Henry VIII. of England summoned Thomas à Becket to appear before the Star Chamber to answer for his crimes and then had him condemned as a traitor, and his bones, that had been nearly four centuries in the tomb and worshipped as holy relics by countless pilgrims, burned and scattered to the winds.
When Stephen VI. succeeded to the tiara in 896, one of his first acts was to cause the body of his predecessor, Formosus, to be exhumed and brought to trial on the charge of having unlawfully and sacrilegiously usurped the papal dignity. A writ of summons was issued in due form and the corpse of the octogenarian pope, which had lain already eight months in the grave, was dug up, re-arrayed in full pontificals and seated on a throne in the council-hall of St. Peter’s, where a synod had been convened to adjudicate upon the case. No legal formality was omitted in this strange procedure and a deacon was appointed to defend the accused, although the synodical jury was known to be packed and the verdict predetermined. Formosus was found guilty and condemned to deposition. No sooner was the sentence pronounced than the executioners thrust him from the throne, stripped him of his pontifical robes and other ensigns of office, cut off the three benedictory fingers of his right hand, dragged him by the feet out of the judgment-hall and threw his body “as a pestilential thing” (uti quoddam mephiticum) into the Tiber. Not until several months later, after Stephen himself had been strangled in prison, were the mutilated and putrefied remains of Formosus taken out of the water and restored to the tomb. The Athenian Prytaneum, as we have already seen, was guilty of the childishness of prosecuting inanimate objects, but it never violated the sepulchre for the purpose of inflicting post-humous punishment on corpses. The perpetration of this brutality was reserved for the Papal See.
From the standpoint of ancient and mediæval jurisprudents the overt act alone was assumed to constitute the crime; the mental condition of the criminal was never or at least very seldom taken into consideration. It is remarkable how long this crude and superficial conception of justice prevailed, and how very recently even the first attempts have been made to establish penal codes on a philosophic basis. The punishableness of an offence is now generally recognized as depending solely upon the sanity and rationality of the offender. Crime, morally and legally considered, presupposes, not perfect, for such a thing does not exist, but normal freedom of the will on the part of the agent. Where this element is wanting, there is no culpability, whatever may have been the consequences of the act. Modern criminal law looks primarily to the psychical origin of the deed, and only secondarily to its physical effects; mediæval criminal law ignored the origin altogether, and regarded exclusively the effects, which it dealt with on the homœopenal principle of similia similibus puniantur, for the most part blindly and brutally applied.
Mancini, Lombroso, Garofalo, Albrecht, Benedikt, Büchner, Moleschott, Despine, Fouillée, Letourneau, Maudsley, Bruce Thompson, Nicholson, Minzloff, Notovich and other European criminal lawyers, physiologists and anthropologists have devoted themselves with peculiar zeal and rare acuteness to the study and solution of obscure and perplexing problems of psycho-pathological jurisprudence, and have drawn nice and often overnice distinctions in determining degrees of personal responsibility. Judicial procedure no longer stops with testimony establishing the bald facts in the case, but admits also the evidence of the expert alienist in order to ascertain to what extent the will of the accused was free or functionally normal in its operation. Here it is not a question of raving madness or of drivelling idiocy, perceptible to the coarsest understanding and the crassest ignorance; but the slightest morbid disturbance, impairing the full and healthy exercise of the mental faculties, must be examined and estimated. If “privation of mind” and “irresistible force,” says Zupetta, are exculpatory, then “partial vitiation of mind” and “semi-irresistible force” are entitled to the same or at least to proportional consideration. There are states of being which are mutually contradictory and exclusive and cannot co-exist, such as life and death. A partial state of life or death is impossible; such expressions as half-alive and half-dead are hyperbolical figures of speech used for purely rhetorical purposes; taken literally, they are simply absurd. It is not so, however, with states of mind. The intellect, whose soundness is the first condition of accountability, may be perfectly clear, manifesting itself in all its fulness and power, or it may be partially obscured. So, too, the will, whose self-determination is the second condition of accountability, may assert itself with complete freedom and untrammelled force, or it may act under stress and with imperfect volition. Moral coercion, whether arising from external influences, abnormities of the physical organism or defects of the mental constitution, is not less real because it is not easy to detect and may not be wholly irresistible. For this reason, it involves no contradiction in terms and is not absurd to call an action half-conscious, half-voluntary, or half-constrained. “Partial vitiation of mind” is a state distinctly recognized in psychiatrical science. In like manner, there is no essential incongruity in affirming that an impulse may be the result of a “semi-irresistible force.” But these mental conditions and forces do not manifest themselves with equal obviousness and intensity in all cases; sometimes they are scarcely appreciable; again they verge upon “absolute privation of mind” and “wholly irresistible force;” and it is the duty of the judge to adjust the penalty to the gradations of guilt as determined by the greater or less freedom of the agent.
