On the 19th I ought to have assumed command myself; I saw that things were not going well—indeed, every one saw that. I blame myself now for not having done so. I did not, because I thought that if I did I should discredit General Warren in the estimation of the troops; and that if I were shot, and he had to withdraw across the Tugela, and they had lost confidence in him, the consequences might be very serious.
I must leave it to higher authority whether this argument was a sound one. Anyhow, I feel convinced that we had a good chance on the 17th, and that we lost it.
Redvers Buller, General.}}
E
From the General Officer Commanding, Natal,
to the Secretary of State for War
(By the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Cape Town)
Spearman’s Hill: 30th January, 1900.
Sir,—In forwarding Lieut.-General Sir C. Warren’s report on the capture and evacuation of Spion Kop, I have the honour to offer the following observations. {{The figures in my report refer to those in margin:—}}
1. Sir C. Warren is hardly correct in saying that he was only allowed 3½ days’ provisions. I had told him that transport for 3½ days would be sufficient burden to him, but that I would keep him filled up as he wanted it. That he was aware of this is shown by the following telegram which he sent on the day in question. It is the only report I had from Sir C. Warren:—