The force thus placed under Sir Charles Warren’s command was hastily put together, and he could not even see them all before they started. The 5th Division had but recently arrived—some of the battalions having just landed from a long sea voyage—had been hurriedly mobilised, and was not acclimatised to the heat of Natal in midsummer. The 2nd Division had only just arrived from Chieveley and was unknown to General Warren until he met it on the line of march on 16th January, while the mounted troops he only saw in detail, as they did not join his command until the 17th of the month. No extra Staff was allotted to the force as a whole, and upon the Staff of the 5th Division were thrown the additional staff duties of the flying column, for no regimental officers were available, all being required with their units.
Sir Charles Warren was ordered to move as soon as supplies were all in and the 10th Brigade had removed from Springfield Bridge to Spearman’s Hill. He tells us in his despatch that he made his arrangements for getting supplies on 15th January, moved the 10th Brigade on the following day, and on the evening of that day left Springfield with a force under his command which amounted to an army corps (less one brigade), and by a night march arrived at Trichard’s Drift, and took possession of the hills on the south side of the Tugela river.
The officers detailed for intelligence were as yet all with Sir Redvers Buller, and therefore Sir Charles Warren, once he started, had to rely for local information entirely on the mounted troops not yet under his command. They had had only a short march, while the infantry marching from Springfield had had a very long day’s march. The cavalry should therefore have been able to carry out some reconnaissances, but no information could be obtained from them during the night. On the 17th they came under Sir Charles Warren’s command, and soon after reported that Wright’s farm was occupied by Boers. At dawn on the 17th Warren commenced throwing his pontoons across the Tugela at Trichard’s Drift; but the infantry, crossing by punts, first Major-General Woodgate’s brigade and then Major-General Hart’s, got across. Sir Redvers Buller was himself present in the middle of the day and addressed Major-General Woodgate’s brigade, giving also directions to that officer as to his attack. The mounted troops passed over principally by the drift, and went over the country as far as Acton Homes. By evening Major-Generals Woodgate and Hart had their brigades with a battery of artillery lining the crests of the foothills facing Spion Kop.
The crossing of the fifteen miles of wagons could not be carried out under thirty-six hours, and occupied the night of the 17th and the whole of 18th January. While this operation was in progress it was necessary to employ one brigade to protect the convoy to the south to prevent an incursion of Boers from Middle Drift, and two brigades to the front. A demonstration was also made by Major-General Lyttelton at Potgieter’s. By the evening of the 18th the passage of the river was successfully accomplished by the whole force with all its impedimenta.
The wagons, however, could not be kept in the hole where the crossing was effected, and orders were given that they should march on the following morning to Venter’s Laager, before the attack on the Rangeworthy hills was commenced. In the meantime the question of attacking the Boer positions in front of them was considered by Major-Generals Woodgate and Hart, who reported that it was too hazardous in the daytime.
During the afternoon of the 18th intelligence was received that a detachment of our mounted troops had had a successful engagement with a party of Boers at Acton Homes and that support was required. Sir Charles Warren sent on the whole of his remaining cavalry (300), and Major-General Hildyard’s brigade was ordered to march early the following morning. The engagement resulted in the capture of thirty-one Boers.
Sir Redvers Buller telegraphed to the Secretary of State for War on the 18th from Spearman’s Hill:
‘A battery of field artillery, howitzer battery, and Lyttelton’s brigade are across the Tugela River at Potgieter’s Drift. The enemy’s position is being bombarded by us. Five miles higher up Warren has crossed the river by a pontoon bridge, eighty-five yards long, and hopes that his force will, by this evening, have advanced five miles from the river. To his right front the enemy are busily intrenching.’