Forty-one years in India: from subaltern to commander-in-chief

by Earl Frederick Sleigh Roberts Roberts

I now received a report from the rear that the road was blocked, and that the progress of Macpherson's brigade would certainly be opposed; while, on the crests of the hills to the right and left of my camp, bodies of men began to assemble, who, I surmised (which surmise I afterwards learnt was correct), were only waiting for the sun to go down to make a general attack upon the camp under cover of dusk.

The situation was one of great anxiety. The whole force with me was not more than 4,000 men and eighteen guns. The treacherous Amir and his equally treacherous Ministers had, of course, kept the Afghan Commander fully informed as to the manner in which my troops were perforce divided; the position of every man and every gun with me was known; and I feared that, as soon as we were engaged with the enemy, the opportunity would be taken to attack my weakly-defended camp and to engage Macpherson's small brigade, encumbered as it was with its large convoy of stores and ammunition.

The numbers of the enemy were momentarily increasing, so delay would assuredly make matters worse; the only chance of success, therefore, was to take the initiative, and attack the Afghan main position at once. Accordingly, I sent an officer with orders to the troops who were moving towards the gorge not to commence work, but to take up a defensive position until my plans were further developed. I sent another messenger to Macpherson, informing him of my intention to take immediate action, and telling him to keep a good look-out, and push on to Charasia with all possible speed, and at the same time I reinforced him by a squadron of Cavalry.

The Afghan position formed the arc of a circle, extending from the sang-i-nawishta gorge to the heights above Chardeh. Both sides of the gorge were occupied by the enemy, as was a semi-detached hill to the south of it, and sixteen guns were observed in position. The line they had taken up occupied nearly three miles of country; and their main position was the ridge, which, close to the gorge, rose 1,000 feet above the plain, running up at its western extremity to a peak 2,200 feet high. Thence the line stretched along the edge of some lower heights to a rugged hill, the summit of which was about 1,800 feet above Charasia. In front of this formidable position were a succession of sandy hills, forming a series of easily defensible posts, and at the foot of these hills ran a bare stony belt, sloping down to the cultivated land surrounding Charasia and the hamlet of Khairabad.

My movements and reconnaissances up till now having led the enemy to believe that I intended to deliver my attack on their left at the sang-i-nawishta, they were seen to be concentrating their forces in that direction. But this position could only have been carried with such damaging loss to us that I determined to make the real attack by an outflanking movement to their right.

The men having made a hasty breakfast, I despatched General Baker in this direction, and placing at his disposal the troops noted [below],[²] I entrusted to him the difficult task of dislodging the enemy, while I continued to distract their attention towards the gorge by making a feint to their left.

Baker's little column assembled in a wooded enclosure close to Charasia, where he left his field hospital and reserve ammunition, for the safe guarding of which I sent him the 5th Punjab Infantry, while he was further reinforced by 450 men of the 23rd Pioneers and three Field Artillery guns. I was thus left with only six Horse Artillery guns, 450 Cavalry, and between 600 and 700 Infantry for the protection of the camp, where I was still handicapped by the presence of the Amir and his untrustworthy following.

While Baker advanced to the left, the party near the sang-i-nawishta gorge, commanded by Major White, of the 92nd Highlanders, was ordered to threaten the pass and to prevent the enemy occupying any portion of the Charasia village, to advance within Artillery range of the enemy's main position above the gorge, and when the outflanking movement had been thoroughly developed and the enemy were in full retreat, but not before, to push the Cavalry through the gorge and pursue.

At about 11.30 a.m. Baker's leading troops emerged into the open, and were immediately engaged with a crowd of armed Afghans, supported by a considerable body of Regular troops. The General now sent one company of the 72nd, under Captain Hunt, to turn the Afghans off a succession of peaks situated at right angles to the ridge they were occupying on their extreme right. Running along this ridge, and stretching across the Indiki road to the sandhills, the Afghan right wing held a line considerably in advance of their left on the hill above the sang-i-nawishta gorge, and one which could not easily be turned, for the peaks the 72nd were sent to occupy were almost inaccessible, and the fire from them swept the slopes up which our troops must advance. These peaks, therefore, formed the key of the position, and their defenders had to be dislodged from them at all hazards before anything else could be attempted. The company of the 72nd with much difficulty fought their way up, and gained a footing on the first peak, where they were obliged to pause, until reinforced by two companies of the 5th Gurkhas under Captain Cook, V.C., when they advanced all together, clearing the enemy from each successive point, while the remainder of the 72nd breasted the hill, and, under cover of the Mountain guns, attacked the position in front. But the enemy were obstinate, and the extremely difficult nature of the ground somewhat checked the gallant Highlanders. Seeing their dilemma, Baker despatched two companies of the 5th Gurkhas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh, and 200 men of the 5th Punjab Infantry, under Captain Hall, to their assistance; while the 23rd Pioneers were brought up on the right, in support, and a detachment of the 5th Punjab Infantry echeloned in rear, on the left of the line.

The engagement now became hot, and the firing fast and furious. My readers will, I am sure, be able to realize with what intense excitement and anxiety I watched the proceedings. It was evident to me that little progress could be made so long as the enemy retained possession of the ridge, which the Afghan Commander apparently had just begun to appreciate was the real point of attack, for his troops could now be seen hurrying to this point, and it became more urgently necessary than ever to carry the position before it could be reinforced. At 2 p.m. it was seized; the Highlanders and Gurkhas could no longer be resisted; the Afghans wavered, and then began to retreat, exposed to a cross-fire that effectually prevented their rallying.