Vienna, 15 miles from Alexandria.
The entire army now fell back to the fortifications around Alexandria. The Thirty-third left the front about seven o’clock Monday evening, halting at two o’clock on the following morning, one mile west of Fairfax Court House. The roads were full of troops and wagon trains, and the night was intensely dark, which added to the confusion. After sleeping two hours, the Division again moved back to the front, and constituted the rear guard of the retreating forces. About ten o’clock it was withdrawn and proceeded towards Alexandria, reaching the old camping ground at ten o’clock in the evening.
So ended the second series of Bull Run engagements. Owing to the timidity and lack of confidence in the people, which have led the military authorities at Washington, from the commencement of the war, to withhold unfavorable intelligence, the country has never comprehended the extent of the disaster which resulted from this week of battles. Our arms unquestionably suffered the severest reverse which has yet befallen them. In addition to the loss of seventy-five cannon and large quantities of small arms, equipments, supplies, etc., there must have been fully twenty thousand Federal troops killed, wounded and taken prisoners.
Neither has the country comprehended the rightful causes of this disaster. We believe that it was occasioned solely by the jealousy of military officers, and not through incapacity on the part of Gen. Pope. No sooner was he appointed to the command of the Army of Virginia, and large forces placed under him, than an emulous spirit manifested itself among the Generals of the Army of the Peninsula. When he issued the injudicious address to his troops, announcing that his headquarters were to be in the saddle, and that they were not to be employed in seeking out lines of retreat, this spirit was still further developed. Finally, when the Peninsular forces were recalled to the capital and placed under Pope, and Gen. McClellan left in command of the fortifications simply, several of his Generals deliberately, we believe, plotted the new leader’s ruin. Gen. Porter was unquestionably the most guilty one of the number, and merited a severer punishment than has been meted out to him. This was the general opinion entertained in the army, outside of his own Corps. However much they loved and admired Gen. McClellan, the troops came to regard his pet, Gen. Fitz-John Porter, with distrust and suspicion. Had he obeyed orders, Gen. Pope informs us that the enemy would have been completely routed.
No satisfactory reasons have ever been given for the late advance and slow march of Gen. Franklin’s Corps from Alexandria to the scene of operations, when it was so much needed. The fact of his never having been called to account for it, is, however, sufficient reason for asserting that Gen. Franklin was not responsible for the delay. He was too much of a patriot, too much of a soldier, to be guilty of any machinations against a brother officer and his country. Great injustice has been done him by associating his name with Gen. Porter’s.
The conduct and correspondence of Gen. McClellan all go to prove that he neither shared in nor countenanced that spirit of rivalry which cost the country so much blood and treasure. Gen. Pope’s plans were well conceived, and if they had been carried out, would doubtless have resulted in a substantial victory. However questionable his veracity, we cannot withhold from him the meed of having displayed good generalship in the East as well as in the West.
CHAPTER XIX.
General McClellan Restored to Command.—Re-organization of the Army.—Advance of the Enemy into Maryland.—March from Washington.—Battle of Crampton’s Pass.—Harper’s Ferry Surrendered.