All the Self-moving Parts are perceptive; and, all Perception is in Parts, and is dividable, and compoundable, as being Material; also, Alterable, as being Self-moving: Wherefore, no Creature that is composed, or consists of many several sorts of Corporeal Figurative Motions, but must have many sorts of Perception; which is the reason that one Creature, as Man, cannot perceive another Man any otherwise but in Parts: for, the Rational, and Sensitive; nay, all the Parts of one and the same Creature, perceive their Adjoining Parts, as they perceive Foreign Parts; only, by their close conjunction and near relation, they unite in one and the same actions. I do not say, they always agree: for, when they move irregularly, they disagree: And some of those United Parts, will move after one manner, and some after another; but, when they move regularly, then they move to one and the same Design, or one and the same United Action. So, although a Creature is composed of several sorts of Corporeal Motions; yet, these several sorts, being properly united in one Creature, move all agreeably to the Property and Nature of the whole Creature; that is, the particular Parts move according to the property of the whole Creature; because the particular Parts, by conjunction, make the Whole: So that, the several Parts make one Whole; by which, a Whole Creature hath both a general Knowledg, and a Knowledg of Parts; whereas, the Perceptions of Foreign Objects, are but in the Parts: and this is the reason why one Creature perceives not the Whole of another Creature, but only some Parts. Yet this is to be noted, That not any Part hath another Part's Nature, or Motion, nor therefore, their Knowledg, or Perception; but, by agreement, and unity of Parts, there is composed Perceptions.
[CHAP. IV. Whether the Rational and Sensitive Parts have a Perception of each other.]
Some may ask the Question, Whether the Rational and Sensitive, have Perception of each other? I answer: In my Opinion, they have. For, though the Rational and Sensitive Parts, be of two sorts; yet, both sorts have Self-motion; so that they are but as one, as, that they are both Corporeal Motions; and, had not the Sensitive Parts incumbrances, they would be, in a degree, as agil, and as free as the Rational. But, though each sort hath perception of each other, and some may have the like; yet they have not the same: for, not any Part can have another's Perception, or Knowledg; but, by reason the Rational and Sensitive, are both Corporeal Motions, there is a strong sympathy between those sorts, in one Conjunction, or Creature. Indeed, the Rational Parts are the Designing Parts; and the Sensitive, the Labouring Parts; and the Inanimate are as the Material Parts: not but all the three sorts are Material Parts; but the Inanimate, being not Self-moving, are the Burdensome Parts.
[CHAP. V. Of Thoughts, and the whole Mind of a Creature.]
AS for Thoughts, though they are several Corporeal Motions, or Self-moving Parts; yet, being united, by Conjunction in one Creature, into one whole Mind, cannot be perceived by some Parts of another Creature, nor by the same sort of Creature, as by another Man. But some may ask, Whether the whole Mind of one Creature, as the whole Mind of one Man, may not perceive the whole Mind of another Man? I answer, That if the Mind was not joyn'd and mix'd with the Sensitive and Inanimate Parts, and had not interior, as well as exterior Parts, the whole Mind of one Man, might perceive the whole Mind of another Man; but, that being not possible, one whole Mind cannot perceive another whole Mind: By which Observation we may perceive, there are no Platonick Lovers in Nature. But some may ask, Whether the Sensitive Parts can perceive the Rational, in one and the same Creature? I answer, They do; for if they did not, it were impossible for the Sensitive Parts to execute the Rational Designs; so that, what the Mind designs, the Sensitive Body doth put in execution, as far as they have Power: But if, through Irregularities, the Body be sick, and weak, or hath some Infirmities, they cannot execute the Designs of the Mind.
[CHAP. VI. Whether the Mind of one Creature, can perceive the Mind of another Creature.]
Some may ask the reason, Why one Creature, as Man, cannot perceive the Thoughts of another Man, as well as he perceives his exterior Sensitive Parts? I answer, That the Rational Parts of one Man, perceive as much of the Rational Parts of another Man, as the Sensitive Parts of that Man doth of the Sensitive Parts of the other Man; that is, as much as is presented to his Perception: for, all Creatures, and every part and particle, have those three sorts of Matter; and therefore, every part of a Creature is perceiving, and perceived. But, by reason all Creatures are composed of Parts, (viz. both of the Rational and Sensitive) all Perceptions are in parts, as well the Rational, as the Sensitive Perception: yet, neither the Rational, nor the Sensitive, can perceive all the Interior Parts or Corporeal Motions, unless they were presented to their perception: Neither can one Part know the Knowledg and Perception of another Part: but, what Parts of one Creature are subject to the perception of another Creature, those are perceived.