| CORPS. | Number of Officers who did Duty with each Corps. | CASUALTIES. | ||||
| Killed in Action. | Died of Wounds. | Died of Disease. | Wounded. | Invalided. | ||
| 1st Punjab Cavalry (1 squadron) 2nd Punjab Cavalry 5th Punjab Cavalry (1 squadron) 1st Punjab Infantry 2nd Punjab Infantry 4th Punjab Infantry | 12 20 7 15 22 24 | 1 1 1 3 3 2 | ... ... 1 ... ... 3 | ... ... ... ... ... 2 | 6 5 ... 6 4 8 | 7 4 ... ... 3 ... |
| Total | 100 | 11 | 4 | 2 | 29 | 14 |
[Footnote 7:] [Captain] Younghushand was at Bozai-Gumbaz, and Lieutenant Davison on the Alichur Pamirs, both places being south of the Aksu branch of the Oxus, flowing from the Little Pamir Lake.]
[Footnote 8:] [The] Infantry comprised twenty-four battalions drawn up in line of quarter columns. The Artillery consisted of one battery (six 7-pounders) carried on elephants, six batteries (six guns each, 5-pounders and 7-pounders) dragged by soldiers, and six batteries (six guns each, 3-pounders and 5-pounders) carried by Bhutia coolies.]
[Footnote 9:] [I] am not unmindful of the visit which Sir Mortimer Durand paid to Kabul after I had left India, but on that occasion, I believe, the question of the defence of Afghanistan was not discussed.]
[Footnote 10:] [The] works were stopped after I left India, but not, I was glad to think, before the redoubts had been finished, with the communications thereto. The reasons given were that a change of plans was necessary for economy's sake, and that the construction of fortifications might induce the Natives to think we were doubtful of the continuance of our supremacy. As regarded the first, I explained that the total outlay for works and armaments was estimated at only £332,274—considerably less than one half the cost of a British line-of-battle ship; and as to the second, I urged that an argument of this sort against frontier defences would hardly bear examination; that the possibility of external attack was freely discussed in every newspaper; that Russian movements and frontier difficulties were known and commented on in every bazaar; that the construction of fortifications in support of the Ruling Power had been an Oriental practice from time immemorial; that our action in this respect was at least as likely to instil the idea that we meant to retain our eastern possessions at any cost, as to give an impression of weakness; that the progressive re-organization and mobilization of our army were well known to have reference to service beyond the frontier; and that we had extended our confidence in this respect to Native Princes by encouraging them to train their own troops and fit them to take their place in line with ours.]
[Footnote 11:] [Given] in the Appendix[*].
See [Appendix XVI.]]