The batteries played on every place where the enemy were perceived to be at work; and more than once obliged them to discontinue their labour. It was the 3rd of October, before they opened any of their batteries: and then, about midnight they began to bombard from nine mortars of eight and ten inches, and continued the bombardment about two hours. At day-light, their fire commenced again from the nine mortars, and also from 37 pieces of cannon from the land side, and 16 from their shipping: and in this they persisted with little variation during several days. The execution done by this heavy fire, was much less than could have been imagined. It consisted in killing a few helpless women and children, and some few negroes and horses in the town, and on the common. On the 6th, the enemy threw some carcasses into the town, which burnt one wooden house: and about 11 o'clock, the General sent a letter, by a flag of truce, to M. d'Estaing, requesting permission to send the women and children out of the place, on board of ships and down the river, under the protection of a French ship of war, until the siege should be ended. After three hours, and a deal of intermediate cannon shot and shells, an insulting answer was returned by Messrs. Lincoln and d'Estaing, in which they refused to comply with this reasonable and humane demand.

The garrison, undismayed by this brutal conduct on the part of their opponents, kept up a smart fire against them; and during the night were extremely busy in adding to their works, and in repairing such of them as had sustained damage. Thus things went on until the morning of the 9th; when, a little before day-break, after a heavy, and as usual, incessant cannonade and bombardment, the enemy attacked General Prevost's lines.

The attack being upon the left of his centre, in front of the French; and very soon after, upon his left and right. It was yet dark, and the darkness was increased by a very thick fog, which made it impossible to determine with precision, where the real attack was to be made, or how many assaults were intended. No reinforcements therefore were sent; but every thing was kept in readiness for that purpose, and the troops waited with the greatest coolness in their different posts, for the approach of the enemy. Those in the lines were prepared to charge them, wherever they should attempt to penetrate: and the General had the greatest hopes, that the fire of the field artillery, which was placed to support the advanced redoubts, would enable him, while the enemy were entangled among these, to throw them into some confusion; and, perhaps, with a good prospect of success, to order his corps de reserve to sally forth and charge them. The ground toward both his flanks, owing to its natural defects, which the utmost efforts of Captain Moncrieffe had been unable effectually to remove, was but too favourable for an enemy. On the right was a swampy hollow, by which they could approach under cover to within fifty yards of his principal works, and in some places still nearer; and there, he supposed, that the rebels would make their assault. On the left, the approach was neither so well covered, nor of so great an extent as that on the right; but as it was sufficiently large to admit troops to act, as the ground was firm and clear, and as it was near their encampment, he expected that the French regulars would make their attack there: but in this he was mistaken. A real attack did take place there: but the principal attack, composed of the flower of the French and rebel armies, and led by the Compte d'Estaing in person, assisted by all the principal officers of both, was made upon his right. Under cover of the hollow, they advanced in three columns; but, owing to the darkness, took a wider circuit than they needed or intended to have done, and went deeper into the bog. These circumstances prevented them from beginning the attack so soon as they had concerted; and besides occasioning a loss of critical time, produced considerable disorder in their ranks. The attack, however, was very spirited, and for some time obstinately maintained; particularly at a redoubt on the Ebenezer road, which was a scene of hot action, great loss, and consummate bravery. Two stand of colours were actually planted, and several of the assailants killed upon the parapet; but they met so determined a resistance, that they could not, with all their efforts, force an entrance. It was now, that the skill and design of the defences raised by Captain Moncrieffe, were fully displayed; for, while the conflict was still dubious and bloody, the field-pieces, from three batteries which were manned by the sailors, took them in every direction, and made such havock in their ranks, that they were thrown into confusion, and compelled to make a pause. At this critical moment, Major Glacier, of the 60th regiment, with the grenadiers of that corps and the marines, advanced rapidly from the lines; in the most impetuous manner, charged the enemy with their fixed bayonets; and plunging among them, into the ditches and works, drove them, in an instant, from the ditches of the redoubt, and from a battery a little to the right of it. Following up the blow, they forced them to fly, in great confusion, over the abatis, and into the swamp. On this occasion, Captain Wickham, of the 2d battalion of the 60th grenadiers, greatly distinguished himself. When the grenadiers advanced, three companies of the second battalion of the 71st regiment were ordered to sustain them: and although they were posted at no considerable distance, and marched forward with the usual ardour of that corps, such was the rapidity with which the grenadiers had made their attack, and so precipitate was the enemy's retreat, that they could not come in for a share of the victory. One of the enemy's columns a little more to their left, in every attempt which it made to come out of the hollow, was repulsed by the brisk and well directed fire of a redoubt, where the militia were posted, aided by Hamilton's small corps of North Carolinians, who were on the right, and moved there with a field-piece to bear obliquely against it, while one of the seamen's batteries took it directly in flank. It was now day-light: but the fog was not sufficiently cleared off, to enable General Prevost to judge with any degree of certainty of the strength, disposition, or further intentions of the enemy on the right. On the left, and in the centre, the fog, with the addition of the smoke, was still impenetrably close: and a smart firing being still kept up there, the General thought it would be improper to draw from it a number of troops sufficient to make a respectable sortie. By these means, an opportunity was lost of taking complete advantage of the confusion of the enemy, by charging them in their retreat; but they did not get off without being severely cannonaded by the batteries and field-pieces, as long as they were in sight, or judged to be within reach. They were every where repulsed: and those on the left were only heard, being concealed from view by the thickness of the fog.

