Put out your skeleton enemy on a good broad front, so as to allow room for change of targets, and do not have them all in one straight line, so that each target shall call for a change of sighting. Let the sections work independently of each other under their section commanders, who, with the other non-commissioned officers, will have to act both as commanders and instructors. Bring the sections up to about twelve hundred yards from the enemy; get them into a line with intervals between them, i.e., spaces measuring from the flank of one to the flank of the other, sufficient to admit of each section being extended to two or three paces between men without its flank men coming too close to those of other sections, e.g., with two sections of eight file, i.e., sixteen men each; you must leave room for half of each to extend to two paces towards the other, and keep a fair interval; that is, from the centre of each of the above sections of eight men in each rank you want 8 ÷ 2 (half the number in the front rank) × 2 (two ranks) × 2 (two paces extension) = 16 paces for the line extended and an interval of, say, 30 yards, which gives 46 yards between each section centre to centre. Now, let the section commanders order the men to extend, lie down, take cover and open fire. The unit commander, the non-commissioned officer in charge of the section, is to name the target and distance and also the rate of fire, rapid or slow, at all distances over six hundred yards from the enemy (I.T., 116 (5)), unless it is desired on occasion to train men to do this for themselves. After fire has been delivered, direct section commanders to proceed with the exercise, giving orders for advancing, halting and firing, the advance to be made from cover to cover as in Exercise No. I, but in quick time. Yourself supervise in chief, and tell section commanders when you want to give orders as to the firing or movement, and let them give the executive commands, after which you and they should pass along the lines and scrutinise each man’s actions in carrying out the orders, questioning them, and repealing hints you may have given when telling them the object and methods of the practice, if they appear not to be giving them effect. The value of the practice depends on the orders you give as to the firing and the following are suggested:—
(a) Switching the fire of all the rifles on to different parts of the enemy’s position, sometimes straight in front, but quite as often at his extreme flanks. This is to introduce the use of enfilade fire (I.T., 116 (11)) and the habit of giving support by fire to other units (F.S.R., 105 (4)), by concentrating the fire on to particular targets.
(b) Distributing the fire laterally along the whole or a part of the enemy’s front (I.T., 116 (10)). This may be done by giving the section a particular extent of the enemy’s front, e.g., “from the dry tree to the gate in the hedge.” The section commander then allots those of the enemy, who can be viewed within his bit of front to individual men, or preferably files of men, who are to treat them as their especial charge and keep on firing at them till otherwise ordered, or till the enemy shifts. Of course, if there is not enough of the skeleton enemy to give each file in the section a live antagonist (and there won’t be on your parades), the commander must indicate bits of cover which individual men of the enemy might be expected to use and tell his men to fire at these spots. This is a most important practice, and needs a good deal of attention and application before the men get really quick at it. It means, of course, that on service you will make it your business to allow as few of the enemy’s riflemen as possible to be free of the distraction of having some bullets landing about them, to upset their nerves and aim. Unless some plan is adopted to do this all along his line, it is all too probable your men will be exposed to some accurate fire from rifles held in steady hands, and even one rifle so held has, to my knowledge, caused a loss of eleven men in as many minutes. This lateral distribution is rather difficult, but it is easy, compared with the concomitant task of spotting where the men of the enemy are hidden, if they really try to hide, at anything but the shortest fighting ranges. The only remedy for this is for each private to carry field glasses of sorts; you will not get them from Government, but if any of your men are keen enough to go in for spotting a hidden enemy for themselves with glasses and would bring their own to parade, forbid them not, but encourage it. I have been told that in some of the yeomanry corps in the South African war nearly every trooper raised somehow and somewhere a pair of glasses—some were mother o’ pearl and silver-mounted, but did the spotting all right in spite of that.
(c) Passing orders and changing targets. Under heavy fire non-commissioned officers will not be able to move along the line, and orders must be passed either by word of mouth or by written messages passed from hand to hand; the former is apt to be slow, and the orders garbled en route unless practised beforehand; the latter is not very practical as men in action are too busy to read bits of paper or trouble themselves to see that they are passed on (I.T., 119 (4)). To practise the verbal method while the men are engaged in firing at any particular target, give orders to one man in a low tone (you would have to speak loud if ball cartridge were being used) to fire at some other target, and to pass the word. The man then tells his neighbours on each side, and yourself and a non-commissioned officer then follow the order each way, and when a man varies it admonish him to repeat just what he got from the last speaker, no more and no less. In a little time the men will become exact in taking and passing messages. This method should be confined to directions about firing; orders for movement should invariably be given by commanders by word themselves or signal, and men should not be allowed to repeat these, as it may lead to grave mistakes on service, as a signal may be seen and acted on by someone for whom it was not intended.
