The kind of vanity of which the Admiral was guilty before the event is shown by his behaviour at the late battle, in which, with darkness coming on and without a chart, he took his fleet in to fight a squadron supported by batteries and land forces, which had enjoyed all the time they needed to make a position impregnable, actually sending half his ships into the shallow water between the French and the shore, to which they had anchored as close as they thought safe.

Our Admiral’s vanity before the event was of the do-and-die sort; he was ready to face destruction at any instant in order to take an advantage of an enemy who, not being equally ready, left certain risks at his mercy. He recalls to my mind the old story of the king who threw his daughter’s glove into a lion’s den, and told her two suitors that the first who brought it out should have her hand. The Golden Knight asked the Silver Knight if they should fight or draw lots to see who should have the privilege of making the first attempt. The Silver Knight said that no wife was worth such a risk, whereupon the Golden Knight leaped into the midst of the lions and picked up the glove without one of them offering to touch him. Our Admiral was always ready to leap into a lion’s den.

It was his vanity at this minute to consider that the conduct of affairs in Naples depended on his presence; but none the less, if he had believed that his presence could have captured Malta, he would have stayed there until he had captured it or died in the attempt. He was the last man to leave a thing undone which he believed he could do, and his idea of what might be achieved by desperate valour the affair of Teneriffe had shown.

I had forgotten the Marquis of Niza, who had shown considerable energy and good-will in blockading Valetta—for which purpose, there being no likelihood of any French line-of-battle ships appearing, Portuguese of the line did as well as any other.

I cannot remember whether or no the Marquis was an admiral in his own service, but he was at all events superior in rank to any of the English officers left at Naples, and conceived it to be essential to his dignity that he should be recognised as being in command of the station while he was there. The Admiral, in his character of bluff British sailor dealing with a pretentious foreigner of whose capacity he had had no sufficient proof, and whom he could not believe to be comparable to Captain Troubridge, the English senior officer on the station, who was only a post-captain, wrote:—

“Vanguard, October 24th, 1798.

“My Lord,—I am honoured with your Excellency’s letter of this evening, and in my public situation I have the honour to acquaint you that I consider your Excellency as an officer serving under my command, and standing precisely in the same situation as an English Rear-admiral, junior to me; which is, having no power or authority to give the smallest order to any Ship or Vessel but those who I may think right to place, by order, under your command.

“I have the honour to be, etc.,
“Horatio Nelson.”

But the same day, being grateful to him for favours past and to come, in his character of diplomatist he wrote to him as follows:—

“Off Malta, October 24th, 1798.

“My Lord,—Having answered your public letter as my duty called me to do, I beg leave to assure you of my very great respect for your character, and that I shall not ever forget your zeal in the blockade of this place. If your Excellency had recollected, I am confident your knowledge of service would not have occasioned you the trouble of writing me a letter. On service with us it is necessary for the Commander-in-Chief, or the Officer Commanding by order from the Commander-in-Chief, to give the Superior Officer, when thought right to detach, orders to take such Ships, and Captains of such Ships to obey their superior Officer serving under the Commander-in-Chief or detached Commander. In the present orders to your Excellency, no ships are placed under your orders but those of Her Most Faithful Majesty.

“I am, etc.,
“Horatio Nelson.”

“Her Most Faithful Majesty” was of course the Queen of Portugal.

At Malta he did nothing beyond sending a cartel to the French General and Admiral summoning them to surrender Valetta, which they were within an ace of doing, although our Admiral knew perfectly well the place was impregnable to a force much superior to anything he had to bring against it. But the Frenchmen plucked up their courage at the last moment, so there was nothing for us to do except to sail back to Naples, leaving a blockading force.