Lieutenant-Colonel de Porbeck, of Weissenbeck's Hessian regiment, was field-officer of the right wing: and being in the redoubt when the attack began, had an opportunity, which he well improved, of signalizing himself in a most gallant manner. It would not be doing justice to the different corps who defended the redoubt, if we neglected to mention them. They were part of the South Carolina Royalists; and the light dragoons dismounted, and commanded (by special order) by Captain Tawae, a good and gallant officer, who nobly fell with his sword in the body of the third man he had killed with his own hand. The loss on the part of the British in this battle, consisted of one captain, and fifteen rank and file killed; one captain, three subalterns, and thirty-five rank and file wounded. The loss sustained by the enemy, as acknowledged by the French, was about a thousand or twelve hundred men killed and wounded; of these, they lost forty-four officers and seven hundred men: and the deserters, of whom there were a great many, all declared, that the loss on the part of the rebels was not less than four hundred men. Among the wounded was M. d'Estaing, (in two places) M. de Fontange, Major-General; and several others of distinction. Count Polaski, (who has been mentioned in the course of these Memoirs), a Colonel of cavalry in the rebel service, in making a desperate push at the British lines, was mortally wounded.

About ten o'clock, the enemy requested a truce, and leave to bury their dead, and carry off their wounded men. This was granted for those who lay at a distance from the lines, or out of sight of them: but those within or near the abatis were interred by the British. Their numbers were on the right, two hundred and three; on the left, twenty-eight. One hundred and sixteen prisoners, most of them mortally wounded, were delivered to the enemy. To this loss, considerable of itself, must be added, the numbers buried by them, the numbers who perished in the swamp, and many who were carried off by them when they retreated.

