Colonel Pearse’s endeavours were, however, looked upon by Sir Eyre Coote as arising from a spirit of insubordination, which never had a place in his breast; and they drew forth a severe and cutting letter from the commander-in-chief, taxing him with unmilitary and unprecedented conduct, tending to sap subordination and obedience to its foundation, and telling him that he was called upon for obedience and not for an opinion, and that he was in nowise answerable for the results.
It must, however, be stated, in justice to Colonel Pearse, that, during the command of General Stibbert, several important military transactions occurred, and General Stibbert being absent in the field, Colonel Pearse obtained permission from him, as commander-in-chief, to address the Government direct on urgent occasions; and it was in the spirit of this permission, considering the disbanding the golundaz as a measure fraught with danger, that Colonel Pearse addressed the representation to Government.
To the commander-in-chief’s letter Colonel Pearse replied, regretting he had fallen under his displeasure, and detailing circumstances, such as the rumour of a body of Mahrattas being in the neighbourhood of Burdwan; the arrival of the ships without any recruits, of which he believed the commander-in-chief to have been in ignorance when the order was dictated, and which seemed to call for the exercise of some discretion on his part, in carrying into execution an order which would cramp the means of defence; that he had, in the exercise of what he deemed a sound discretion, stated the facts to Government, who could at once determine whether orders might with safety be instantly carried into execution, or whether they should be delayed until the commander-in-chief could be consulted; he deprecated any unguarded expressions, if such there were, in his former letter, being construed into a want of respect; and concluded by begging that the step he had taken might be considered as founded in error of judgment, and not in want of obedience; and entreated the commander-in-chief to overlook his error, and entertain a more favourable opinion of him than that expressed in the letter with which he had been honoured.
The appeal to Government was ineffectual, and the minutes of Council of 23rd November, 1779, “ordered that the native officers of the golundaz corps, at the presidency, be paid up to the end of this month and immediately discharged from the service; that the commandant of artillery be directed to repeat the offers already made to the men, and those who still decline to accept of them be immediately discharged.”
Those who feared the native powers training up good artillerymen by means of deserters from the British service, do not appear to have considered that without the material which is provided and kept up at a heavy expense, the best artillerymen would be useless; and that, although artillerymen are taught the preparation of stores, still very few have that intimate knowledge which only results from constantly handling and making them up; and which is, in reality, found in a much greater degree in the magazine workmen—a class who come and go at their pleasure, and appear to be little thought of, although the practical information they could carry to an enemy would be worth more than hundreds of mere well drilled artillerymen.
The Court of Directors, however, must be excepted, for in their warrant (17th June, 1748) they direct that “no Indian, black, or person of a mixed breed, nor any Roman Catholic, of what nation soever, shall, on any pretence, be admitted to set foot in the laboratory, or any of the military magazines, either out of curiosity, or to be employed in them, or to come near them, so as to see what is doing or contained therein.” And to such an extent did this fear then carry them, that another paragraph runs: “And if any person belonging to the company of artillery marry a Roman Catholic, or his wife become a Roman Catholic after marriage, such person shall immediately be dismissed from the company of artillery, and be obliged to serve the remainder of his time in one of the other companies, or be removed to another of the Company’s settlements, to serve it out there, if the Council think fit,” &c. And again, in their military letter to Bombay (6th April, 1770), they say: “As it is very essential that the natives should be kept as ignorant as possible, both of the theory and practice of the artillery branch of the art of war, we esteem it a very pernicious practice to employ the people of the country in working the guns; and, if such practice is in use with you, we direct that in future you attach European artillerymen to the service of the guns which may belong to sipahi corps, and that no native be trusted with any part of this important service, unless absolute necessity should require it.”
With these views it is not to be wondered at that the Home Government should have directed the golundaz to be reduced; but Indian experience might even then have taught that no more dangerous ally can be found for a native army than a large and imperfectly-equipped artillery. A native power will hardly bear the heavy continued expense required to keep it efficient; or, if the state should supply the means, the want of integrity in its agents will divert them from their proper course; and consequently, in the hour of emergency, the army is forced to fight a pitched battle to protect the unwieldy train of cannon, which becomes an incumbrance instead of a support: so it had been at Plassey and Buxar, and so it has been in every general action since. Assye, Argaum, Laswaree, Mahidpoor, would have been avoided, had there been no artillery in the native armies; unencumbered, they could have evaded the British; but the necessity of protecting their trains, and, perhaps, the confidence which their presence inspired, induced them to try the result of a battle.
Instead of discouraging native powers from organizing large parks of artillery, our policy should have been the reverse, resting confident that native parsimony and dishonesty would insure inefficiency in that branch.
In the new organization of the artillery now ordered, it was formed into two European battalions of five companies each, and to each company was attached a battalion of six companies of lascars, under the command of the same officer; they were to perform the whole duty dependent on the corps of artillery, and to be instructed in the usual services of artillery, with the exception “of pointing and loading guns and mortars.” They were dressed in uniform, and armed with a light pike, so constructed as to form a cheveux-de-frise.
| ORGANIZATION of 1779. | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| per Company. | per Battalion. | Total. | On returns 1 Feb. 1780. | |||
| Colonel Commandant. | 1 | Effective. | Invalids. | |||
| EUROPEAN. | Lieutenant-Colonels. | 1 | 2 | 2 | ||
| Majors. | 1 | 2 | 2 | |||
| Captains. | 1 | 5 | 10 | 10 | 1 | |
| Captain-Lieutenants. | 1 | 5 | 10 | 9 | ||
| Lieutenants. | 3 | 15 | 30 | 29 | 2 | |
| Lieut. Fireworkers. | 3 | 15 | 30 | 30 | ||
| Adjutants. | 1 | 3 | 4 | |||
| Aides-de-Camp. | 1 | |||||
| Serjeant-Majors. | 1 | 2 | ||||
| Qr.-Master Serjeants. | 1 | 2 | ||||
| Drill Serjeants. | 1 | 2 | ||||
| Drill Corporals. | 2 | 4 | ||||
| Pay Serjeants. | 1 | 5 | 10 | |||
| Serjeants. | 6 | 30 | 60 | 44 | 17 | |
| Corporals. | 6 | 30 | 60 | 41 | 10 | |
| Drummers. | 3 | 15 | 30 | 31 | ||
| Bombardiers. | 8 | 40 | 80 | 529 | 43 | |
| Gunners. | 24 | 120 | 240 | |||
| Matrosses. | 53 | 265 | 530 | |||
| LASCARS. | Serangs Commandant. | 1 | 10 | 3 | ||
| Serangs. | 1 | 6 | 60 | 53 | ||
| Tindals. | 2 | 12 | 120 | 106 | ||
| Cossibs. | 2 | 12 | 120 | 87 | ||
| Lascars. | 50 | 300 | 3000 | 2272 | ||
| Sircars. | 1 | 10 | 10 | 8 | ||
| Native Doctors. | 2 | 20 | 20 | 16 | ||
| Doolies. | 3 | 30 | 30 | |||
| Havildars. | 1 | 10 | 10 | 8 | ||
| Bheesties. | 6 | 60 | 60 | 48 | ||