(d) Besides firing at the skeleton enemy or bits of cover, let fire be directed at civilians who are moving about in the field of view. Call on some individual man by name to choose some such target, and tell him he has to pass the word to the rest of his squad what target he has chosen and to fire at it. This gives practice in target definition, i.e., describing its position so that other men can know just where to look for it. It is not easy in a landscape devoid of noticeable objects to do this quickly, but it is important, as the difficulty of locating a well-concealed enemy with smokeless powder requires that every pair of eyes in the ranks should be engaged in the search till all the positions of the enemy’s riflemen are seen, and the information given to everyone in the firing line. Until this is done, the affair is one of trying to neutralise aimed by unaimed fire, a pretty hopeless task. Hence train your men to use their eyes for seeing and their tongues for description.
(e) Accustoming the men to judge distance, and use their backsights without orders. Judging distance for the men as a formal practice is confined to ranges under 800 yards, but it does no harm to let them judge greater ranges. Let the unit commanders define targets to be fired at, omitting to state the range, and let the men judge it for themselves and fire. Walk up the line and see that no man forgets to adjust his backsight for the distance he estimates. If possible, have the correct ranges taken previously with a range finder, and let the men know what they are after they have aimed. Each change of target gives the men a useful lesson in judging distance.
(f) Having put the men through all sorts of paces in the way of firing while advancing and retiring, in quick time do the same thing again, but with the movements in double time, and, in addition, carry out the increases and decreases of the extension, inclines and changes of direction given in I.T., 93, throughout insisting on the same steadiness in firing as when in quick time. All this will at first probably get the men “rattled,” and the benefit of it is that after some of it they will get over being “rattled,” and will not let hurried orders or speed of movement interfere with deliberation and steadiness in shooting.
EXERCISE IV.
The Assault.
Exercise III. can suitably be wound up by a practice in delivering an assault, as this does not take long, and the moral may be pointed that all fire training is only a preparation for a successful assault. The fixing of bayonets before assault commonly leads to a complete cessation of fire in the firing line. This is quite wrong, as such complete cessation of fire by the firing line must largely surrender for the time being that superiority of fire which facilitates the delivery of the assault (I.T., 121 (7)), for it gives the enemy a chance to take aim again. Supporting fire by artillery or infantry not in the firing line cannot be relied on when the firing line has reached assaulting distance. Therefore, do not have a simultaneous fixing of bayonets, but let one-half fix while the other fires, and the best arrangement is evidently one that ensures a fire being kept up along the whole front and not in patches. The system I have found most satisfactory is to fix bayonets by ranks, the front rank fixing while the rear rank continues firing, and then the rear rank fixing while the front rank fires. It may be done by odd and even files, or other ways, but, the company being organised in files, the same men are usually in the front and rear rank, and there is no difficulty in their remembering which they are. The important thing is to adhere to one system once it is adopted, and have it well understood by all. It does not matter much if a few men fix bayonets out of turn, so long as the fire is merely diminished and not stopped during the time bayonets are being fixed. In the charge, the men should work by their files, i.e., the two men of each file should act together and run at the same objective. The meaning of this is that in actual conflict two men would go together for the same individual enemy, and between the two of them they would be pretty sure to bring him to an untimely end, if the enemy really waited for the steel, and with less chance of his doing damage than if the combat took place man-to-man; thereafter they could turn their attentions to some other person.
For the practice choose and indicate any position for assault; work sections up to about two hundred yards from it, and then order rapid fire and bayonets to be fixed. As soon as all are ready, order the charge to be sounded. (I.T., 124). When the men hear the bugle they must at once jump from their cover and go straight and hard at the position; there must be no waiting by individuals to fire a last shot or two. The rush should be made suddenly and swiftly, so that the enemy has no time to see what is happening before the men are well on their way at him. When the position is reached, pass right through it and well beyond it, to escape hostile gunfire (I.T., 124 (5)), and then order the “Halt,” when the men may lie down under cover and open a pursuing fire. Walk along the line and see, with the help of non-commissioned officers, whether men of each file are together; if so, it will be proof that they have obeyed the directions to keep together during the charge. Allow a minute or two of the pursuing fire, then let section or platoon commanders sound their whistles, close and reform their sections under cover. On the whistle-sound (a succession of short blasts), men rise and double to where the commander is, resume their places, and lie down. This re-organisation is very important for you as company commander, for by it you get your men formed up quickly into platoons and ready to be closed into company or to take fresh orders in the minimum of time. The usual thing seen is that after the assault the ground is covered with a mixture of men of all companies staring about, and apparently thinking the show at an end, whereas on service this is the very time you may expect either a counter-attack by infantry or a burst of artillery fire directed on the lost position.