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Religious Education must be provided out of the Funds of the Church.
It appears to me that there is no difference of opinion amongst us on these points—namely, that means must be found of preaching the word of God to the people of England; and I go further—for this point is also not disputed—and I say that those means must proceed, in the first instance, from the church, and that they must be exhausted before the public is called on for other means; in providing those means, you will not only be performing a duty incumbent upon you, but you will also be following the example of every other nation in the world. It has been my lot to live among idolaters—among persons of all creeds, and of all religions; but I never knew yet of a single instance in which public means were not provided sufficient to teach the people the religion of their country. They might be false religions; I know but of one true one; but yet means were never wanting to teach those false religions; and I hope that we shall not have done with this subject until we have found sufficient means for teaching the people of England their duty to their Maker, and their duty to one another, founded on their duty to that Maker.
July 30, 1840.
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Necessity of administering Oaths.
I entreat your lordships to pause, and recollect that the foundation of all justice is truth; and that the mode of discovering truth has always been to administer an oath, in order that the witness may give his deposition under a high sanction. I hope your lordships will not adopt another of those bills which have been before your lordships only a few days, and which suggest, in truth, nothing more than a way of enabling a witness, who thinks proper to say he has conscientious scruples, to escape the solemnity of an oath. I admit that the inconvenience of the present state of the law falls on the community rather than on the individuals; but, at the same time, I think that, by every one of those relaxations, we shake the foundations of justice.
August 4, 1840.
Church-rate Martyrs—true state of the Case.
In my opinion, this case is a very simple one, and one on which there can be no doubt as to the course which should be taken. Here is a man who has been sued for a sum of money, which, it is understood, was lawfully due by him. The law renders him liable to pay that sum of money, and the law supports the proceedings against him for the recovery of it. This person could have easily avoided these proceedings, by simply paying the sum of 5s. 6d., which was demanded of him; or he could have gone into court and had the question fairly tried, whether he was lawfully bound to pay it or not, according to the laws of the country in which he resides; for, of course, he must be bound by the laws of his country, as well as all other British subjects. But he has not chosen to take either course. He has said, "I will not pay that money;" and, in consequence of his own conduct, a large amount has been incurred in the way of costs. These costs are not matters of speculation or amusement, they are realities; they are sums of money paid for the labour of certain individuals, for certain services performed in the execution of their duties, under the legal authority of the ecclesiastical courts, and in this suit. Now, those costs must be paid. Were we to let the man off from paying the 5s. 6d. for the rate, that remission would not get rid of his liability for the costs; these latter must be paid, either by himself or his friends, or else they must be paid by the other party, by the lawful suitors, by the lawful plaintiffs, who had a right originally to recover the money. They are the persons who would have to pay the costs, unless your lordships consent to insert the clause proposed by my noble friend. Somebody must pay the costs after all. But it is said that the defendant is not to pay the costs, and that he is to be let out of prison. Well, you may let him out, if you please; but, surely, you would not call upon the plaintiffs to pay the costs incurred by his conduct? That would not be justice. That would not be fair between man and man. Not a soul in this house could be of that opinion. It is not consistent either with law or justice to throw these expenses upon those on whom the law of the country has laid the necessity of incurring them. Not they, but he who, by his own conduct, rendered the proceedings imperative, ought to be made to pay the costs.