After dark, by which time we had one man killed and two wounded, the firing died away into a continuous but desultory rifle-fire, with an occasional dropping shell from the guns. Under cover of dark, I tried to guard the drift and dead ground to the south of it, by men standing up and firing at that level, but towards midnight I was forced to withdraw them into the trenches, after several casualties, as the enemy then apparently woke up and kept up a furious rifle-fire upon us for over an hour. During this time the guns went through some mysterious evolutions. At first we got it very hot from the north, where the guns had been all along. Then suddenly a gun was opened on us away from the southwest, and we were shelled for a short time from both sides. After a little the shelling on the north ceased, and continued from the southwest only for twenty minutes. After this the guns ceased, and the rifle-fire also gradually died away.
When day dawned not a living soul was to be seen; there were the dead men, horses, and the deserted wagons. I feared a trap, but gradually came to the conclusion the Boers had retired. After a little we discovered the river-bed was deserted as well, but the Boers had not retired. They had discovered the dead ground, and under the mutually supporting fire of their guns, which had kept us to our trenches, had all crossed the drift and trekked south.
True, we were not captured, and had very few losses, and had severely mauled the enemy, but they had crossed the drift. It must have evidently been of great importance to them to go on, or they would have attempted to capture us, as they were about 500 to our 50.
I had failed in my duty.
During the next few hours we buried the dead, tended the wounded, and took some well-earned rest, and I had ample leisure to consider my failure and the causes. The lessons I derived from the fight were:
20. Beware of convex hills and dead ground. Especially take care to have some place where the enemy must come under your fire. Choose the exact position of your firing-trenches, with your eye at the level of the men who will eventually use them.
21. A hill may not, after all, though it has "command," be the best place to hold necessarily.
22. A conspicuous "bluff" trench may cause the enemy to waste much ammunition, and draw fire away from the actual defences.
In addition to these lessons, another little matter on my mind was what my colonel would say at my failure.
Lying on my back, looking up at the sky, I was trying to get a few winks of sleep myself before we started to improve our defences against a possible further attack, but it was no use, sleep evaded me.