On the 4th August the fleet anchored near Chillingching; the troops were landed, and took possession of Batavia without opposition on the 8th; an attempt by the enemy to drive them out the following night failed; and on the 10th the British advanced and drove the enemy from their intrenched camp at Weltervreeden. Captain Noble, with the Madras horse artillery, performed the chief artillery duties on this occasion.
The enemy having concentrated their force in the strong lines around Fort Cornelis, a battering-train was landed, and trenches were opened at about 800 yards from the position. These the enemy flooded by cutting dams on the 19th; on the 20th batteries for twelve and eight 18–pounders and nine howitzers and mortars were commenced; on the 21st the enemy opened a heavy fire on the unfinished batteries; but nevertheless the guns were mounted by the 22nd, when the enemy made a vigorous sally, and overcoming the unarmed working parties, who were not even protected by a guard, succeeded for a moment in capturing the batteries; but they were quickly driven back. On the 23rd and 24th a heavy fire was kept up by the enemy from twenty-four 32–pounders on the batteries and trenches; but although, on the 24th the fire of the nearest redoubt was repeatedly silenced, and towards evening several of the enemy’s guns were dismounted by the fire from the batteries, yet it became evident that without regular approaches the place could not be carried (unless by a coup de main), and this would require time, labour, and exposure in a baneful climate, which was to be avoided by all means.
Lieutenant Farnabie was killed by a stray shot while standing in the trench, and Captain Richards was wounded by some cartridges taking fire in the battery during these two days.
It was determined to storm the lines on the 26th. To occupy the enemy, a party, covered with nine guns, took post behind a rising ground on the right, and opened their fire, while the main column, under Major-General Gillespie, attacked the left, and after sustaining a severe loss, finally succeeded in carrying the lines,—capturing 6,000 prisoners and 280 pieces of fine brass ordnance.
In the orders issued to the army after this exploit, no mention is made of the artillery; and this omission has been attributed to a dislike said to have been taken to the Bengal artillery. That some such feeling was supposed to exist, we may conclude from the following passage, which appears in a letter from an engineer officer on the island to Colonel Horsford, written in October:—“You will see that the artillery were left out in the thanks to the army on the 26th August; but allow me to say, and that decidedly, that had it not been from the fire of our 18–pounders on the 23rd, 24th, and 25th, I believe not a man would have returned from the storm of the 26th without some remembrance, as the day before the storm 130 men and 4 officers were killed and wounded by our batteries; the consequence was, that their artillerymen positively refused to work at the batteries, and hardly a gun was fired by the enemy during the storm, although they had plenty of time; in short, I declare to you that I scarcely ever saw a more destructive fire kept up than by our batteries; indeed the killed and wounded in a hospital four miles to the south of Cornelis showed it, as well as the number of guns that were dismounted. I was constantly in the batteries. * * * The effect of our artillery, when they did fire, was so conspicuous, that at a practice I never saw better firing, especially of three guns on the right of the twelve-gun battery, commanded by Lieutenant Cameron. I declare to you I never witnessed anything like it, for every shot he fired went into the enemy’s embrasures; the consequence was, that in an hour and a half the redoubt which was opposed to it was silenced.”
In Sir Samuel Achmuty’s report to Lord Minto, the following mention is made of the ordnance branches:—“I have the satisfaction to assure you that both the artillery and engineers were actuated by the same zeal in performing their respective duties which has been so conspicuous in all ranks and departments, though, from deficiency of the means at their disposal, their operations were unavoidably embarrassed with uncommon difficulties.”
From Cornelis, General Jansens fled to Bintenzorg, and thence to Samarang, near which town he took up a position, Jattoo, on high and rugged hills, defended by thirty pieces of artillery, and the road cut off by cheveux de frise; he was attacked on the 16th of September by a detachment of 1,200 men, under Colonel Gibbs, with whom were 110 artillerymen and six guns; with the artillery were Major Caldwell, Lieutenants Scott, Farrington, Cameron, and Ralfe. Two of the guns were sent to the right with a force to seize on a hill which overlooked the enemy’s left, while the remainder were placed in a position in front to throw their shot across the valley into the enemy’s position. As soon as the two detached guns opened their fire, the advance rushed on; the enemy were surprised and fled, doing little execution with their artillery, which was all taken.
This was the last effort of General Jansens; he fled to Salatiga and capitulated; Fort Ludovick was surrendered, and the war, as far as the Dutch were concerned, may be said to have ended; but to avoid returning to Java again, we will here notice such other affairs as occurred during the time the British held possession of the island. But before continuing the narrative, we will here insert a sketch of the medal granted to the native troops employed in the expedition; and we may also state that medals were for this service granted to officers in H.M.’s service, but to none under the rank of commanding officer of a corps, or holding an important staff office.
The next service on which this force was employed was the expedition under Gillespie to the Palmsbury river, in April, 1822, in which were Captain S. Shaw, Lieutenants Hill and Delafosse.