A Short History of the Fatimid Khalifate

by De Lacy O'Leary

In 395 the old penal laws dating from the year 36 were re-enforced against Christians and Jews. Both were required to wear a distinctive dress, the Christians to have turbans of black or dark blue, a custom which the Christians seem to have adopted voluntarily in the first place, and which the Coptic clergy retain to the present day, the Jews to wear yellow turbans: the women of both religions were forbidden to wear the waist sash which was a characteristic part of female attire, and the men were required to adopt it. At the same time it was forbidden to sell slaves to Christians or Jews.

The citizens of Fustat, sorely tried by the scarcity and dearness of food resulting from the bad Niles, groaned in secret over the caprices and severities of their ruler, but did not yet venture to express their dissatisfaction openly. It was otherwise with the free Arab tribes settled in the country, and in 395 the B. Qorra in Lower Egypt broke out in open rebellion. Al-Hakim had no great trouble in punishing these rebels but his severity in doing so, although it checked the movement, only left them ready to take up arms again on a more promising opportunity, and for this they had not long to wait.

A serious revolt took place in North Africa in 396, which before long seemed to threaten the very existence of the Fatimid Khalifate. In its first inception this revolt connected with far off Spain. There the Umayyads had been reigning since 138, but were now in their decline. The supreme power at this time had passed into the hands of the Wazir Mansur ibn Abi ʿAmir, who treated the Khalif of Cordova very much in the same way as Kafur had treated the later Ikhshids, but, more cruel and unscrupulous, was steadily getting rid of every one who stood in the way of his ambition. Many of the Umayyad kindred were put to death, whilst others left the country. Amongst these latter was one commonly known as Abu Raqwa, “the man with the leather bottle,” because he carried a bottle like that used by the travelling darwishes. As a darwish he journeyed to Egypt, thence to Mecca, Yemen, and Syria, everywhere observing the possibilities of forming a party to support the claims of the Umayyad family and the evidences of discontent and probabilities of stirring up civil strife. In all his wanderings, however, he met with no success: the Umayyads had long passed out of the main current of Islamic life, and it did not seem that their name could anywhere be used as a rallying cry for the dissatisfied; there was no religious attachment to the Umayyads like there was to the ʿAlids. At last he came back to Egypt at the time when the B. Qorra were smarting under the severe chastisement they had received from Hakim, and this seemed to him to offer some promise. Passing westwards he took refuge amongst the Berber tribe of Zanata where he obtained great esteem for his piety, acting as Imam in the services of the mosque and teaching the Qurʾan to the children. It is perhaps as well to note that “Imam” in this connection means no more than customary leader in prayer; it has nothing in common with the “Imam” as understood by the Shiʿites, save that both imply the general idea of religious teacher. At length he managed to get a following, and proclaimed himself as Emir under the title of “he who is sent by the order of God” and “he who has victory over the enemies of God,” both titles common enough amongst the Shiʿites but strange as applied to an Umayyad. His supporters were chiefly drawn from the Zanata, but before long he was joined also by other Berber tribes and by the B. Qorra.

At the head of a considerable army of the usual undisciplined Berber type Abu Raqwa advanced eastwards and took Barqa where he was careful to prevent all pillage and violence, and thus proclaimed that he was not a mere leader of tribes on the war path, but aimed at establishing an orderly government. At the fall of Barqa Hakim saw that the rebellion had to be taken seriously, and sent out an army under the command of Inal. This Egyptian force had to cross a considerable stretch of desert before it could reach Barqa, and Abu Raqwa sent a rapidly moving body of cavalry across the route to fill in the wells, and then waited at the end furthest from Egypt. At length Inal’s force appeared, exhausted and thirsty from its desert march, and the engagement which followed left the advantage with Abu Raqwa. Before the action commenced a number of the Katama tribesmen serving with the Egyptians deserted and joined the enemy, induced to do so by disgust with the conduct and now notorious cruelties of Hakim. When they presented themselves before Abu Raqwa their first act was to intercede with him on behalf of their fellow tribesmen still serving in the Fatimid army, and as he promised them a favourable reception they called out to them and they deserted also. After this Abu Raqwa joined battle and inflicted a serious defeat on Inal. The news of this disaster caused great alarm in Cairo; there was an immediate rise in the prices of provisions, and preparations were made for another expedition to North Africa.

After his success Abu Raqwa made his residence at Barqa and seemed disposed to establish a kingdom in Ifrikiya. Before long, however, he received letters from several leading men in Egypt, including Husayn b. Jawhar who was Hakim’s Commander-in-Chief, begging him to invade Egypt and assuring him of a welcome and substantial support. This, more than anything else, shows to what an extent the strange conduct of Hakim had now alienated his subjects and even those who, like Husayn, were his chief ministers and were, or had been, his personal friends. If we suppose that, by this time, Hakim had given unmistakable signs of disordered intellect we shall find in that a reasonable explanation of the desire for some one to come and deliver the country from what threatened to be a serious danger.

