The American Government, deceived by the erroneous information which they had received respecting the disaffection of the Canadian population to Great Britain, had calculated upon meeting with considerable support from the people in their invasion of the Province. They had been told, and they believed, that the militia would not serve, or, if embodied, would be worse than useless. The embodying, arming, and training of 2,000 of the most active portion of the population, for several weeks before the war was declared, was a severe disappointment to the American Government; and was one of the causes of that determined resistance, which they afterwards experienced in every attempt to penetrate into that Province. This militia force also enabled the Commander of the forces to detach a larger portion of the regular troops, than he could otherwise have been justified in parting with, to the Upper Province; while, at the same time, it afforded him the means, on the breaking out of the war, of guarding the different passes and roads into Lower Canada, with a description of men perfectly well acquainted with the nature of the country, and with the mode of warfare necessary for its defence. The line of frontier in the Lower Province was thus most effectually guarded by Sir George Prevost's able disposition of this new force, together with the assistance of the regular troops; and every prudent precaution consistent with his means, and with the instructions he was constantly receiving from England, to avoid all unnecessary expense, was taken. The precautionary measures which were pursued upon this occasion, by the Commander of the forces, met with the full approbation of His Majesty's Government, expressed in a despatch from Lord Bathurst, of the 6th November, 1812, in which his Lordship informed Sir George Prevost, that "the preparations for defence which he had made upon the first intimation of eventual hostility with America, and which he had since so vigorously continued, had met with the Prince Regent's entire approbation."
After charging Sir George Prevost with negligence, in not preparing to meet the threatened hostilities, the Reviewer proceeds to hazard an opinion, that the occupation and fortifying of Coteau du Lac, and Isle aux Noix, which he terms the keys of Lower Canada, was a measure which Sir George Prevost ought to have adopted, in preference to all others; but which he entirely overlooked and neglected.[23] The fact is, that the occupation of Coteau du Lac, as is well known to every military man acquainted with the Canadas, could only be useful as against the enemy advancing from Lake Ontario, or the shores of the St. Lawrence, above Montreal. No such force could be expected to descend the river from the lake, so long as we had the command of it, as we undoubtedly had, not only at the commencement of the war, but for several months afterwards; and as little was it to be apprehended as collecting on the shores of the river. The information which the Commander of the forces was constantly receiving of the intended movements of the enemy, and of the real and immediate object of their attack, was too correct to leave him in any doubt as to their attempting the Lower Province in that direction, or to induce him to diminish the small means he possessed, for the defence of more important points, by the occupation of posts which at that period could afford him no additional security. Coteau du Lac, was not therefore occupied as a post, either before the war or for several months afterwards, but its real importance was neither overlooked nor disregarded, as the Reviewer has stated. It was examined and reported upon by different officers, sent to inspect the line of frontier extending from Lower Canada to Lake Ontario, immediately after the declaration of war, and particularly by Colonel Lethbridge, who was afterwards in command there. In possession of Kingston, and commanding the waters of the lake, and with the knowledge possessed by Sir George Prevost, of the force and designs of the enemy, no military man in the Canadas, would have thought it necessary, in the then state of affairs, that Coteau du Lac should be occupied. When subsequent events clearly shewed the intentions of the enemy to invade Lower Canada from Lake Ontario, and when the means of Sir George Prevost were better adapted for defending the whole line of that frontier, Coteau du Lac was occupied and fortified; and had it not been for the defeat which part of General Dearborn's army met with from Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison's division in descending the St. Lawrence, that post would have presented a formidable obstacle to the advance of the enemy.
The importance of Isle aux Noix, as a post, has been considerably lessened[24] since the defence of the Canadas by the French, in consequence of the facility with which Lower Canada may now be entered by the various routes which the intercourse between that Province and the United States has created. Isle aux Noix had long ceased to be either the only, or principal barrier between the two countries. The occupation of this post was not therefore deemed necessary as a precautionary measure before the war; nor was it until some time afterwards that Sir George Prevost was enabled to put it in a state of defence. As soon, however, as the reinforcements and supplies from England gave him the means of more effectually guarding all the avenues to the Lower Province, Isle aux Noix became the object of his consideration. In consequence of the condition in which it was then placed, and of the force stationed there, two armed schooners of the enemy fell into our possession, and laid the foundation of the marine which was afterwards formed for carrying forward the operations on Lake Champlain. There cannot be a stronger proof of the little importance which the enemy themselves attached to this post in the early part of the contest, than their never making the slightest attempt to obtain possession of it.
Having thus stated what Sir George Prevost did not do, by way of preparation for the defence of the Canadas before the war, the Reviewer proceeds to point out what was done by him after the commencement of hostilities. And here we find the same want of candour which distinguishes the remarks to which we have already adverted.[25]
In order to form a correct opinion of Sir George Prevost's conduct at this period, it will be necessary to advert to the system which he adopted on the commencement of the war, and to the motives which induced him to pursue it.
