The employment of Lord Moira's force, and its future destination, depend on plans of continental operations, but in the meantime its effect is almost beyond calculation in its present position, menacing everything from Dunkirk to Brest, and defending everything from Yarmouth to the Land's End. You will see this in a minute, if you compare the facility of moving that force, either by land or sea, with the efforts of the same sort that the enemy can make, either offensively or defensively.
We cannot have too much force anywhere, but if I am not very sanguine, Sir C. Grey has already a force beyond what the service requires; and it is likely that he will still be reinforced without breaking up Lord Moira's army, which I consider as the most usefully employed, and telling the most effectually against the enemy of any troops now in our service.
I will send your artillery plan to Dundas.
Ever most affectionately yours,
G.
LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.
St. James's Square, July 9th, 1794.
My dearest Brother,
I am sincerely sorry to see that you do not entertain the same hopes as I do of good from the new arrangements. I confess I think it so great an object to have annihilated all distinction of parties in this country among those who are attached to the present order of things; and I feel that the late events abroad have given so much more importance to this point, with a view to the internal situation of this country, than it had before, that I cannot help feeling very sanguine as to the consequences of the steps now taken with that view. God only knows which of us is right, and time only can show. In the meantime, jacta est alea, and we must abide by it.
On the subject of war and peace, you state very truly, that nothing is less probable than that peace should now be in our option. The retreat to Antwerp has been decided, not by opinions here, nor even by those of the Duke of York and Lord Cornwallis, but by the necessity consequent upon the Austrian movements. Whether those movements were right, I am not enough of a soldier, nor enough informed as a statesman, to pretend to form an opinion. The immediate effect of them is not necessarily the abandoning the towns taken last year, which are in a state to maintain themselves long, and to impede many of the operations of the enemy. Nor, as long as the Austrians maintain their line from Louvain to Namur, is the possibility of succouring them considered as desperate. What I most fear in the present moment is the effect of despondency here and abroad, without which I should see no reason why we should not, as you suggest, fight the country over and over again, inch by inch, with means and resources for carrying on the war, such as are out of all comparison superior to those of the enemy. It would have been a flattering and glorious thing, and a brilliant success, to have terminated the war by the favourable result of a plan of offensive operation in Flanders. If that has failed, I am very far from thinking this a reason for abandoning a cause in the issue of which I consider our existence as implicated. If we listen to the ideas of peace in the present moment (even supposing it were offered), it can be only because we confess ourselves unable to carry on the war. Such a confession affords but a bad security against the events which must follow, in Flanders, in Holland, and (by a very rapid succession) in this island.
I do not know from whence the papers have got the idea of Lord Camelford's return. He is not come, nor any officer or despatch, from Vancouver, but I understand the ship has been heard of in October last, all well. Many thanks for the offer of Paddington, which we may probably be glad to avail ourselves of.
Ever, my dear brother,
Most affectionately yours,
G.