As the army prepared to move from Fort Cumberland, William Shirley, secretary to General Braddock, advised Governor Morris "we move from this place with 200 Waggons."[28] In many communications such as this there appears a certain looseness in reporting numbers in round figures, and also in using the words "waggons" or "carriages" in an all inclusive sense. It is obvious that such figures must often have included any wheeled vehicle, and sometimes even the gun carriages. Thus the figure 200 undoubtedly includes 145 Pennsylvania wagons,[29] plus a number of British Army wagons, tumbrils, and perhaps gun carriages. By Braddock's own count he had about 40 wagons over and above those he got from Pennsylvania;[30] how many of these were British wagons, tumbrils, or possibly a few of the wagons Gage had impressed on his march to Wills Creek, is unknown.[31]
From the beginning of the march, the roads were a challenge, for both Braddock's and Burd's roads presented what appeared to be unsurmountable obstacles. An examination of the terrain over which they had to pass causes far greater respect for these road builders and drivers than is usually accorded them. Orme again comes forward with the picture of their labors. Major Chapman had marched from Wills Creek at daybreak of May 30,[32] with the advance unit of the army and, says Orme, "it was night before the whole baggage had got over a mountain about two miles from the camp. The ascent and descent were almost a perpendicular rock; three waggons were entirely destroyed, which were replaced from the camp; and many more were extremely shattered."[33] Braddock went out from the fort and reconnoitered this section of road. Although 300 men and the company of miners had been working on the road for several days, the General "thought it impassable by howitzers," and was about to put another 300 to work when Lt. Spendelowe of the detachment of seamen informed him of an easier route he had found.[34] Thus the remainder of the wagons were spared the trip over the "perpendicular rock."
In addition to these difficulties of baggage movement, there was the unavoidable peril of losing horses, particularly at night. Orme gives the following description of the situation:[35]
Most of the horses which brought up the train were either lost, or carried home by their owners, the nature of the country making it impossible to avoid this fatal inconvenience, the whole being a continual forest for several hundred miles without inclosures or bounds by which horses can be secured: they must be turned into the woods for their subsistance, and feed upon leaves and young shoots of trees. Many projects, such as belts, hobles, &c., were tried, but none of these were a security against the wildness of the country and the knavery of the people we were obliged to employ: by these means we lost our horses almost as fast as we could collect them, and those which remained grew very weak, so we found ourselves every day less able to undertake the extra-ordinary march we were to perform.
Braddock soon appointed a Wagon Master General, and under him wagon masters, horse masters, and drovers. By his order, horses were to be mustered both morning and evening. When the men made camp, the wagons were to be drawn up in a single line along the road, with an interval between companies. The horses were then turned into the woods to feed, surrounded by a line of sentinels who were not to permit any horses to pass them.
By June 16, when the first brigade reached Little Meadows, Braddock realized that the advance of his column was being retarded and his troops weakened by the number of wagons in his train.[36] Washington, who had profited from his 1754 experiences in Pennsylvania, previously had recommended that Braddock use more pack horses and fewer wagons.[37] It became obvious that wagons, while ordinarily superior to pack animals, lost this advantage if the roads were not sufficiently opened to admit their easy passage. In view of this, Braddock decided to advance from Little Meadows with a picked detachment of 1,300 men and a minimum of wagons, about 30 in number, and to leave the heavier baggage with 84 wagons in charge of Colonel Dunbar and his 850 men.[38] Prior to this re-organization at Little Meadows, four horse teams had been used in accordance with the terms of Franklin's advertisements. Now, however, the advance unit of the army marched with six horses to a wagon,[39] a change necessitated equally by the rugged terrain and the hastily constructed roads with which they were forced to contend, and by the poor condition of the horses.[40]
While this lightened column moved forward more rapidly, the mountainous and rocky roads continued to impede the progress of the army. On the morning of June 25 so steep a grade was encountered that the men were obliged to ease the carriages down with tackles. Throughout the remainder of June and the early part of July the column was so retarded by the road conditions that only a few miles could be covered each day.[41] By July 4 the country had become less difficult and the army was able to add a few more miles to the daily march. At one o'clock on the afternoon of July 9 this small train of wagons moved over the second ford of the Monongahela between the troops of the 44th and 48th regiments. A short time later the unfortunate expedition met defeat for all its efforts. As the battle drew to a close, many of the surviving troops began to gather around the wagons. This drew heavier fire on the wagons and at this point, said Franklin, "the waggoners took each a horse out of his team and scamper'd."[42]
As evening drew on, the wounded Braddock sent Washington back to Dunbar's Camp, nearly 45 miles behind, to order wagons forward with provisions and hospital stores and to transport the wounded back to Wills Creek. A number of these wagons met the retreating army on July 11, at Gist's Plantation; then, after wounds were dressed, they returned to Dunbar's Camp. There most of the wagons were gathered with the stores and burned in order to keep them from the hands of the enemy. The survivors continued their retreat, accompanied by a few of the wagons loaded with wounded comrades.
The number of Pennsylvania wagons that arrived back at Wills Creek has not been definitely established. For the service of their wagons, 30 owners received payment for a period greater than the 51 days, but of these, only 10 were paid for services beyond what appears to be July 20.[43] Only the wagon of William Douglas, out of 146 wagons involved, seems to have survived the campaign intact.[44] Inasmuch as the other owners were reimbursed for the loss of their wagons, it is likely that those few that arrived back at Fort Cumberland were so badly damaged as to render them unserviceable, and therefore not worth driving back to eastern Pennsylvania.
Seven criticisms were made of Braddock's advance to the forks of the Ohio. Of these seven, six, in varying degrees, concern transportation.[45] In choosing Alexandria to land his troops he put himself more distant from the needed wagons; his horses were too few and too weak to bear the burden of all the supplies on the entire march, without depots having first been established at the various camps along the line of march; his troops were delayed by the progress of the wagons and by the necessity of their having to help with the wagons; the roads were inadequate in many places for the excessively heavy artillery and the wagons; the pack horses were weakened by the extra service they were required to perform; and due to his lack of horses, Dunbar had been left too far behind.[46] While other factors contributed to the outcome of the expedition, many of the officers learned, as had Washington in 1754, the importance of proper transportation.