We ask any open-minded man whether a Force thus constituted is an army at all, much less an army to which this country can entrust its existence as a great Nation?
We do not bring these facts forward in order to discredit Lord Haldane's courageous efforts or to depreciate the patriotism of those now serving in the Force. We bring them forward simply in order to demonstrate the impossibility of constructing a defensive Army equal to this country's needs on a basis of voluntary enlistment. If Lord Haldane, backed by the hearty support of King and country, has failed—and by his own admission he has failed—who is likely to succeed?
Not many weeks ago this country was on the verge of a gigantic war. And it was a war which, if it had come, would have come unexpectedly and suddenly. What would have been our position? All the soothing fallacies which pass current in time of peace—the belief that our Expeditionary Force can at the same time be sent abroad and yet kept at home to cover the training of the Territorial Force; the belief that this Force is sure of six months' unmolested leisure in which it can fit itself for the serious business of war—would have been shattered in twelve hours. The Expeditionary Force—to be of any use at all—must have been despatched abroad without a day's delay; and, for the defence of these islands, we should have had to rely upon a handful of Regulars left behind in the depots as "unfit"; such of the Special Reserve as may not be required for the Expeditionary Force, and the National Reserve; but mainly upon a Territorial Force,[[1]] nominally 264,000 strong, untrained for war, and further weakened by a shortage of 1,800 officers!
Now, making every allowance for the immense resisting power which in moments of supreme peril nations and cities have occasionally derived from enthusiasm or despair, is it either fitting, we ask, or even prudent, that, in the twentieth century, Great Britain should repose her trust in so problematical and hazardous a presumption? For the transformation of the most heroic enthusiasm into an effective weapon of war demands time, exactly as the transformation of the Territorials into an efficient Army demands time. But when war comes it will come with great suddenness; the essential crisis will be on us in an instant, and for Great Britain—as Lord Salisbury in his latest utterances significantly warned us—the stake is not to be reckoned in millions of a war indemnity; the stake is our very existence as an Empire.
When Lord Haldane cites the exploits of untrained or semi-trained forces, when he speaks of "a whole nation springing to arms at the call of duty," he has his eyes fastened upon other circumstances and upon other times than ours. Under the conditions of modern war, discipline alone can confront discipline on a field of battle.
"We appeal to our countrymen to join us in our effort," I went on to say. "We appeal, above all, to the officers and men of the existing Territorial Force. We are working to insure that their sacrifice to patriotism should not be made futile, nor their devotion thrown away. We are working to make the Army to which they belong a reality—that is to say, a Home Army efficient and sufficient; an Army which shall always be ready to take up the defence of these islands, and leave our Regulars free and our Fleets free to fight our battles elsewhere. We ask them to assist us in our efforts to introduce a system of compulsory training, the only system under which the safety of the country can be secured and the Territorial Force made really effective."
[[1]] On June 17, 1908, Lord (then Mr.) Haldane said: "In the event of a great war breaking out ... the Territorials would be embodied, not for immediate fighting, if it could be avoided, but for their war training."
THE TERRITORIAL FORCE
LORD HALDANE'S SCHEME EXAMINED