We encamped at Momund on the 30th, whence I sent the following telegram to Simla:
'My force arrived here to-day; we march to Kandahar to-morrow. General Primrose heliographs that a letter from Ayub's camp brings information that the mother of the late Heir-Apparent, Abdulla Jan, with other ladies, has been sent to Zamindawar. Arrival of the young Musa Jan in Ayub's camp is confirmed. Hashim Khan is also there. The position is being strengthened, especially on the Pir Paimal side, where two guns have been placed with two regiments. From further information, I learn that the Baba Wali Kotal is occupied by three regiments and two guns. The Kotal-i-Murcha is held by the Kabul regiments, and Ayub's own camp is at Mazra, where it is said that the majority of his guns are parked. I propose to encamp the Infantry to the west of Kandahar immediately under the walls, and the Cavalry under the walls to the south. Should I hear that Ayub contemplates flight, I shall attack without delay. If, on the contrary, he intends to resist, I shall take my own time. The country he is occupying is, from description and map, extremely difficult and easily defensible, and each separate advance will require careful study and reconnaissance to prevent unnecessary loss of life.'
Kandahar On the morning of the 31st we marched into Kandahar, just over 313 miles from Kabul. The fever, which had attacked me rather sharply, had left me extremely weak, and I was unable to ride the whole way. I got on my horse, however, some distance from Kandahar to meet Generals Primrose, Burrows, and Nuttall, who came out to receive the column. As we approached the city, the whole garrison turned out and gave us a hearty welcome; officers and men, Native and British, crowded round us, loud in their expressions of gratitude for our having come so quickly to their assistance. We, on our side, were all anxiety to learn the particulars about Maiwand, how they had fared while invested, and all they could tell us of Ayub Khan, his position, strength of his army, etc.
I confess to being very greatly surprised, not to use a stronger expression, at the demoralized condition of the greater part of the [garrison];[4] there were notable [exceptions],[5] but the general bearing of the troops reminded me of the people at Agra in 1857. They seemed to consider themselves hopelessly defeated, and were utterly despondent; they never even hoisted the Union Jack until the relieving force was close at hand. The same excuses could not, however, be made for them, who were all soldiers by profession, as we had felt inclined to make for the residents at Agra, a great majority of whom were women, children, and civilians. The [walls][6] which completely surrounded Kandahar were so high and thick as to render the city absolutely impregnable to any army not equipped with a regular siege-train. Scaling-ladders had been prepared by the enemy, and there was an idea that an assault would be attempted; but for British soldiers to have contemplated the possibility of Kandahar being taken by an Afghan army showed what a miserable state of depression and demoralization they were in.
I halted the column for two hours outside the south wall of the city, where it was sheltered from the enemy's fire, Ayub Khan's position being within long range directly north of Kandahar. While the men rested and breakfasted, and the baggage animals were being unloaded, fed, and watered, I went into the citadel to talk matters over with General Primrose and Colonel St. John, and inquire whether there was sufficient accommodation for the sick men of my force, numbering 940, who needed to be taken into hospital. The thermometer now registered 105° Fahr. in tents during the day, but the nights were still bitterly cold, and the sudden changes of temperature were extremely trying to people in bad health.
On the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, whose intimate acquaintance with the neighbourhood of Kandahar, gained while serving on Sir Donald Stewart's staff, was now most valuable to me, I determined to take up a position to the west of the city, with my right on the cantonment and my left touching Old Kandahar. This enabled me to cover the city, gave me command of a good supply of water, and placed me within striking distance of Ayub Khan's camp.
At 10 a.m. the first and third brigades moved off and occupied Piquet Hill, Karez Hill, and the north-east spur of the hill above Old Kandahar. A few shots were fired at the advance guard from distant orchards, and the ground proved to be within range of some of the enemy's Field-pieces on the Baba Wali Kotal, but it was a case of Hobson's choice, as water was not to be found anywhere else at a come-at-able distance.
Large numbers of men were to be seen crowning the Baba Wali Kotal, and constructing shelter-trenches along the crest of the low black ridge, which jutted out in a south-easterly direction from the more lofty range on which the kotal is situated. Piquets were immediately sent to occupy the northern spur of the Kohkeran Hill commanding the road to Gundigan, the village of Abbasabad, the Karez Hill, the village of Chihal Dukhtaran, the greater and lesser Piquet Hills, and the village of Kalachi, all of which were found to be deserted.
From a cursory examination of the ground, I satisfied myself that any attempt to carry the Baba Wali Kotal by direct attack must result in very severe loss, and I determined to turn it. But before I could decide how this could best be done, it was necessary to ascertain the strength and precise extent of the Afghan position. I therefore detailed a small [party],[7] under the command of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, to make as complete a reconnaissance as time would allow. In the meantime I despatched the following telegram to the authorities at Simla:
'KANDAHAR,
31st August, 1880.