The last year of the nineteenth century opened at a period of intense gloom for the British nation. The war in South Africa had found us, as most wars do, quite unprepared. The little force in Natal, under Sir George White, had been speedily surrounded by the mobile Boers, its line of communication had been cut, and it was itself shut up in an unfavourable position for defence at Ladysmith, and blockaded by a Boer force.
Large reinforcements were pouring into South Africa from England, and Sir Redvers Buller, who had arrived at Cape Town on 31st October to take supreme command, had gone to Natal. Here he made his first strategical mistake; and just as Sir George White, induced by political pressure, occupied positions in the extreme North of Natal, which he was not strong enough to hold, and had the consequences of this departure from sound strategy burnt into him by the siege of Ladysmith, so Sir Redvers Buller, moved by clamours for the relief of Ladysmith and Kimberley, divided his force, sending part under Lord Methuen to relieve Kimberley, and himself taking the remainder to relieve Ladysmith, and learned a similar lesson.
Such inattention to the very elements of strategy might have speedily led to overwhelming disaster and to the triumph of the Boer States, and would undoubtedly have done so, had the Boers possessed a general worthy of the name. With what surprise and satisfaction would such a commander have observed the disposition of the British force in the North of Natal, with what rapidity would he have masked Sir George White’s division, and, crossing the Tugela, seized the railway at its mouth, and, by the capture of Durban, have held Natal in the hollow of his hand! But, although the generalship of the Boers was hopelessly timid, and they lost the opportunity of carrying all before them at the outset, and driving the British into the sea, the neglect of sound strategy on our side made itself seriously felt, and it was not until Lord Roberts, at a later date, having collected and organised a large force, moved steadily on his objective—the capital of the Orange Free State—that either Kimberley or Ladysmith was relieved.
At the end of 1899 disaster after disaster had caused the public spirit at home to be much depressed, and men began to ask one another what was the reason. Was it the fault of our generals? or were the pluck and splendid bravery of our troops—so much in evidence—impotent, in these days of smokeless powder and quick-firing and long-range guns, against white men, equally well if not better armed, accustomed from their childhood to ride and shoot, stalk game, and avail themselves of cover, knowing the country and using every device to fight without endangering their own lives?
But to whatever depths the spirit of the nation sank at that terrible Christmas of 1899, however freely it was confessed that we had been too cocksure of success, had too much forgotten the God of battles, had despised our enemy, and arrogantly assumed that the war would be a walk-over; however much mothers and sisters, widows and orphans, plunged into saddest mourning by the losses under Lord Methuen at Belmont, Eslin, the Modder River, and Majesfontein, under Major-General Gatacre at Stormberg, and under Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso, might bewail their loved ones who had died for their country on the battlefield, there was a most notable, a most wonderful, self-control among the people generally. Subdued by a distinct sense of disappointment and humiliation as one disaster after another occurred, there was no hesitation, no acceptance of defeat, but a dogged determination that the war, being a righteous war, must at any sacrifice be carried to a victorious conclusion. The national honour had been wounded by the impudent invasion of British dominions beyond the seas, and that wound could only be healed by the complete subjugation of the invader. The galling remembrance of the disasters of the previous Boer war—never retrieved—of the overbearing insolence and ingratitude which had rewarded the pusillanimous policy of so-called magnanimity, had formed amongst all classes a determination that there must be no more Majuba treaties. Never again must a British defeat by Boers be allowed to conclude the matter, to rankle and fester in a way so difficult for a high-spirited people to bear, even when disguised under the name of magnanimity. Defeat must only mean renewed effort and determination to succeed. We were in the hands of God, but, so long as we could send out a man to fight, we were determined to go on, and, God willing, at whatever cost to end the matter, once for all, in such a way that our wounded honour should be healed, the susceptibilities of our invaded Colonies soothed, and the Boer taught to know his proper place, but as a member of a free and world-wide Empire and a subject of the Queen.
Such were the feelings of disappointment and sorrow, and yet of determination, by which the majority of people at home were animated when the last year of the nineteenth century commenced, and the successes of Major-General French at Colesberg, and of Colonel Pilcher at Douglas on New Year’s Day, cheered despondent hearts, and inspired a hope that the luck was about to turn.
At this time Lord Roberts, who, after the disasters of the first half of December 1899, had been sent out to take supreme command, was, with Lord Kitchener, still on the high seas; Lord Methuen was holding a position at the Modder River, waiting for reinforcements before taking further action; Sir Redvers Buller, after the failure of the attack on Colenso on 15th December 1899, had withdrawn his whole force (two divisions) to Chieveley, there to mature his plans for a second advance. Time was passing, Sir George White was hardly pressed in Ladysmith by the investing Boers, and the 5th Division, commanded by Sir Charles Warren, had not yet arrived at the Cape. Three days after the battle of Colenso Sir Redvers Buller had sent orders to the Cape that this division was to be sent on to him at once, and he awaited its arrival before making his next move.
It was no wonder then that, in the state of public feeling at home at this time, the chief interest centred in the Natal Field Force, and great expectations were formed of what Sir Redvers Buller, whose reputation as a man of exceptional power and ability stood high in the official world, would do when reinforced by the 5th Division under so capable a commander as Sir Charles Warren. This officer, as we have seen, had recently commanded the Thames District and had gained much experience in South African warfare twenty years previously, while some years later he was entrusted with the command of the Bechuanaland Expedition, and carried through the campaign so successfully that the Boers yielded all the main issues without fighting. When he was nominated to the command of the 5th Division in November every one rejoiced, wondering only that he had not been among the first generals to be sent out. When he landed with his division in Natal on the first day of the New Year, and by his seniority became second in command to Sir Redvers Buller, great hope was entertained that the combined wisdom of these two distinguished men would soon solve the difficulty of the relief of Ladysmith, and the operations immediately after his arrival were watched at home with hopeful if critical eyes.