It must not, however, be supposed that Boers can fight only behind prepared trenches. They are experts at quickly raising up ‘schanzes,’ which they make in a few minutes, and they only construct regular trenches when they have considerable time at their disposal, or when there is no natural material lying handy on the ground. On Spion Kop, and to the west over the Rangeworthy hills and beyond, the Boers did not require trenches to make an effectual resistance. There was plenty of material to enable them to hold the crests of the hills against a far superior force; but they preferred to make their position almost impregnable by selecting continuous grassy slopes, over which an advance would be impracticable in daylight. From such positions nothing but artillery fire could drive them out.
CHAPTER III
ADVANCE TO VENTER’S LAAGER AND ATTACK OF THE RANGEWORTHY HILLS
At the end of Chapter II we left Sir Charles Warren across the Tugela with all his force, including his wagons, on the night of 18th January and ready to march to Venter’s Laager on the following morning.
As the wagons marched on the morning of the 19th in four or five parallel columns, in length about three miles or so, the brigades commanded by Major-Generals Hart and Woodgate also kept pace with them until opposite Fair View, where the right of the line was to rest in the attack of the Rangeworthy hills. The two brigades then occupied the slopes of the adjoining hills. This march was a very remarkable one, and it is to be doubted whether there is another instance on record of such a force, forming a length of three or four miles, with wagons four or five deep on the column’s reverse flank, being successfully led by a flank march right along the face of commanding hills held by an enemy strongly intrenched and provided with long-range guns, on a road just out of range of effective rifle fire, and with a rapid river on its reverse flank. It was in accordance with the instructions, but it was a most hazardous proceeding, and it was owing to the careful management of Sir Charles Warren, as well as the want of initiative or military instinct on the part of the Boer commander, that there was no disaster.
General Warren had reconnoitred the Fair View-Groote Hoek road, and found that it led within effective rifle range round the west flank of Spion Kop, and was therefore an undesirable road so long as Spion Kop was held by the enemy. He then crossed the Venter’s Spruit, near Venter’s Laager, and examined the other road by Acton Homes. He ascertained that it led through a strongly defended pass at the water-parting, and that on both sides it was held by the Boers, while it was twice the length of the first road. The length was the great defect. There was only one road leading to it, and the wagons could only go singly. The force could not possibly watch a front of fifteen miles occupied by the enemy. The result would be that each day’s march must be limited by the length of road that could be watched. The force was to be provisioned for only four days, and, even if everything went successfully, it would take three days to get from Venter’s Spruit by Acton Homes to the point near Groote Hoek. It was therefore evident that the road could not be used, even if it were not so strongly held by the enemy.
In the evening Sir Charles Warren assembled his General and Staff Officers and the Officers Commanding Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, and pointed out to them that there were only two roads by which the wheeled transport and guns could proceed: (1) by Acton Homes, and (2) north of Fair View by Rosalie or Groote Hoek. He informed them that he rejected the Acton Homes road because time would not allow of it, and his subordinate commanders concurred unanimously. He then pointed out that the only possible way of all getting through by the road north of Fair View would be by taking three or four days’ food in their haversacks and sending all their wagons back across the Tugela; but before this could be done the position in front of them must be captured.
Although Sir Redvers Buller does not mention in his despatches what information he possessed, either as to the routes to Ladysmith or as to the measures taken by the Boers to prevent them to him, he quotes incidentally, and in quite a different connection, the following message which Sir Charles Warren telegraphed to him the same evening: