Private Despatch from Sir George Prevost to Earl Bathurst, p. 179.
(Private.)
"Montreal, 21st Sept. 1814.
"My Lord,
"In my despatch from Plattsburg, of the 11th inst. I reported to your Lordship the unfortunate event which induced me to withdraw the troops with which I had advanced into the enemy's territory. My reasons for that measure I can more fully explain to your Lordship in a private communication than it might be proper to do in a public letter.
"Your Lordship must have been aware from my previous despatches, that no offensive operations could be carried on, within the enemy's territory, for the destruction of his Naval Establishments, without naval support. Having ascertained that our flotilla was in every respect equal to the enemy's, and having received from Captain Downie the assurance, not only of his readiness, but of his ability to co-operate with the army, I did not hesitate in advancing to Plattsburg, and confidently relying upon the successful exertions of the squadron, I made my arrangements for the assault of the enemy's works the moment it should appear.
"The disastrous and unlooked for result of the naval contest, by depriving me of the only means by which I could avail myself of any advantage I might gain, rendered a perseverance in the attack of the enemy's position highly imprudent, as well as hazardous. From the state of the roads, each day's delay at Plattsburg rendered my retreat more difficult. The enemy's Militia was raising en masse around me, desertion increasing, and our supply of provisions scanty.
"Excluded from the use of water communication, and that by roads passing through woods and over swamps, becoming, from the state of the weather, as well as from the obstructions made by the enemy, nearly impassable—under these circumstances, I had to determine whether I should consider my own fame, by gratifying the order of the troops in persevering in the attack, or consult the more substantial interests of my country, by withdrawing the army which was yet uncrippled, for the security of these provinces; in adopting the latter measure, I feel that I have accorded with the views of His Majesty's Government, and that a contrary conduct would have been attended with immediate and imminent danger to this Province.
"The most ample success on shore, after the loss of the fleet, could not have justified the sacrifice I must have made to obtain it. Had I failed, and such an event was possible, after the American army had been cheared by the sight of a naval victory, the destruction of a great part of our troops must have been the consequence, and with the remainder I should have had to make a precipitate and embarrassed retreat, one very different from that which I have made.