The declaration of war by the United States of America, it is well known, was finally carried in Congress, after long debate, and a most violent opposition, by a comparatively small majority. The northern and eastern states, whose interests, it was acknowledged, were most affected by the British orders in council, the ostensible and avowed cause of the war, were constantly and strenuously opposed to hostile measures. It was apparent to every person at all conversant with what was passing in the United States at this time, that a contest undertaken in opposition to the sentiments and wishes of so considerable a portion of the Union, and for an object which Great Britain might, without any sacrifice of national honor, so easily concede, as she was, in fact, about to do, at that very period, must necessarily be of short duration. This was the opinion entertained by the most sensible and well informed men in the northern and eastern states, as well as in the Canadas, and in that opinion Sir George Prevost concurred. It will likewise be seen, that the sentiments of His Majesty's Government on this head were in unison with those of the Commander of the forces. Under these circumstances, and with these impressions, it became the obvious policy of Sir George Prevost, upon the breaking out of the war, to avoid whatever might tend to widen the breach between the two countries, and to pursue a line of conduct, which, while it should effectually tend to defeat the object of the American Government in their attack upon the Canadas, should also serve still further to increase the dislike and opposition of the northern and eastern states, to those measures of aggression against the British Provinces, which they had constantly predicted would be attended with discomfiture and disgrace. In his adherence to this defensive system, Sir George Prevost was encouraged and supported, as it will speedily be shewn, not only by the approbation of the British Government, but likewise by the concurrence of those who were best qualified by their knowledge and situation to form a correct judgment on the propriety of the measures which he was pursuing. This policy was also the more necessary, in consequence of the inadequacy of the means possessed by the Commander of the forces to repel the threatened attack of the Americans at the commencement of the contest. The whole of the regular force at that time in the Canadas did not amount to 5,000 men; the law for embodying the militia had only been recently passed; and the population, which had been previously considered as not well affected, had neither been armed nor accustomed to discipline for many years. The military chest was exhausted, and there was little prospect, that for some months at least, considering the exertions which Great Britain was then called upon to make in Europe, any supplies either of men or money could be afforded for the defence of her Dominions in North America. These difficulties neither depressed nor discouraged the ardent and active spirit of Sir George Prevost. Although he fully coincided in opinion with that able and judicious officer Sir James Craig, that in the event of a war with America, Quebec should be the object of primary consideration; yet the defence of the whole line of frontier between the Canadas and the United States, occupied his early and serious consideration. That frontier comprehended a distance of more than 900 miles, every part of which he determined to dispute inch by inch, and to defend by every means in his power.
It was in pursuance of the defensive line of policy which had been so wisely determined upon, as well with reference to his own resources, and the character of the enemy with whom he had to contend, as to the views and instructions of the British Government, that the Commander of the forces immediately after the commencement of the war, gave general instructions to those in command under him, to abstain from any unnecessary and uncalled for act of hostility upon the American territory. Notwithstanding these general instructions, much was of course left to the discretion of those who received them, in availing themselves of any fair opportunity of retaliating upon the enemy the aggressive warfare they might attempt, by attacking, wherever it might be done with any reasonable prospect of success, the contiguous forts and possessions of the Americans.
The private letter of 31st March, 1812, to Major-General Brock, from which an extract has already been made, evidently shews, that Sir George Prevost never meant to restrain the officers in command under him from acting upon the offensive, whenever circumstances were such as would justify their departure from the defensive system. Of these circumstances they were the best judges. That this was the light in which Sir George Prevost's instructions were viewed by Major-General Brock, appears by the following extract from a letter addressed by him to the Commander of the forces, on the 3rd July, 1812, at which time he was fully aware of the defensive line of policy which had been adopted:
"The account received, first through a mercantile channel, and soon after repeated from various quarters, of war having been declared by the United States against Great Britain, would have justified, in my opinion, offensive operations. But the reflexion, that at Detroit and St. Joseph's, the weak state of the garrisons would prevent the Commanders from attempting any essential service connected in any degree with their future security, and that my only means of annoyance on this communication, was limited to the reduction of Fort Niagara, which could be battered at any future period, I relinquished my original intentions, and attended only to defensive measures."
That Captain Roberts, the commanding officer at Fort St. Joseph's, acted from a sense of this discretion thus entrusted to him, there cannot be a doubt, as in his official letter to the Adjutant-General, announcing the capture of Michilimachinac, he does not allude in the slightest degree to his having acted contrary to his orders. The approval of his conduct in general orders is likewise a convincing proof that Sir George Prevost considered that he had acted up to the spirit of his instructions whatever they might have been, and that he had used a sound discretion respecting them.