At the time that our troops crossed the frontier, the Rajah Shere Singh was in force on both banks of the Chenab, with his advanced parties pushed forward to Eminabad and Goojranwallah, and occasionally even to the banks of the Ravee. These, however, fell back before the advancing columns under Brigadier-Generals Cureton and Campbell, and the Rajah abandoned the town of Ramnuggur, and placed the principal part of his force on the right bank of the river, but still holding the left with large masses of cavalry, and some smaller bodies of infantry. The town of Ramnuggur, on the left bank of the Chenab, is situated about two miles from the river, from which it is divided by a low tract of waste cander land, subject to occasional inundation, and intersected by a few easy nullahs. Nearly midway between the town and the river was a small but dense grove of trees, around which hovered the advanced bodies of the Sikh army.
On the 20th November, Brigadier-Generals Cureton and Campbell were within an easy march of Ramnuggur, and during the night they were joined by the Commander-in-Chief. The following day the first collision took place between the army of the Punjaub and the Sikh troops under Shere Singh. It was an unfortunate affair, which led to the loss of some valuable lives without any corresponding advantages to ourselves. Lord Gough was on the ground or in its neighbourhood, but Brigadier-General Campbell was that day in command. However, as the work was entirely confined to the cavalry and horse-artillery, Brigadier Cureton was the actual leader. It was his lordship’s wish to drive Shere Singh completely across the river. The Sikh cavalry were, as before mentioned, hovering between the grove and the left bank. Our cavalry and two troops of horse-artillery (Lane’s and Warner’s) were pushed forward rapidly to dislodge them. The 14th dragoons, charging inconsiderately too far in advance, came unexpectedly upon a nullah filled with Sikh infantry, and were received with a heavy musketry fire, which caused them considerable loss. Colonel Havelock and many others fell in the skirmish, and also the brave old General Cureton. Nor was this all; one of our troops of horse-artillery (2nd troop 3rd brigade) advancing too close to the river’s edge, got under a heavy fire from the enemy’s batteries, and was compelled to retreat with the loss of a gun, which stuck against the bank of a nullah and could not be extricated. Such was the unpropitious commencement of the campaign. The Sikhs were certainly compelled to confine themselves to the right bank, but no doubt the same object might have been gained without so great an expenditure of life.
Meantime the heavy train, with No. 6 horse field-battery, and Penny’s brigade of infantry, were moving up as rapidly as possible. After crossing the Ravee, the detachment diverged from the main road for the purpose of attacking a fort of some strength, called Jhubber, into which a rebel sirdar, Attar Singh, had thrown a small garrison, when he proceeded to join the camp of the sirdar. Two guns of No. 6 field-battery, with small detachments of infantry and irregular cavalry, proceeded in advance against the fort, while the main body followed. The garrison, however, refused to surrender to the nine-pounders, and the walls were too strong for field-pieces. It needed, however, but a sight of the elephant-guns to induce the garrison to throw open their gates, and yield themselves prisoners. Some small pieces of ordnance were captured in the fort, which, together with the neighbouring village, were destroyed by orders from head-quarters.
On the 30th November, the heavy ordnance, anxiously awaited by Lord Gough, joined head-quarters at Ramnuggur, and that very night several pieces were placed in battery near the grove, and also farther to the right and higher up the stream, while Sir J. Thackwell, with nearly all the cavalry, Campbell’s division of infantry, and three troops of horse-artillery, and two field-batteries, marched up the stream to find a ford whereby to effect a passage, and so turn the enemy’s position.[[107]] This Lord Gough expected could be effected about nine miles above Ramnuggur; but Sir J. Thackwell found himself under the necessity of moving nearly as far as Wuzeerabad before he could effect the passage. This of course occasioned considerable delay.
On the 1st and 2nd there was some exchange of shots between our batteries and those of the enemy on the opposite bank; but the distance was too great to allow of any effect being produced. On the night of the second, our batteries were advanced to within 400 yards of the river’s edge; but in the morning it was apparent that the enemy had drawn back a great part of his camp, though he had left some batteries near the river, between which and ours some desultory firing took place. In the afternoon heavy firing was heard some few miles up the river. This was Thackwell, who had been attacked while resting after several long marches.
There was nothing more than a cannonade from either side. Shere Singh tried to dislodge Thackwell, but could effect nothing by his fire, while, on the other hand, he himself was soon driven from the field by three troops of horse-artillery, 1st and 3rd troop 2nd brigade, and 1st troop 3rd brigade, under Huish, Christie, and Warner, and two field-batteries (No. 5 under Captain Kinleside, and four guns of No. 10 under Captain Austin). Thackwell made no pursuit; being ignorant of the strength of the enemy both in men and guns, and his own troops being somewhat weary, he was unwilling to become more closely engaged. The enemy suffered considerably, but our loss was trifling, and principally in the artillery; Captain E. G. Austin, of No. 10 heavy field-battery, was severely, and Lieutenant J. E. Watson, of 1st troop 2nd brigade horse-artillery, slightly wounded.
As day broke on the morning of the 4th, it was discovered by the indefatigable General Gilbert, as he rode from our batteries to the river’s edge, that the enemy had entirely deserted his position. A ford was immediately sought for, and soon discovered; Thackwell, reinforced from head-quarters,[[108]] pursued the retreating Sikhs until they entered a thick belt of jungle, into which he did not consider it prudent to follow them. He accordingly encamped at Hailah, his camp equipage and baggage having been sent to join him from Ramnuggur. About the 8th or 9th he was again reinforced. The remainder of the horse-artillery, under Brigadier Brooke, C.B., crossed the river, also No. 17 heavy field-battery under Captain Dawes, and the 1st company 4th brigade with four 18–pounders and two 8–inch howitzers, under Captain Sir R. C. Shakespear. Thackwell had with him now nearly all the force; two brigades of infantry, Hearsay’s brigade of irregular cavalry, Miles’s battery (No. 6), and the park, being all now left at head-quarters. His camp was formed at Hailah, in an extensive and for the most part uncultivated plain. In his front was the broad belt of jungle before mentioned, which extends from the sandy ridge on the banks of the Jhelum, some twelve or fifteen miles into the Dooab. At the further edge of this belt lay Shere Singh, his left resting on Russool, at the western extremity of the sand-ridge, his right flank being at Futteh-shah-ke-chuck, and his back towards the river. After the 5th December, each force remained inactive for a considerable period, save that the Sikhs occasionally sent small parties of horse through the jungle, who annoyed Thackwell by carrying off baggage, camels, &c.
On the 18th, a pontoon bridge having been constructed across the river, head-quarters, Mountain’s brigade of infantry, Hearsay’s of irregular cavalry (with the exception of the 11th under Holmes, left at Ramnuggur), and Brigadier Huthwaite and his staff, crossed the Chenab, and were then joined by No. 10 light field-battery under Lieutenant Robertson. On the 1st January, the head-quarters force moved to Janu-ke (about 1½ miles in rear of Hailah), when the artillery train and park joined from Ramnuggur, at which place a bridge-head had been constructed, armed with two 24–pounders and the guns of No. 6 heavy field-battery.
On the 9th, head-quarters force and that under Madwell changed ground, and effected a junction at Lussooria and Loah Tibbee, on the main road from Lahore to Attock, and about 12 miles in advance of the Chenab. Here it was supposed that the force would remain for a considerable time, and no doubt such was the original intention; but Attock, long defended by the gallant Herbert, fell, and Chutter Singh was known to be in full march to join his son, the Rajah, on the Jhelum; and Mackeson, the Governor-General’s agent, impressed upon the Commander-in-Chief the advisability of overthrowing the latter before reinforced by his father. His lordship, willing always to follow warlike counsels, readily consented: he reviewed his army, ordered up two corps of native infantry from Ramnuggur, on the 12th moved through the jungle, to Dhingee, and on the 13th fought the battle of Chillianwallah.
The strongest part of the enemy’s position was supposed to be his left, at Russool, on the extremity of the sand ridge, where it abuts on the river Jhelum. The immediate neighbourhood of Dhingee was pretty free from jungle, but along the base of the sand ridge, and in front of the whole of the Sikh position, it was exceedingly dense,—rendering all military operations (especially movements of cavalry or artillery) most difficult and hazardous; and concealing effectually the enemy’s line. It was Lord Gough’s original intention to attack Russool with his right (Gilbert’s division), while General Campbell should operate upon Lallianwallah and Futteh-shah-ke-chuck; but there was so much counter advice offered to him on the night of the 12th, that he was induced to forego his intention of attacking the enemy on the following morning. The force, however, marched from camp on the 13th, and the line of contiguous columns at first bore steadily down towards the enemy, the right directed on Russool. After a time, the right was brought more forward, so that the direction of our march became parallel to the enemy’s line, and Lord Gough gave orders to his quartermaster’s department to find a suitable spot for encampment, without going too near the enemy, and, at the same time, without the necessity of retracing our steps towards Dhingee. This was somewhat difficult, as the army had just passed some villages,—Burra and Chota Oomrao, between which and Chillianwallah there was no water. At Chillianwallah, on a mound, or small hillock, was the enemy’s most advanced post; of this, however, we were not aware, till a small party of our cavalry came upon it unexpectedly, and was fired upon; and thus Lord Gough was forced to fight the action on that day.