From this time to the 18th, nothing very material happened. Several flags of truce were sent during that period by the enemy, and a great deal of civility passed mutually between the French and British. Many apologies were made for their refusal to allow the women and children to be sent out of town: and the blame of this base conduct was laid, by a French Colonel, Compte O'Duin, entirely on the scoundrel Lincoln, and the Americans.[100] The offer was then made with great earnestness, that the ladies and children should be received by the Chevalier du Romain, on board of the Chimere; but the answer given to it was blunt and soldierly, that what had once been refused, and that in terms of insult, was not in any circumstances deemed worth acceptance. All the French officers seemed quite ashamed of this affair. As it was with them only, that the British had any intercourse after the repulse on the 9th, the sentiments of the Americans could not be so well known. But, as the letter was signed by d'Estaing, as well as by Lincoln, their imputing this harsh, cruel, and unprecedented refusal, entirely to the brutality of the American General, may serve to shew their consciousness, that it was altogether indefensible; but is by no means sufficient to exculpate the French Commander, from his share of the blame and disgrace, inseparable from it. An author,[101] who is extremely partial to the American cause, endeavours to defend this measure from motives of policy: "The combined army (says he) was so confident of success, that it was suspected, that the request of sending away the women and children, proceeded from a desire of secreting the plunder lately taken from the South Carolinians, and artfully covered under the specious veil of humanity. That the Commanders were suspicious, considering the stratagem Prevost had practised after being summoned, is not strange. It was also presumed, that a refusal would expedite a surrender." There does not seem to have been much cordiality between the French and Americans in this enterprise. M. d'Estaing would have been well pleased to have done the business without them, by summoning the place to surrender to his Most Christian Majesty. This, the latter took much amiss, as they considered themselves as principals, and the French only as auxiliaries: and for this piece of presumption, some concessions were made. When the time assigned by M. d'Estaing for this expedition had elapsed, and still more was required by the engineers, if it was expected that the garrison should be compelled to surrender by regular approaches, he became extremely impatient to bring matters to a quick decision, and urged giving the assault to the place. This measure, says Mr. Gordon, was forced on M. d'Estaing by his naval officers, who had remonstrated against his continuing to risk so valuable a fleet in its present unrepaired condition, on such a dangerous coast in the hurricane season; and at so great a distance from the shore, that it might be surprised. These remonstrances were enforced, by the probability of their being attacked by the British fleet completely repaired, with their full complement of men, soldiers, and artillery on board, when the ships of his Most Christian Majesty were weakened, by the absence of a considerable part of their crews, artillery, and officers, employed at the siege of Savannah. These reasons had great weight with M. d'Estaing: and he prevailed on General Lincoln to storm the place without farther loss of time. The Americans seemed to think, that by a little more patience and perseverance, the town must have submitted; as in a few days, the lines of the besiegers would have been carried quite close to the works of the besieged. Their allies, however, judged themselves to be in so critical a situation, that they acquiesced in M. d'Estaing's proposal; for, if the French had retired to their ships, the siege must have been raised, so that there remained only one alternative for them to adopt. The repulse which they had received, was not followed by mutual accusations of want of courage or conduct in either party; but the French, in all their conversations, spoke of the Americans with the greatest contempt.

It was not perceived until the 18th, that the enemy had raised the siege; but, the fog clearing up in the morning of that day, it was found that they had moved off. For some days previous to this, they had been busy in drawing off their cannon and mortars, and in embarking their sick and wounded, of whom they had a great number. General Prevost immediately detached parties in pursuit of them; but they had got to such distance before it was discovered they had retreated, that they could not overtake them: the enemy in their march having broken down all the bridges. The French embarked in Augustine creek, and the rebels crossed the river Savannah, at Zubley's ferry, and got into South Carolina. The enemy's fleet quitted the coast on the 26th October, and their frigates and galleys on the 2d of November, as soon as an exchange of prisoners had taken place. The balance of prisoners was in the enemy's favour: for while they were off this coast, on the 11th of September, his Majesty's ship, Ariel, of 24 guns, was taken by the French frigate, the Amazon, of 36 guns; and besides taking the Experiment, they took also the Myrtle, navy victualler; and Champion, storeship. The last of these was a prize of considerable importance to them, for their fleet was very badly manned, their crews sickly, their ships in bad condition, short of anchors and cables, and no running rigging to reeve, but this ship afforded them a supply. She had been sent from New York, with naval stores for the ships and vessels, under the command of Captain Henry.

No. II.

Address from the Council and House of Representatives of St. Vincents to Lieut.-Col. Prevost, p. 7.

"Sir,