The same process of reasoning would lead to the admission of quasi-vitiations of mind and quasi-irresistible forces as grounds of exculpation. Thus one might go on analyzing and refining away human responsibility, and reducing all crime to resultants of mental derangement, until every malefactor would come to be looked upon, not as a culprit to be delivered over to the sharp stroke of the headsman or the safe custody of the jailer, but as an unfortunate victim of morbid states and uncontrollable impulses, to be consigned to the sympathetic care of the psychiater.
Italian anthropologists and jurisprudents have been foremost and gone farthest, both theoretically and practically, in this reaction from mediæval conceptions of crime and its proper punishment. This violent recoil from extreme cruelty to excessive commiseration is due, in a great measure, to the Italian temperament, to a peculiar gentleness and impressionableness of character, which, combined with an instinctive aversion to whatever shocks the senses and mars the pleasure of the moment, are apt to degenerate into shallow sentimentality and sickly sensibility, thereby enfeebling and perverting the moral sense and distorting all ideas of right and justice. To minds thus constituted the cool and deliberate condemnation of a human being to the gallows is an atrocity, in comparison with which a fatal stab in the heat of passion or under strong provocation seems a light and venial transgression. This maudlin sympathy with the guilty living man, who is in danger of suffering for his crime, to the entire forgetfulness of the innocent dead man, the victim of his anger or cupidity, pervades all classes of society, and has stimulated the ingenuity of lawyers and legislators to discover mitigating moments and extenuating circumstances and other means of loosening and enlarging the intricate meshes of the penal code so as to permit the culprit to escape. To this end they eagerly seized upon the doctrine of evolution and endeavoured to seek the origin of crime in hereditary propensities, atavistic recurrences, physical degeneracies and other organic fatalities, for which no one can be held personally responsible, and constructed upon the basis of the most recent scientific researches a penological system giving free scope and full gratification to this pitying and palliating disposition.
But, although the Italians have been pioneers in this movement, it has not been confined to them; it extends to all civilized nations, and expresses a general tendency of the age. Even the Germans, those leaders in theory and laggards in practice, whose studies and speculations have illustrated all forms and phases of judicial procedure, but who adhere so conservatively to ancient methods and resist so stubbornly the tides of reform in their own courts have yielded on this point. They no longer regard insanity and idiocy as the only grounds of exemption from punishment, but include in the same category “all morbid disturbances of mental activity,” and “all states of mind in which the free determination of the will is not indeed wholly destroyed, but only partially impaired.” In order to realize the radical changes that have taken place in this direction within a relatively recent period, it will suffice merely to compare the present criminal code of the German Empire with the Austrian code of 1803, the Bavarian code of 1813, and the Prussian code of 1851. It must be remembered, too, that these changes have been effected under the drift of public opinion in spite of the political preponderance of Prussia and her strong bureaucratic influence, which has always been exerted in favour of severe penalties, and shown slight consideration for individual frailties and criminal idiosyncrasies in inflicting punishment. As the stronghold of a stolid and supercilious squirearchy (Junkerthum) in Germany, Prussia has stubbornly resisted to the last every reformatory movement in civil and social, and especially in criminal legislation.
