LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.
Dropmore, Sept. 9th, 1799.
My dearest Brother,
I hope, from your account, that the worst is over, and that Lady B. will continue to mend, but we shall be very anxious to hear that it is so. If nothing new arise, and if we shall not be troublesome to you, we think of being with you on Wednesday in next week; but pray let us know if you would wish us to delay our visit.
If the project holds respecting Holland, it is likely, I think, that I shall not be much longer before I am called upon to begin my preparations. I have as yet no answer from Tom, but I shall have one to-day or to-morrow; for we know that the wind changed to the eastward on the other side the water on Friday, and we have three mails due.
Our first division of Russians, five thousand two hundred men, are arrived, and are under sailing orders for the Texel. Popham left the second division at Elsineur on Sunday last; and calculates that both this and the rear division, amounting together to above eleven thousand men, will be here by Tuesday or Wednesday next. Our own transports were also beginning to arrive, so that we shall have to send them in the course of a week or ten days a reinforcement of twenty-six thousand men, besides cavalry. I have no doubt that this is more than sufficient, with tolerable activity and enterprise, to do our work completely, and in a very few weeks—I might almost say days—for we have the command of the Zuyder Zee, by which we can turn the enemy on their right, and of the North Sea, which equally turns their left; and they have, I am confident, no means of assembling an army of half the force of ours, to oppose it in front. All this, however, is a question of time; for if that is allowed them, one can answer for nothing.
We have not heard of Abercromby (nor indeed could we) since the 31st. He was then preparing to march forward to Alkmaar. Have you got Wiebeking's map of Holland and Utrecht? If not, let anybody write for it for you from Hamburgh. You will see, indeed, in any map, a little promontory that runs forward opposite to Amsterdam, on the north bank of the Y., between Buyksloot and Newdam. The opinion of persons of the country is, that if we can make ourselves masters of that point, Amsterdam is open to be bombarded, and must capitulate on the first summons. All the other advantages of the country we have to act in, upon our line of march, are obvious by looking at the map. The disadvantages are, the facility of retarding our march by defending the dykes and narrow causeways along which we must pass; but a great superiority of force will enable us to surmount many of these. The French papers talk of having marched against us the garrisons of the Generality. So much the better if it is so, for then we shall not find them there, and the fact itself proves (if even our intelligence were defective) how little other force they have in the country.
I am greatly obliged to you for what you have written on the subject of the Militia. It seems to me that allowing the Militia to volunteer by companies for a fixed time is the best suggestion I have yet heard. But it would be necessary to consider, on a statement of numbers, how many could be so procured from all the Militias—English, Scotch, and Irish—though, with respect to these last, there is, I fear, an insurmountable difficulty, from the necessity of assembling Parliament, which could not be done in Ireland without broaching the question of Union before we are prepared for it.
Less than twenty thousand men would not, on the most sanguine calculations, answer our object, and the issue of the war so much depends upon it that we should be unpardonable to omit any possible effort that we could make for it. What we want is to be able to garrison Holland with twenty thousand men so as to have as soon as possible after the conquest of it the means of disposing of our whole army now there. It is a very doubtful question, I think, whether our Militia volunteering would be more or less promoted if we confined our proposal to that particular service, and sent our Militia battalions into the Dutch garrisons, employing the army now there in the active service, or if we took the offer generally for foreign service, and made such distribution between the two as might best suit our convenience.
There would be no difficulty as to Parliament; we can call them together at a fortnight's notice. We would do so for this object alone. The King would speak of nothing else, and ask no supply; and we could easily, in a moment of triumph like the present, exclude all other discussions, so that the execution, were the plan once arranged to the satisfaction of the Militia officers, would take up not more than ten days or a fortnight at most.