Ricardo.
LXXII[215].
Gatcomb Park, Sept. 4, 1820.
My dear Malthus,
I was very desirous of hearing from you, and was on the point of telling you so when your letter reached me from Brighton. Mr. Hump[hre]y Austin, a neighbour of mine, told me he saw you at Paris and I had heard of your safe arrival in England. I am quite pleased to hear that your journey has been agreeable to you; it could not fail to be so when it gave you the opportunity of seeing and conversing with the principal literary men of France and of hearing their opinions on the present state of that important country. I hope in that quarter there will be no interruption of the present order of things for some time to come; but, if they do make a movement, I trust it will be for the purpose of securing more effectually the liberty of the people by perfecting as far as human means can perfect the representative system. There is nothing on which the happiness of the great body of the people so much depends. I did not expect that I had so many readers in France as the number of copies of the French translation which you tell me have been sold would seem to imply. I am not surprised that you found few who understood my theory correctly and still fewer who were disposed to agree with me. I have not yet succeeded in making many converts in my own country; but I do not despair of seeing the number increase; the few I have are of the proper description, and do not want zeal for the propagation of the true faith.
I have seen Say's letters to you[216]; it appears to me that he has said a great deal for the right cause but not all that could be said. In one point I think he falls into the same error as Torrens in his article in the Edinburgh Review[217]. They both appear to think that stagnation in commerce arises from a counter set of commodities not being produced without which the commodities on sale are to be purchased, and they seem to infer that the evil will not be removed till such other commodities are in the market. But surely the true remedy is in regulating future production; if there is a glut of one commodity, produce less of that and more of another, but do not let the glut continue till the purchaser chooses[218] to produce the commodity which is more wanted. I am not convinced by anything Say says of me; he does not understand me and is frequently at variance with himself, when value is the subject he treats of. In his 4th edition[219], vol. ii, page 36, he says everything falls in value, as the quantity is increased, by the facility of production. Now suppose that you have to pay for what he calls 'services productifs' in these commodities which have so fallen in value, will you give the same value if you give for them the same quantity of commodities as before? Certainly not, according to his own admission; and yet he maintains, page 33, that productive services have not varied if they receive the same quantity of a commodity, notwithstanding the cost of production of that commodity may have fallen from 40 to 30 francs per ell. He has two opposite notions about value, and I am sure to be wrong if I differ with either of them[220].
I am sorry that the government of France is prejudiced against Political Economy. Whatever differences of opinion may exist amongst writers on that science, they are nevertheless agreed upon many important principles, which are proved to demonstration. By an adherence to these, governments cannot fail to promote the welfare of the people who are submitted to their sway. What more clear than the advantages which follow from freedom of trade, or than the evils resulting from holding out any peculiar encouragement to population?
I have been reading your book a second time with great attention, but my difference with you remains as firmly rooted as ever. Some of the objections you make to me are merely verbal; no principle is involved in them; the great and leading point in which I think you fundamentally wrong is that which Say has attacked in his letters. On this I feel no sort of doubt. With respect to the word value, you have defined it one way, I another. We do not appear to mean the same thing, and we should first agree what a standard ought to be and then examine which approaches nearest to an invariable standard, the one you propose, or that which I propose.