In reply to your letter of the 30th ult. asking the distance of the American squadron from the batteries of Plattsburg, on the 11th day of September, 1814, while engaged with the British squadron, I will state that it is my decided opinion that the American squadron was upwards of three thousand yards distant from the batteries, being confirmed in that belief from observations made on the actual range of the heaviest guns of the British ship, Confiance, when fired towards the batteries, the balls falling short upwards of five hundred yards.
With respectful consideration,
I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) Alex. Macomb."
"To Cadwr. R. Colden, Esq."
If therefore our squadron could not have been recovered, or that of the enemy annoyed or injured by the capture of their works on shore, it may be asked, what advantages could have resulted from persevering in the attack? It has been already shewn that the primary object of this expedition was the destruction of the enemy's flotilla on the Lake. Had that object been accomplished, Plattsburg might have been occupied by our troops, and from thence, with the assistance of our squadron, they might have been transported to other parts of the Lake for the further annoyance of the enemy. The loss of our squadron, however, immediately rendered all these important operations impracticable. Without the assistance of a fleet, nothing beyond the occupation of Plattsburg could have been accomplished. That Plattsburg would have fallen, neither the Commander of the forces, nor a man under him, could have entertained a doubt. The enemy were indeed strongly entrenched, and under works, which afforded complete shelter to several thousand expert marksmen, from whose fire our troops must have suffered most severely; but granting, that after a considerable loss, we had carried the enemy's works, what adequate advantages should we have gained? To retain Plattsburg was not possible without the assistance of a fleet, which would have been necessary to the provisioning of our army; a retreat, therefore, after destroying all we could not carry away, would have been indispensable. Such was, however, the state of the season and of the weather, that 24 hours delay in retiring with our troops to Canada, would not only have made such a measure dangerous, from the advance of the enemy in every direction, but would have rendered the conveyance of our ordnance and stores exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. The militia of the state of New York and Vermont were turning out, and rapidly increasing in numbers; and although in the open field our troops would justly have despised them, they would have proved most formidable in the woods, and hanging upon the flank and rear of a retreating army. Sir George Prevost knew that he had only to give the word, and that his gallant troops would accomplish all his wishes,[90] but he knew at the same time how useless the acquisition would be, and how costly the sacrifice at which it was probable it would be made. He was also bound to bear in mind the instructions of His Majesty's Government, with regard to the committal of the force under him, so necessary for the preservation of the Provinces entrusted to his care.
He therefore wisely determined to retreat, whilst retreat was practicable, and whilst it could be effected with the least possible loss. The order was accordingly given for that purpose, and such was the energy and promptitude of the execution, that the retreat was conducted without the smallest molestation from the enemy, who, in fact, were not aware of it until it was nearly completed. Notwithstanding the almost impassable state of the roads, from the rains which were falling, not a gun was left behind; and, although the subject has been much exaggerated, yet in fact only a very small quantity of provisions and stores, together with fifteen wounded men in hospital, was left to the enemy. Of deserters, the utmost amount was under 300 men, which was the consequence, not as has been falsely asserted, of the retreat,[91] but of the advance, many of them having deserted upon our entry, and as we afterwards penetrated into the American territory; a consequence which almost invariably attended every attack upon their frontier, and was most strongly manifested in Colonel Scott's expedition, in December, 1813, against part of General Wilkinson's army, when, out of a force of not more than 500 men, he lost upwards of 90 by desertion.
The exaggerated account of this retreat having induced his Majesty's government to call upon Sir George Prevost for a more particular detail of the losses attending it, it appears, by Sir George Prevost's reply to Lord Bathurst's despatch on the subject, together with the documents accompanying it, that the whole loss in killed, wounded, prisoners, and deserters, from the time of the army entering the American territory, until it was withdrawn, did not amount to 500 men. This affords a complete answer to one of the Reviewer's concluding mis-statements, that when Sir George Prevost wrote the despatch from Montreal, though dated at Plattsburg,[92] "he knew that the desertion of 800 men had attended his shameful defeat."
