8. In that he, in the hope of justifying the prearranged surrender of the Fortress to the enemy, on December 29, 1904, reported to the Tsar in a telegram that: 'By the capture of Fort No. 3 the Japanese have become masters of the whole north-east front, and the Fortress can only hold out for a very few days. We have no artillery ammunition ...'—a report which was not in accordance with the facts, as at the Council of War held on that day (December 29), when the members by a large majority declared themselves in favour of holding out to the last moment, both Major-Generals Biely and Nickitin declared that there was sufficient ammunition in hand for a further defence.
Provided for under, etc.
9. In that he intentionally, improperly, and with false statements recommended:
(a) Lieutenant-General Fock for promotion to the Third Class Order of St. George for the battle which he lost at Kinchou, and in which he displayed complete incompetence;
(b) Major-General Nadein for promotion to the Third Class Order of St. George for the same battle, in which he in no way distinguished himself;
(c) Major-General Reuss for the Fourth Class of the same Order, this officer himself asserting that he had done nothing whatever to merit such a reward.
Provided for under, etc.
10. In that he, while in command of the District, and being the senior officer in a fortress which was being besieged by the Japanese, and of which the Commandant was subordinate to him, decided to surrender the Fortress to the enemy, and, in order to do so, in spite of the opinion of the great majority of the Council of War held on December 29, 1904, in favour of the continuation of the defence (which was in every way possible), and without, in accordance with the Regulations, convening a fresh Council of War, did between 3 and 4 p.m. on January 1, 1905, despatch a parlementaire to General Nogi, commanding the besieging army, proposing to enter into negotiations for the surrender of the Fortress, although all means of defence had not been exhausted, as the fighting strength of the garrison and the amount of war material and of supplies permitted of a continuation of it.
In that he, after this, agreed to the proposal of Lieutenant-General Fock, commanding the land defences, to abandon Little Eagle's Nest, Kuropatkin Lunette, and B Battery without a fight, which action greatly diminished the power of resistance of the Fortress.
In that he, on the following day—January 2, 1905—authorized Colonel Reuss, his Chief of the Staff, to conclude definitely the capitulation without giving him any precise instructions as to the terms to be insisted upon on our side, in consequence of which Colonel Reuss signed, in the village of Siu-shuing, to terms which were disadvantageous and derogatory to the dignity of Russia, in which action General Stössel himself failed to perform his duty according to his oath and to the honour of a soldier.
In that he, having surrendered the Fortress to the enemy, did not share the fate of the garrison by accompanying it into military confinement.
Provided for under, etc.