In general Mehnert adopts the functional standpoint of Cuvier, von Baer, and Roux. His considered judgment as to the phylogenetic value of the biogenetic law closely resembles that formed by von Baer, for he admits recapitulation only as regards the single organs, not as regards the organism as a whole. He has, however, much more sympathy with the law than either Keibel or Oppel, though he agrees that it cannot be used for the construction of ancestral trees. But he ascribes to it as a fact of development considerable importance. The following passage gives a good summary of his view as to the scope and validity of the law. "The biogenetic law has not been shaken by the attacks of its opponents. The assertion is still true that individual organogenesis is exclusively dependent on phylogeny. But we must not expect to find that all the stages in the development of the separate organs, which coexisted in any member of the phylogenetic series, appear at the same time in the individual ontogeny of the descendants, because each organ possesses its own specific rate of development. In this way it comes about naturally that organs which become differentiated rapidly, as, for example, the medullary tube, as a rule dominate earlier periods of ontogeny than do the organs of locomotion. For the same reason the cerebral hemispheres of man are almost as large in youth as in maturity. The picture which an embryo gives is not a repetition in detail of one and the same phylogenetic stage; it consists rather of an assemblage of organs, some of which are at a phyletically early stage of development, while others are at a phyletically older stage."[536]
A different line of attack was that adopted by O. Hertwig in a series of papers, which contain also what is perhaps the best critical estimate of the present position and value of descriptive morphology.[537]
It had not escaped the notice of many previous observers that quite early embryos not infrequently show specific characters even before the characters proper to their class, order and genus are developed—in direct contradiction of the law of von Baer. Thus L. Agassiz[538] had remarked in 1859 that specific characteristics were often developed precociously. "The Snapping Turtle, for instance, exhibits its small crosslike sternum, its long tail, its ferocious habits, even before it leaves the egg, before it breathes through lungs, before its derm is ossified to form a bony shield, etc.; nay, it snaps with its gaping jaws at anything brought near, when it is still surrounded by its amnion and allantois, and its yolk still exceeds in bulk its whole body" (p. 269).
Wilhelm His,[539] in the course of an acute and damaging criticism of the biogenetic law as enunciated by Haeckel, showed clearly that by careful examination the very earliest embryos of a whole series of Vertebrates could be distinguished with certainty from one another. "An identity in external form of different animal embryos, despite the common affirmation to the contrary, does not exist. Even at early stages in their development embryos possess the characters of their class and order, nay, we can hardly doubt, of their species and sex, and even their individual characteristics" (201).
This specificity of embryos was affirmed with even greater confidence by Sedgwick in a paper critical of von Baer's law.[540] He wrote:—"If v. Baer's law has any meaning at all, surely it must imply that animals so closely allied as the fowl and duck would be indistinguishable in the early stages of development; and that in two species so closely similar that I was long in doubt whether they were distinct species, viz., Peripatus capensis and Balfouri, it would be useless to look for embryonic differences; yet I can distinguish a fowl and a duck embryo on the second day by the inspection of a single transverse section through the trunk, and it was the embryonic differences between the Peripatuses which led me to establish without hesitation the two separate species.... I need only say ... that a species is distinct and distinguishable from its allies from the very earliest stages all through the development, although these embryonic differences do not necessarily implicate the same organs as do the adult differences" (p. 39).
Hertwig interprets this fact of the specific distinctness of closely allied embryos in the light of the preformistic conception of heredity. According to this view the whole adult organisation is represented in the structure of the germ-plasm contained in the fertilised ovum, from which it follows that the ova of two different species, and also their embryos at every stage of development, must be as distinct from one another as are the adults themselves, even though the differences may not be so obvious. If this be the case there can be no real recapitulation in ontogeny of the phylogeny of the race, for the egg-cell represents not the first term in phylogeny, but the last. The egg-cell is the organism in an undeveloped state; it has a vastly more complicated structure than was possessed by the primordial cell from which its race has sprung, and it can in no way be considered the equivalent of this ancestral cell.
Hertwig puts this vividly when he says that "the hen's egg is no more the equivalent of the first link in the phylogenetic chain than is the hen itself" (p. 160, 1906, b).
If ontogeny is not a recapitulation of phylogeny, how is it that the early embryonic stages are so alike, even in animals of widely different organisation? Hertwig's answer to this is very interesting. He takes the view that many of the processes characterising early embryonic development are the means necessarily adopted for attaining certain ends. Such are the processes of segmentation, the formation of a blastula, of cell-layers, of medullary folds where the nervous system is a closed tube, the formation of the notochord as a necessary condition of the development of the vertebral column, and so on. "Looked at from this standpoint it cannot surprise us that in all animal phyla the earliest embryonic processes take place in similar fashion, so that we observe the occurrence both in Vertebrates and Invertebrates of a segmentation-process, a morula-stage, a blastula and a gastrula. If now these developmental processes do not depend on chance, but, on the contrary, are rooted in the nature of the animal cell itself, we have no reason for inferring from the recurrence of a similar segmentation-process, morula, blastula, and gastrula in all classes of the animal kingdom the common descent of all animals from one blastula-like or gastrula-like ancestral form. We recognise rather in the successive early stages of animal development only the manifestation of special laws, by which the shaping of animal forms (as distinct from plant forms) is brought about" (p. 178, 1906, b).
"The principal reason why certain stages recur in ontogeny with such constancy and always in essentially the same manner is that they provide under all circumstances the necessary pre-conditions through which alone the later and higher stages of ontogeny can be realised. The unicellular organism can by its very nature transform itself into a multicellular organism only by the method of cell-division. Hence, in all Metazoa, ontogeny must start with a segmentation-process, and a similar statement could be made with regard to all the later stages" (p. 57, 1906, a).
Similarities in early development are therefore no evidence of common descent, and in the same way the resemblances of adult animals, subsumed under the concepts of homology and the unity of plan, are not necessarily due to community of descent, but may also be brought about by the similarity or identity of the laws which govern the evolution of these animals. In the absence, therefore, of positive evidence as to the actual lines of descent (to be obtained only from palæontology), homological resemblance cannot be taken as proof of blood relationship, for homology is a wider concept than homogeny. The only valid definition of homology is that adopted in pre-evolutionary days, when those organs were considered homologous "which agree up to a certain point in structure and composition, in position, arrangement, and relation to the neighbouring organs, and accordingly possess identical functions and uses in the organism" (p. 151, 1906, b).