Foscarini then lays down in answer six maxims, the first of which is that things attributed to God must be expounded metaphorically according to our manner of understanding and of common speech. The other maxims are more metaphysical, as that everything in the universe, whether corruptible or incorruptible, obeys a fixed law of its nature; so, for example, Fortune is always fickle. In concluding his defense, he claims among other things, that the Copernician is a more admirable hypothesis than the Ptolemaic, and that it is an easy way into astronomy and philosophy. Then he adds that there may be an analogy between the seven-branched candlestick of the Old Testament and the seven planets around the sun, and possibly the arrangement of the seeds in the "Indian Figg," in the pomegranate and in grapes is all divine evidence of the solar system. With such an amusing reversion to mediæval analogy his spirited letter ends.
Some or all of these scriptural arguments appear in most of the attacks on the doctrine even before its condemnation by the Index in 1616 was widely known. Besides these objections, Aristotle's and Ptolemy's statements were endlessly repeated with implicit faith in their accuracy. Even Sir Francis Bacon (1567-1631) with all his modernity of thought, failed in this instance to recognize the value of the new idea and, despite his interest in Galileo's discoveries, harked back to the time-honored objections. At first mild in his opposition, he later became emphatically opposed to it. In the Advancement of Learning[301] (1604), he speaks of it as a possible explanation of the celestial phenomena according to astronomy but as contrary to natural philosophy. Some fifteen years later in the Novum Organon,[302] he asserts that the assumption of the earth's movement cannot be allowed; for, as he says in his Thema Cœli,[303] at that time he considered the opinion that the earth is stationary the truer one. Finally, in his De Augmentis Scientiarum[304] (1622-1623) he speaks of the old notions of the solidity of the heavens, etc., and adds, "It is the absurdity of these opinions that has driven men to the diurnal motion; which I am convinced is most false." He gives his reasons in the Descriptio Globi Intellectualis[305] (ch. 5-6): "In favor of the earth [as the center of the world] we have the evidence of our sight, and an inveterate opinion; and most of all this, that as dense bodies are contracted into a narrow compass, and rare bodies are widely diffused (and the area of every circle is contracted to the center) it seems to follow almost of necessity that the narrow space about the middle of the world be set down as the proper and peculiar place for dense bodies." The sun's claims to such a situation are satisfied through having two satellites of its own, Venus and Mercury. Copernicus's scheme is inconvenient; it overloads the earth with a triple motion; it creates a difficulty by separating the sun from the number of the planets with which it has much in common; and the "introduction of so much immobility into nature ... and making the moon revolve around the earth in an epicycle, and some other assumptions of his are the speculations of one who cares not what fictions he introduces into nature, provided his calculations answer." The total absence of all reference to the Scriptures is the unique and refreshing part of Bacon's thought.
All the more common arguments against the diurnal rotation of the earth are well stated in an interesting little letter (1619) by Thomas Feyens, or Fienus, a professor at the school of medicine in the University of Louvain.[306] Thus Catholic, Protestant, and unbeliever, Feyens, Melancthon, Bacon and Bodin, all had recourse to the same arguments to oppose this seemingly absurd doctrine.
Froidmont, or Fromundus, the good friend and colleague of Feyens at Louvain, was also much interested in these matters, so much so that some thought he had formerly accepted the Copernican doctrine and "only fled back into the camp of Aristotle and Ptolemy through terror at the decree of the S. Congregation of Cardinals."[307] His indignant denial of this imputation of turn-coat in 1634 is somewhat weakened by reference to his Saturnalitæ Coenæ[308] (1615) in which he suggests that, if the Copernican doctrine is admitted, then Hell may be in the sun at the center of the universe rather than in the earth, in order to be as far as possible from Paradise. He also refers in his De Cometa (1618) to the remark of Justus-Lipsius[309] that this paradox was buried with Copernicus, saying "You are mistaken, O noble scholar: it lives, and it is full of vigor even now among many,"[310] thus apparently not seeing serious objection to it. M. Monchamp summarizes Froidmont's point of view as against Aristotle and Ptolemy, half for Copernicus and wholly for Tycho Brahe.