In response to this invitation Abu Raqwa started his advance into Egypt. The news of his undertaking threw the country into great alarm. The Druze books describe Hakim himself as completely unmoved, but other writers speak of him as seriously frightened and even planning to retire to Syria if all came to the worst. Meanwhile he sent to Syria for the Hamdanid armies, and put the general Fadi b. Salih in command of the native forces. With these Syrians and such other levies as he could raise Fadl went out and encamped at Gizeh, waiting for the invaders. At their arrival Fadl did not give battle, but manoeuvred so as to evade them, and by his position at Gizeh prevented them from being able to make a crossing of the river as that would have exposed them to his attack whilst going across. Meanwhile he managed to open up correspondence with some of the subordinate officers, amongst them with a certain captain of the B. Qorra named Mahdi, who agreed to keep him informed of all Abu Raqwa’s plans. After some delay the invaders advanced direct upon the Fatimid general who was unable to evade the movement, and so an engagement was forced near Kum Sharik. It was not decisive, but it was very severe, and caused Fadl to determine not to give battle again if he could possibly avoid doing so. Owing to his severe losses he was compelled to retire, but still lay between Abu Raqwa and the river so as to be able to make a flank attack if the Berbers tried to cross.

Abu Raqwa and his men, however, were perfectly confident that success was assured, and made plans for their future policy as conquerors. They decided to settle in Egypt and rule that country and the adjacent North Africa, leaving Syria to the Arabs. This scheme repeated the old plan of a purely Berber state in Africa with the Arabs excluded and sent back to their own country. Fadl received full information as to these projects. But there was treachery in his own army also: the Arab leaders brought from Syria had been tampered with by Abu Raqwa’s agents who tried to persuade them that they were making a mistake in fighting for the Fatimid state, and that it would be more satisfactory to divide its territories between them, the Africans under Abu Raqwa taking Egypt, the Asiatic Arabs taking Syria. It was agreed therefore that Abu Raqwa should make a night attack on Fadl’s army and, as soon as the attack commenced, the Syrian leaders were to march their men over to the enemy and thus an easy victory would be assured. But Fadl was fully informed of this plan, and the evening before the projected attack he invited the Arab leaders to dine with him. When the dinner was over and the guests wished to retire he detained them and, on one pretext or another, kept them near him until the enemy attacked. Even then he still detained them and sent orders to the Syrians to engage their opponents, and the Syrians, ignorant of the private plans of their leaders, did so. The followers of Abu Raqwa were surprised at the unexpected resistance and were finally driven off.

Meanwhile Hakim succeeded in raising reinforcements of 4,000 horsemen, which he tried to send across the river to Fadl. Abu Raqwa heard of this and determined to intercept them, setting out so quickly that Mahdi was unable to send a message to Fadl until he was already on the way. When the message reached Fadl it was too late, he could no longer get into a position to protect the new force from the fierce onset of the Berbers, and about a thousand of them were slain. The news of this misfortune, which Fadl contrived to conceal from his men for a time, caused great alarm in the city: the people were seized with panic, they feared an immediate assault, they were too much alarmed to remain in their houses and camped for the night in the streets.

Even yet the way to the river was not clear, for a considerable force remained ready to attack the Berbers if they tried to get down to the ford, and Abu Raqwa found it impossible to get to grips with them. So the Berbers were moved nearer and took up their position before the pyramids. Fadl followed at a distance. Then Abu Raqwa thought that he could force an engagement by leading him into an ambush. He passed on, therefore, towards the Fayyum, and at a place called Sabkha stationed a body of men in concealment and sent another company back towards Fadl. This body made a perfunctory attack and then turned to flight so as to draw the pursuers to the place of ambush. Unfortunately the whole plan had not been clearly explained to the men beforehand, and when those in ambush saw the others in flight they thought there had been a real defeat and, coming out of concealment, joined their retreat. This change in the arranged programme threw Abu Raqwa’s men into confusion, and Fadl profiting by the disorder fell upon them and inflicted a severe defeat. This took place on the 3rd of Dhu l-Hijja in 396. As a result Fadl was able to send to Cairo 6,000 heads of enemy slain and 100 prisoners.

This severe engagement was decisive, although Abu Raqwa himself escaped and fled, first to Upper Egypt, then to Nubia. Here he went to Hisnaljebel where the Nubian king lay ill, and pretended to be an ambassador sent by the Khalif Hakim. Owing to the king’s illness he was not able to see him and thus, ostensibly waiting for an interview, he was able to live for some time in security. Fadl had followed close behind to the Nubian frontier and managed to find out where he was. As soon as he knew this he sent a messenger to the governor of the palace informing him of the facts, and the governor had Abu Raqwa kept under close observation. In due course the king died and his son ordered the fugitive to be conducted across the frontier, and so he was taken across and conducted to Fadl’s camp. The Fatimid general received him with every courtesy and, fully supposing that Fadl’s conduct represented the attitude of the Khalif the prisoner, as he was in spite of polite treatment, wrote a letter to al-Hakim appealing to his generosity and begging that he might be pardoned for his rebellion with protestations of penitence.