The unfortunate loss of our fleet, and the consequent withdrawing of our troops from the American territory, afforded an opportunity to the party opposed to Sir George Prevost's civil administration in Canada, of which they immediately and eagerly availed themselves, of circulating the most unfounded statements, and the most exaggerated accounts, with respect to both those transactions. These were industriously transmitted to England by a private ship belonging to one of Sir George Prevost's most violent opponents, and upon their arrival, and in the absence of any official accounts of the transactions to which they referred, they created a general belief that the disastrous result of the naval action had been occasioned by a want of co-operation from the shore; that the retreat had been conducted in a precipitate and disgraceful manner; that a severe loss of men, guns, stores, and provisions, had been the consequence of it; and that the whole army was indignant at the conduct of their commander. The arrival of Sir George Prevost's despatches, together with the explanations afforded, as well by them as by the person to whom they had been given in charge, could not fail to undeceive His Majesty's Government on this subject, and to convince them of the grossness of the misrepresentations which had gone forth. Had not some expressions in Sir James Yeo's letter, accompanying the account of the naval action, been construed into charges against Sir George Prevost, which, in justice to him, as well as to the public, it was deemed proper to call upon him to answer, there cannot be a doubt but that the further management of the war in the Canadas would still have been entrusted to the Commander who had hitherto so successfully conducted it. Even if the subsequent conduct of Sir James Yeo did not afford ample proof of the fact, there is not wanting other evidence to shew that the letter in question was written by him under the irritation of the moment, and in consequence of Captain Pring's communication to him of the result of the naval action, but without any intention of making a charge against Sir George Prevost, and without the most distant idea that it could be so construed. Sir James Yeo must have possessed too honourable a mind to become a guest in Sir George Prevost's family, and to partake of his attention and hospitality, had he for a moment supposed that his public letter, on the subject of the naval action at Plattsburg, could have been construed into a formal accusation. Had he really meant it as such, he would most undoubtedly, in a manly and open manner, have communicated the proceeding he had adopted to the party accused; and, under such circumstances, would, no less certainly, have refused the kindness and attention of the person of whom he had publicly expressed so unfavourable an opinion. That this must have been the case may further be inferred, from the circumstance that, although Sir George Prevost was recalled to answer the charges, amounting to three in number, supposed to be contained in Sir James Yeo's letter, it was not until more than four months after both these officers arrived in England, that the precise charges upon which he was to take his trial, were officially communicated to him, and which charges differed materially from those in Sir James Yeo's letter. Whether, under these circumstances, Sir James Yeo would have supported the charges, had the investigation taken place, cannot now be determined; but a confident appeal may be made to the intelligent reader, whether, upon the facts disclosed in these pages being made known, such an attempt must not have utterly failed.
