Some Account of the Public Life of the Late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart. / Particularly of His Services in the Canadas, Including a Reply to the Strictures on His Military Character, Contained in an Article in the Quarterly Review

by E. B. Brenton

From the above correspondence it incontrovertibly appears, that the orders transmitted from the Commander of the forces, through General de Rottenburg to Major-General Vincent, were the real and only cause of that officer's not retreating to York, and of his continuing to hold his position at Burlington; which, as appears by his own letter of the 27th October, before referred to, he was preparing to leave on the 1st November.

Sir George Prevost's orders to General Vincent, to fall back upon Kingston, had not reached him on the 23rd October; previous to which, his orders to retreat had been discretionary. On the 27th he was preparing to obey them, and on the 4th of November he received orders to remain where he was.

There cannot, therefore, be a doubt of the gross incorrectness of all the Reviewer's statements,[69] of the repeated peremptory orders to retreat; of the advice which the firmness of General Procter and others had induced them to give General Vincent to disobey those orders, and of his being persuaded upon their responsibility to adopt it.

It was, in fact, the prompt and decided measures of Sir George Prevost, as soon as the truth, with regard to General Procter's defeat, was made known to him, that alone prevented General Vincent from continuing his retreat, and that led to those offensive operations which followed shortly afterwards on the Niagara frontier, and which, notwithstanding the attempt made by the Reviewer to give the sole credit of them to General Vincent and Colonel Murray, originated in the instructions which the former officer had received from General de Rottenburg, then commanding in Upper Canada. Even the attack upon Fort Niagara had previously been pressed upon the consideration of Major-Generals de Rottenburg and Sheaffe, by the Commander of the forces, as desirable, whenever circumstances might render such a measure practicable.

In summing up the events of the campaign of 1813, the Reviewer observes,[70] "that on the British side, the occurrences of the year, on the part of the subordinate commanders and troops, presented a brilliant series of achievements, the greater number of which were rendered nugatory or imperfect in result, from the absence of all energy, talent, and enterprise, in their Commander-in-Chief."

In support of this opinion, which is sufficiently singular, considering what the Reviewer has himself stated to have been the result of the campaign, he adds, that the successes obtained by General Vincent and Colonel Harvey, by General Procter, Colonel Murray, and Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison, were all obtained either against the positive commands of Sir George Prevost, or without any instructions from him; and that in the only measure which could be ascribed to him, he endeavoured to wrest the merit from Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry, because he happened to arrive when the enemy were beaten.

The following observations will afford a full answer to this unfounded and disgraceful attack upon the character and reputation of Sir George Prevost. The brilliant affair at Stoney Creek, under Major-General Vincent and Colonel Harvey, and the equally successful operation on the Michigan frontier, when General Procter defeated the forces of Winchester and Clay, arose out of the circumstances of the moment, of which those officers immediately, with great judgment and gallantry, availed themselves. There could, therefore, be no time for communication with the Commander of the forces, and consequently the operations in question could not have taken place in direct opposition to commands which were never received. With regard to the general instructions under which the subordinate Commanders acted, it has already been shewn that General Procter had discretionary orders from Sir George Prevost to act on the defensive or otherwise, as circumstances might require; so likewise had General Vincent; and the marked approbation expressed, both in general orders, and in the despatches to the Secretary of State announcing these events, is a further strong proof that the conduct of those officers was in perfect accordance with the orders and instructions which they had received from the Commander of the forces. Colonel Murray's expedition against Plattsburg was, as appears by the despatch to Lord Bathurst, of the 1st August, 1813, planned altogether by Sir George Prevost, who had previously endeavoured to place our marine on the Richelieu, which had been increased by the capture of the two schooners from the enemy, on a respectable footing; first, by the appointment of Captain Pring to the naval command there, and subsequently by obtaining the services of Captain Everard, and the officers and seamen of the Wasp sloop of war, then lately arrived at Quebec from Halifax, to man these vessels and the gun-boats. Colonel Murray was the officer particularly selected by Sir George Prevost to command on this expedition, from the opinion he entertained of his zeal and energy. The event amply justified his expectations, and this enterprise, undertaken by the orders and under the instructions of the Commander of the forces, was in every respect successful.

The daring exploit which was subsequently achieved by Colonel Murray, in the capture of Fort Niagara, so far from being in opposition to Sir George Prevost's orders, or in the absence of any instructions respecting it, was the consequence of the verbal instructions given by Sir George Prevost to Lieutenant-General Drummond, previous to his assuming the command in Upper Canada, and confirmed in his letter to him of the 3rd December, 1813. Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison had been detached from Kingston with the 49th, the 2nd battalion of the 89th, and the Voltigeurs, as a corps of observation, to follow the motions of General Wilkinson's army, then threatening Montreal from Sackett's Harbour, in consequence of the express orders and directions of Sir George Prevost; a fact established by his despatch to Lord Bathurst of the 15th November, 1813.

The foresight of the Commander of the forces in providing this force to watch the enemy, and his judgment in the selection of Lieut.-Colonel Morrison to command it, led beyond all doubt, to the defeat which General Boyd received at Chrystler's farm, and ultimately, by the interruptions thus occasioned to General Wilkinson's plans, to the safety of Lower Canada. That the measures adopted by Sir George Prevost might in some degree have contributed to the success which attended Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry's defence of his position at Chateaugay, the Reviewer seems most unwillingly to admit, while at the same time he imputes to him the base and unworthy attempt of endeavouring to assume to himself the merit which on that occasion was alone due to Colonel De Salaberry.

In Sir George Prevost's despatch to Lord Bathurst on this subject, of the date of 30th October, 1813, he expresses himself fortunate at having arrived at the scene of action shortly after it commenced, as it enabled him personally to witness the conduct of the officers and men engaged in it, and to form a proper judgment of their merits, which he then severally details in his letter. The unqualified praise which he bestows upon the officer immediately commanding, (Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry) is of itself a sufficient refutation of this libel on the part of the Reviewer.[71]