So far as these opinions can be stated in tabular form, they will stand thus,—
| Yes. | No. | ||||
| Answer | to | first | question, | 6 | 11 |
| " | " | second | " | 2 | 11 |
| " | " | third | " | 4 | 10 |
| " | " | fourth | " | - | 15 |
| " | " | fifth | " | - | 2 |
On the fifth question, three gave it as their opinion that this army ought to advance as soon as Vicksburg falls, should that event happen. The following is a summary of the reasons assigned why we should not at this time advance upon the enemy:—
1. With Hooker's army defeated, and Grant's bending all its energies in a yet undecided struggle, it is bad policy to risk our only reserve army to the chances of a general engagement. A failure here would have most disastrous effect on our lines of communication and on politics in the loyal States.
2. We should be compelled to fight the enemy on his own grounds or follow him in a fruitless chase; or, if we attempted to outflank him and turn his position, we should expose our line of communication, and run the risk of being pushed back into a rough country well known to the enemy and little to ourselves.
3. In case the enemy should fall back without accepting battle he could make our advance very slow, and with a comparatively small force posted in the gaps of the mountains could hold us back while he crossed the Tennessee River, where he would be measurably secure and free to send reinforcements to Johnston. His force in East Tennessee could seriously harass our left flank and constantly disturb our communication.
4. The withdrawal of Burnside's ninth army corps deprives us of an important reserve and flank protection, thus increasing the difficulty of an advance.
5. General Hurlburt has sent the most of his force away to General Grant, thus leaving West Tennessee uncovered, and laying our right flank and rear open to raids of the enemy.
The following incidental opinions are expressed,—
1. One officer thinks it probable that the enemy has been strengthened rather than weakened, and that he (the enemy) would have reasonable prospect of victory in a general battle.