Major-General Coke could hardly have left the summit at 6.30 P.M. when Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, as night was closing in, made up his mind that the hill was untenable. He sent the following message to Sir Charles Warren, which was not received that night:
‘The troops which marched up here last night are quite done up. They have had no water, and ammunition is running short. I consider that, even with the reinforcements which have arrived, it is impossible to permanently hold this place so long as the enemy’s guns can play on the hill. They have three long-range guns, three of shorter range, and several Maxim-Nordenfeldts, which have swept the whole of the plateau since 8 A.M. I have not been able to ascertain the casualties, but they have been very heavy, especially in the regiments which came up last night. I request instructions as to what course I am to adopt. The enemy are now firing heavily from both flanks, while a heavy rifle fire is being kept up in the front. It is all I can do to hold my own. If my casualties go on at the present rate I shall barely hold out the night. A large number of stretcher-bearers should be sent up, and also all the water possible. The situation is critical.’
But he did not wait for a reply. At the time he despatched this message the intention to abandon the position had already been taken, for at half-past six o’clock the companies of the Royal Lancaster Regiment were ordered to form up near the dressing station preparatory to retirement and Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft himself says in his report:
‘When night began to close in I determined to take some steps, and a consultation was held. The officer commanding Scottish Rifles and Colonel Crofton were both of opinion that the hill was untenable. I entirely agreed with their view, and so I gave the order for the troops to withdraw on to the neck and ridge where the hospital was.’
By seven o’clock orders were issued for the troops to retire on the Hospital Sangar, and the collecting of the men and bringing in of the wounded commenced. It is said that Colonel Hill had a warm discussion with Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, who, however, asserted his right as brigadier-general commanding on the summit to order a retirement. He neither sent word to Major-General Coke nor to Sir Charles Warren. Why Colonel Hill did not tell Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft that the former had only just left the hill remains unexplained.
At the time that Major-General Coke left his post in charge of his Staff Officer the preparations for retirement had been in full swing for three hours.
The first intimation that Captain Phillips, Major-General Coke’s Staff Officer, had of the retirement was being awakened at the command post by the sound of men moving at 11.30 P.M. He then found a general retirement proceeding. He at once stopped the flow of men down the hill—the Scottish Rifles and a large number of stragglers of the Dorset, Middlesex, and Imperial Light Infantry, whom he collected. The reserves—Bethune’s Mounted Infantry and the bulk of the Dorsets—remained in position as posted in support of the front line. The other corps had gone down the hill, and Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft with them. Captain Phillips promulgated the following memorandum to all commanders, but they did not act on it, urging that they had distinct orders from Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft:
‘Officers Commanding Dorsetshire and Middlesex Regiments, Scottish Rifles, Imperial Light Horse:
‘The withdrawal is absolutely without the authority of either Major-General Coke or Sir Charles Warren. The former was called away by the latter a little before 10 A.M. When General Coke left the front about 6 P.M. our men were holding their own, and he left the situation as such, and reported that he could hold on. Some one, without authority, has given orders to withdraw, and has incurred a grave responsibility. Were the General here, he would order an instant reoccupation of the heights.