Froidmont's best known books are the two he wrote in answer to a defense of the Copernican position first by Philip Lansberg, then by his son. The Ant-Aristarchus sive Orbis Terræ Immobilis, Liber unicus in quo decretum S. Congregationis S.R.E. Cardinal. an. 1616, adversus Pythagorico-Copernicanus editum, defenditur, appeared in 1631 before Galileo's condemnation. The Jesuit Cavalieri wrote to Galileo in May about it thus:[311] "I have run it through, and verily it states the Copernican theory and the arguments in its favor with so much skill and efficacy that he seems to have understood it very well indeed. But he refutes them with so little force that he seems rather to be of an opinion contrary to that expressed in the title of his book. I have given it to M. César. If you wish it, I will have it sent to you. The arguments he brings against Copernicus are those you have so masterfully stated and answered in your Dialogo." Nearly a year later, Galileo wrote to Gassendi and Diodati that he had received this book a month before and, although he had been unable to read much of it on account of his eye trouble, it seemed to him that of all the opponents of Copernicus whom he had seen, Fromundus was the most sensible and efficient.[312] Again he wrote in January, 1633, regretting that he had not seen it till six months after he had published his dialogues, for he would have both praised it and commented upon certain points. "As for Fromundus (who however shows himself to be a man of great talent) I wish he had not fallen into what seems to me a truly serious error, although a rather common one, in order to refute the Copernican opinion, of beginning by poking scorn and ridicule at those who consider it true, and then (what seems to me still less becoming) of basing his attack chiefly on the authority of the Scriptures, and finally of deducing from this that in this respect it is an opinion little short of heretical. To argue in this way is clearly not praiseworthy;" for as Galileo goes on to show, if the Scriptures are the word of God, the heavens themselves are his handiwork. Why is the one less noble than the other?[313]
Froidmont replied in 1633 to Lansberg's reply with his second attack, Vesta, sive Ant-Aristarchi Vindex, in which he laid even more emphasis upon the theological and scriptural objections. Yet, in ignorance of Galileo's condemnation, he considers the charge of heresy too strong. "The partisans of this system do not after all disdain the authority of the Scriptures, although they appear to interpret it in a way rather in their favor." He also, and rightly, denies the existence at that time of any conclusive proof.[314]
In spite of Froidmont's position, the University of Louvain was not cordial in its response to the papal nuncio's announcement in September, 1633, of Galileo's abjuration and sentence, in marked contrast to the reply sent by the neighboring university of Douay. The latter body, in a letter signed by Matthæus Kellison (Sept. 7, 1633), declared the condemned theory "should be discarded and hissed from the schools; and that in the English College there in Douay, this paradox never had been approved and never would be, but had always been opposed and always would be."[315]
This opposition in the universities in Belgium continued throughout the century to be based not so much on scientific grounds as upon the Bible. This may be seen in the manuscript reports of lectures in physics and astronomy given at Liège in 1662, and at Louvain between 1650-1660, though one of these does not mention the decree of 1616.[316] The general congregation of the Society of Jesus in 1650 drew up a list of the propositions proscribed in their teaching, though, according to M. Monchamp (himself a Catholic) not thereby implying a denial of any probability they might have. The 35th proposition ran: "Terra movetur motu diurno; planetæ, tanquam viventia, moventur ab intrinseco. Firmamentum stat."[317] The Jesuit astronomer Tacquet in his textbook (Antwerp, 1669) respected this decision, acknowledging that no scientific reason kept him from defending the theory, but solely his respect for the Christian faith.[318]
One of the pupils of the Jesuits revolted however. Martin van Welden, appointed professor of mathematics at Louvain in 1683, debated a series of theses in January, 1691. The second read: "Indubitum est systhema Copernici de planetarum motu circa sole; inter quos merito terra censetur." His refusal to alter the wording except to change indubitum to certum brought on a stormy controversy within the faculty which eventually reached the Council of Brabant and the papal nuncio at Brussels.[319] The professor finally submitted, though he was not forbidden to teach the Copernician system, nor did the faculty affirm its falsity, merely that it was contrary to the Roman decree. The professor re-opened the matter with a similar thesis in July, thereby arousing a second controversy that this time reached even the Privy Council. Once more he submitted, but solely with an apology for having caused a disagreement. His new theses in 1695 contained no explicit mention of the Copernician system; at least he had learned tact.[320]
The absorption of the German states in the Thirty Years War may account for the apparent absence there of Copernican discussion until after the Peace of Westphalia. A certain Georgius Ludovicus Agricola gave a syllogistic refutation of the doctrine as his disputation at the university of Wittenberg in 1665. While he acknowledged its ingenuity, he preferred to it "the noblest, truest, and divinely inspired system" of Tycho Brahe. The four requirements of an acceptable astronomical hypothesis according to this student are: (1) That it suit all the observations of all the ages; (2) That as far as possible, it be simple and clear; (3) That it be not contrary to the principles of physics and optics; (4) That it be not contrary to the Holy Scriptures. As the Copernican theory does not meet all these tests, it is unsatisfactory. Incidentally, he considers it "ridiculous to include the earth among the planets, because then we would be living in Heaven, forsooth, since we would be in a star." He decides finally "that the decree of March, 1616, condemning the Copernican opinion was not unjust, nor was Galileo unfairly treated."[321]