When are we likely to meet? I suppose that your campaign will not last much beyond the King's journey. You will not, I hope, forget that this place is your best inn, whether you go to Stowe or to town; but you must give me a few days' notice, that I may be sure to be here. God bless you.

The progress of the negotiations on the continent, and the weakness of Austria and Prussia, mixed up with no inconsiderable amount of indecision and duplicity, are freely commented upon in letters from Mr. Grenville and Lord Malmesbury. Want of power, and want of will—fear, hesitation, and imbecility—were so conspicuous in the conduct of these Courts, as to destroy all confidence in their professions. The character drawn by Lord Malmesbury of the King of Prussia—which the reader will find confirmed in the subsequent communications of Mr. Grenville—shows how little reliance, under any circumstances, could be placed on His Majesty's co-operation.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

(Private.) Vienna, Sept. 22nd, 1794.
My dearest Brother,

The course of this last week has been employed—as you will have seen from our despatch—in very long, but fruitless arguments on our parts. The proposal which we send to you, has no other recommendation than that of its having been strenuously resisted by us, and steadily persisted in by them. If the fact really was, as they are disposed to consider it, that England—at no risk and no expense—could, in the shape of this guarantee, furnish means to Austria, without which they must consider themselves as beat, and act too under that impression, to their own certain ruin, and to the great probable danger of Holland; if, I say, all this mischief could be prevented without any real expense to England, the question would seem to me very different from what it now is. But, I confess, that I have not been able to make out of their conversation on this subject any of that security on these points which they must insist upon. They say, provision can be made by which the interest of this money can be punctually secured, to be paid strictly when due to the commissaries of the English army, or any other persons appointed to receive it; yet what those provisions are which provide for that security, I do not make out, nor do they seem able to describe. I state to them that Mr. Pitt must find ways and means for the payment of the interest of this loan, which must increase the first shape of our annual expenses, whether they are afterwards honestly repaid or not; but they maintain that M. Desardroui can settle this somehow or other, though how they have not by any means explained; perhaps M. Desardroui has been more fortunate with Mr. Pitt.

One considerable difficulty in regard to this proposition seems to be the influence which this loan might have upon their wish to regain the Low Countries—a wish which we already think too weak in their minds, and which would probably become weaker from the reflection that the income of those revenues was already mortgaged for a considerable sum. It was with a view to this that I dropped to them the notion of their giving a larger security, and asking a smaller loan, as well as complying with the requisitions of augmented force and British command. The general security you see they do consent to give; but, until I hear some more distinct explanation, I shall still fear that they mean to throw the whole security upon the Netherlands. They are still quarrelling more every day with everything that is Prussian: they have stopped a large magazine of blue cloth from Prussia to Switzerland, which they say they know is destined to France; and the King of Prussia threatens, in consequence, to stop some of their supplies in their passage to their armies. Thugut said of the King of Prussia to-day, with some truth and some humour, that all he wanted was to save the whole of his army, to conquer Poland without the loss of a man, and in reward to receive from us a pension of a million and a half per annum. If half that sum would purchase from him thirty thousand troops absolutely at our disposal, to make with British, Hessian and Dutch an army under English orders of one hundred thousand men, for the side of Holland; and that the other half—viz.: £700,000—given in the way of subsidy to Austria, could give it good heart to make a vigorous offensive campaign, I know not whether my inclinations would not lead me to the experiment; but their wants here are so great, and their resources, or at least their spirit and exertions, so reduced, that the prospect is certainly very discouraging. They seem full of new fears about the Turks, and express much expectation that our Minister at Constantinople will make great efforts to keep all quiet there.

I believe I told you there were apprehensions of the Poles, under Kosciusko, breaking with the Austrians. A small affair had taken place, but it is said to be amicably settled, and to be, for the present, safe on that side. We are anxiously expecting our permission to return; and I depend now upon seeing you so soon, that I will not unnecessarily protract this letter.

I know not who you are sending here; but we have taken great pains to keep alive in them here the most favourable dispositions that we could; and as far as appearances can be depended on—if the pecuniary demands were out of the question—nothing can be more promising than their general language and professions are, of earnestly desiring to establish the most intimate union between the two Courts.

God bless you, my dearest brother.

LORD MALMESBURY TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.