With regard to the naval action on Lake Champlain, we are unwilling to say more than may be necessary for the vindication of the character and conduct of Sir George Prevost. The real causes of the disastrous result of that affair, were such, as particularly belong to naval actions, and which, when they do occur, must materially influence the issue of the conflict. It is not a little remarkable, that the naval Court-martial on Captain Pring and his officers, should have overlooked or disregarded these causes; and it is greatly to be regretted, that they should have thought themselves justified in ascribing the disaster to the conduct of Sir George Prevost, and in passing so severe a censure upon an officer of another service, of whose orders and instructions they must necessarily have been ignorant, and who was neither present to defend himself, nor amenable to their jurisdiction. It is clear that it was Captain Downie's intention, on going into action, to lay his own ship, in the size and strength of which he seemed to place great confidence, along side of the American Commodore; but the unfortunate failure of the wind, before he could accomplish this object, obliged him to anchor at a distance of more than half a mile from his opponent; the same circumstance also induced Captain Pring, in the Linnet, to take his situation still farther from the enemy. But even this disadvantage would probably not have been attended with the consequences which afterwards ensued, had Captain Downie's invaluable life been spared, and had all under him done their duty. The Finch, in going into action, grounded out of the line of fire, and was shortly afterwards taken possession of by the enemy. The gun-boats, when the action commenced, were considerably distant from the enemy's line, and slowly pulling up in apparent confusion. The Chub, very shortly after the action, having her cables shot away, drifted into the enemy's line, and was obliged to surrender. The Confiance, it would thus appear, being left nearly alone to bear the brunt of the whole action; the greater part of the enemy's fire being directed against her; the two schooners gone, and the gun-boats, with the exception of two or three, taking no part in the contest, it is not to be wondered at, that against such fearful odds, the men could not be kept to their guns, and that, notwithstanding the exertions and bravery of the officers, she was compelled to surrender. The real causes of the disaster must, therefore, be sought for in the unfavourable circumstances under which the action commenced; in the squadron's not taking the station which Captain Downie had designed they should; in the early loss of that officer; the grounding of the Finch; the surrender of the Chub, and the desertion of the gun-boats—circumstances more than sufficient to account for the capture of our squadron, without having recourse to a reason which the gallant Downie would have scorned to assign, and which we have already shewn to be without the slightest foundation—namely, the want of a co-operation from the army. Had even the gun-boats done their duty, the result of the action might, and probably would, have been widely different, as the men on board of the Confiance assigned it as one reason for their refusing to stand to their guns, that the gun-boats keeping at a distance, the whole fire of the enemy was directed against the Confiance. The Commander of these gun-boats, it is to be observed, was so sensible of his own misconduct, that he shortly after the action, made his escape from Kingston, and was not afterwards heard of. The removal of Captain Fisher from the command of the Lake Champlain squadron, precisely at the period when it was about to be employed in the service before mentioned, was particularly unfortunate; and it was no less so that his zealous offer to Captain Downie, to serve under him in command of the gun-boats, could not be accepted by that officer.
In the month of March, 1815, Sir George Prevost received the despatch communicating to him the Prince Regent's pleasure, that he should return to England to answer the charges preferred against him by Sir James Yeo, and a commission was, at the same time, transmitted to Lieutenant-General Drummond, revoking the appointment of Sir George Prevost as Governor-in-Chief and Commander of the forces in the Canadas, and authorizing General Drummond to assume, provisionally, the chief civil and military command of those Provinces. By this measure, Sir George Prevost was compelled either to remain for six weeks, until the navigation of the St. Lawrence should be open—a private individual in the country over which he had so lately presided as its chief magistrate, and exposed to the observations of all who had been hostile to his measures,—or to encounter at a most inclement season the fatigue and dangers of a journey, to be performed, frequently on foot, through the wilderness to New Brunswick. His high and honourable feelings did not permit him to hesitate for a moment as to the course which it was his duty to pursue, and he immediately quitted his government. It was no inconsiderable consolation to him, under circumstances like these, to know that he carried with him on his departure the regret and the good wishes of the inhabitants of Canada, which were manifested, not only by the different addresses and letters[93] which were presented to him upon this occasion, but in a still more striking manner, by the terms of a vote of the House of Representatives, who proposed to present to their late Governor-General a service of plate of the value of 5,000l. This munificent act, though honoured with the approbation of the Prince Regent, was not carried into effect, in consequence of a refusal to accede to it on the part of the legislative council.[94]
On the arrival of Sir George Prevost in England, in the month of May, 1815, it was evident that his constitution had suffered a fatal injury. His health had yielded to the excessive fatigues of his journey to New Brunswick, and his illness was aggravated by the delays which he experienced in urging forward the investigation which he so earnestly desired. Notwithstanding all his efforts, the Court-martial was not directed to assemble before the month of January, 1816—a delay which proved fatal to his hopes. He died on the 5th January, 1816, in the 49th year of his age.[95]