A recent decision of the supreme court of the German Empire (pronounced in the summer of 1894) seems to put a check upon this tendency by rejecting the plea of “moral insanity” in the extenuation of crime. As a matter of fact, however, the question whether such a state of mind as “moral insanity” exists or can exist has not yet been settled; and so long as psychiaters do not agree as to the actuality or possibility of this anomalous mental condition, courts of justice may very properly refuse to take it into consideration or to allow it to exert the slightest influence upon their judgment in the infliction of judicial punishment. Moral insanity, as usually defined, involves a disturbance of the moral perceptions and a derangement of the emotional nature, without impairing the distinctively intellectual faculties. The supposed victim of this hypothetical form of madness is capable of thinking logically and often shows remarkable astuteness in forming his plans and executing his criminal purposes, but seems utterly destitute of the moral sense and of all the finer feelings of humanity, performing the most atrocious deeds without hesitation and remembering them without the slightest compunction. In moral stolidity and the lack of susceptibility he is on a level with the lowest savage. German psychiaters, on the whole, are inclined to regard such persons, not as morally insane, but as morally degenerate and depraved; and German jurists and judges are not disposed to admit such vitiation of character as an extenuating circumstance, especially at a time when criminals of this class are on the increase and are banded together to overthrow civilized society and to introduce an era of anarchy and barbarism. The decision of the German judicatory is therefore not reactionary, but merely precautionary, and simply indicates a wise determination to keep the administration of criminal law unencumbered by theories, which science has not yet fully established and which at present can only serve to paralyze the arm of retributive justice.
Mediæval penal justice sought to inflict the greatest possible amount of suffering on the offender and showed a diabolical fertility of invention in devising new methods of torture even for the pettiest trespasses. The monuments of this barbarity may now be seen in European museums in the form of racks, thumbkins, interlarded hares, Pomeranian bonnets, Spanish boots, scavenger’s daughters, iron virgins and similar engines of cruelty. Until quite recently an iron virgin, with its interior full of long and sharp spikes, was exhibited in a subterranean passage at Nuremberg, on the very spot where it is supposed to have once performed its horrible functions; and in Munich this inhuman instrument of punishment was in actual use as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century. The criminal code of Maria Theresa, published in 1769, contained forty-five large copperplate engravings, illustrating the various modes of torture prescribed in the text for the purpose of extorting confession and evidently designed to serve as object lessons for the instruction of the tormentor and the intimidation of the accused. That Prussia was the first country in Germany to abolish judicial torture was due, not to the progressive spirit of the nation or of its tribunals, but solely to the superior enlightenment and energy of Frederic the Great, who effected this reform arbitrarily and against the will of jurists and judges by cabinet-orders issued in 1740 and 1745. Crimes which women are under peculiar temptation to commit, were punished with extraordinary severity. Thus the infanticide was buried alive, a small tube communicating with the outer air being placed in her mouth in order to prolong her life and her agony. A case of this kind is recorded in the proceedings of the “Malefiz-Gericht” or criminal court of Ensisheim in Alsatia under the date of February 3, 1570. In 1401, an apprentice, who stole from his master five pfennigs (then as now the smallest coin of Germany and worth about the fifth of a cent), was condemned to have both his ears cut off. Incredible barbarities of this kind were practised by some of the best and noblest men of that age. Thus Cardinal Carlo Borromeo, who was pre-eminent among his contemporaries for the purity of his life and the benevolence of his character, did not hesitate to condemn Fra Tommaso di Mileto, a Franciscan monk, to be walled up alive, because he entertained heretical notions concerning the sinfulness of eating meat on Friday, and expressed doubts touching the worship of images, indulgences, the supreme and infallible authority of the pope, and the real presence in the eucharist. This cruel sentence, a striking illustration of the words of Lucretius,
“Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum,”