The scenes of that night vividly recalled the memories of the seven days’ retreat on the Peninsula. Though no panic prevailed, there was the utmost confusion. Owing to the darkness and the large number of wounded, and immense amount of war materiel which had to be conveyed over, many of the wounded were left where they fell during the battle, it being impossible to bring them away. This was the case with most of those belonging to the Thirty-third. Lieut. Rossiter died in the hands of the enemy. By morning the entire Corps was safely over, and encamped along the flats on the opposite side. The Thirty-third crossed the bridge about 8 o’clock, A. M.
The next morning the rebels commenced shelling the troops from the west bank, which caused them to draw back immediately from the river. Brooks’ and Newton’s Divisions moved a few miles to the northward, Howe’s remaining in the vicinity. During the following night the main army re-crossed above, under cover of a fierce storm. Wednesday and Thursday were spent in getting back to Falmouth. Howe’s Division returned to White-Oak Church during Friday, now for the third time.
The Thirty-third encamped in a field about three-quarters of a mile from its former position. It was a sad sight, those thin and decimated ranks; of five hundred and fifty brave men, who two weeks before marched out to meet the enemy, less than three hundred now returned.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
Gen. Stoneman’s Expedition Successful.—Reasons for the Campaign proving a Failure.—Death of Jackson.—His Character.—Gen. Neill’s Report.
Gen. Stoneman fully accomplished the object of his expedition by destroying the railroad bridge, but owing to the defeat of the army, no material advantage resulted from his labors.
So terminated the second bloody campaign of the Rappahannock. The reader who has followed us through the various operations, will readily fix upon two main circumstances, as contributing to our defeat—the breaking of the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville, and the failure to take possession of the upper range of hills at the left of Fredericksburg. Gen. Hooker had succeeded admirably in getting the main portion of the army in the rear of the enemy. He had chosen a good position, and skilfully posted his troops. All was going well until the giving away of the Eleventh Corps let Jackson, with forty thousand men, upon his right flank. He was thenceforward compelled to act upon the defensive. Sedgwick was now brought forward upon the board, and assigned the duty of restoring, at least, equilibrium to the contest, by a bold, fearless move. If unsuccessful, the entire army must rapidly retreat across the Rappahannock. If successful, the fortunes of the campaign would be retrieved, and Lee ground to atoms between the upper and nether millstone, or forced to “ingloriously fly” towards Richmond. The Heights were victoriously stormed, and all was well with Sedgwick. But now comes the terrible blunder which decides the contest, the neglect to occupy the upper ridge.
If, says Victor Hugo, Bulow, Blucher’s Lieutenant, had debouched from the forest above Freschemont, instead of pursuing the route he did, the form of the nineteenth century would have been different. If Sedgwick had debouched from the Heights above Fredericksburg to the ridge at the left, instead of pushing on towards Chancellorsville, the enemy would have been hemmed in, and the bloody battle of Gettysburg never have been fought; or if a single battery of heavy guns had been left to command the road leading down from the ridge and the ravine through which the flanking force had to pass, in order to reach Marye’s Heights, the tables would not have been turned, and Sedgwick instead of Lee compelled to fight one way and face another.
Our losses during the seven days’ campaign were not far from sixteen thousand, or four thousand more than those incurred in the December struggle. Of this number, more than five thousand came from the Sixth Army Corps.