[CHAP. XIII. Nature cannot judg her self.]

Although Nature knows her self, and hath a free power of her self; (I mean, a natural Knowledg and Power) yet, Nature cannot be an upright, and just Judg of her self, and so not of any of her Parts; because every particular part is a part of her self. Besides, as she is Self-moving, she is Self-changeing, and so she is alterable: Wherefore, nothing can be a perfect, and a just Judg, but something that is Individable, and Unalterable, which is the Infinite GOD, who is Unmoving, Immutable, and so Unalterable; who is the Judg of the Infinite Corporeal Actions of his Servant Nature. And this is the reason that all Nature's Parts appeal to God, as being the only Judg.


[CHAP. XIV. Nature Poyses, or Balances her Actions.]

Although Nature be Infinite, yet all her Actions seem to be poysed, or balanced, by Opposition; as for example, As Nature hath dividing, so composing actions: Also, as Nature hath regular, so irregular actions; as Nature hath dilating, so contracting actions: In short, we may perceive amongst the Creatures, or Parts of this World, slow, swift, thick, thin, heavy, leight, rare, dense, little, big, low, high, broad, narrow, light, dark, hot, cold, productions, dissolutions, peace, warr, mirth, sadness, and that we name Life, and Death; and infinite the like; as also, infinite varieties in every several kind and sort of actions: but, the infinite varieties are made by the Self-moving parts of Nature, which are the Corporeal Figurative Motions of Nature.


[CHAP. XV. Whether there be Degrees of Corporeal Strength.]

As I have declared, there are (in my Opinion) Two sorts of Self-moving Parts; the one Sensitive, the other Rational. The Rational parts of my Mind, moving in the manner of Conception, or Inspection, did occasion some Disputes, or Arguments, amongst those parts of my Mind. The Arguments were these: Whether there were degrees of Strength, as there was of Purity, between their own sort, as, the Rational and the Sensitive? The Major part of the Argument was, That Self-motion could be but Self-motion: for, not any part of Nature could move beyond its power of Self-motion. But the Minor part argued, That the Self-motion of the Rational, might be stronger than the Self-motion of the Sensitive. But the Major part was of the opinion, That there could be no degrees of the Power of Nature, or the Nature of Nature: for Matter, which was Nature, could be but Self-moving, or not Self-moving; or partly Self-moving, or not Self-moving. But the Minor argued, That it was not against the nature of Matter to have degrees of Corporeal Strength, as well as degrees of Purity: for, though there could not be degrees of Purity amongst the Parts of the same sort, as amongst the Parts of the Rational, or amongst the Parts of the Sensitive; yet, if there were degrees of the Rational and Sensitive Parts, there might be degrees of Strength. The Major part said, That if there were degrees of Strength, it would make a Confusion, by reason there would be no Agreement; for, the Strongest would be Tyrants to the Weakest, in so much as they would never suffer those Parts to act methodically or regularly. But the Minor part said, that they had observed, That there was degrees of Strength amongst the Sensitive Parts. The Major part argued, That they had not degrees of Strength by Nature; but, that the greater Number of Parts were stronger than a less Number of Parts. Also, there were some sorts of Actions, that had advantage of other sorts. Also, some sorts of Compositions are stronger than other; not through the degrees of innate Strength, nor through the number of Parts; but, through the manner and form of their Compositions, or Productions. Thus my Thoughts argued; but, after many Debates and Disputes, at last my Rational Parts agreed, That, If there were degrees of Strength, it could not be between the Parts of the same degree, or sort; but, between the Rational and Sensitive; and if so, the Sensitive was Stronger, being less pure; and the Rational was more Agil, being more pure.


[CHAP. XVI. Of Effects, and Cause.]