Lord Roberts' Message to the Nation

by Earl Frederick Sleigh Roberts Roberts

Can it be pretended for a moment that such a number provides the Home Army which Mr. Asquith described as necessary, if we are to be able to guard against a successful invasion of even 70,000 men? I say nothing at this point of the danger of believing that no force larger than 70,000 may have to be dealt with; but I must point out that, in order to deal with an invasion of even 70,000 highly-trained soldiers, a field force of at least 300,000 partially-trained men are required, in addition to some 200,000 men needed for the protection of the naval bases and arsenals, and to garrison the principal places in Great Britain and Ireland.

It is important that you should realize the facts: that the number asked for was quite inadequate; that even that number has not been obtained, and that the age and physique of a considerable proportion of those who have come forward are not up to a satisfactory standard; for Lord Haldane has been concentrating all his efforts and the attention of the public on securing, at almost any cost, the number of men for the Territorial Force—that is, the total of 315,000 men, to which his ideal of a Nation in Arms has shrunk. But even in this he has failed. These frantic efforts to secure a nominal success are designed to distract attention from the far more serious question of the training of the Territorial Force, and to create the impression that the scheme is a masterpiece which is beyond criticism, and which has, once for all, made it quite unnecessary to discuss the question of compulsory service for the Home Army.

So much for organization and numbers; now for the third condition—namely, the training of the Territorial Force. In discussing this question I must try to avoid misinterpretation by saying that, in stating plain facts, I am not criticizing the officers or men of that Force. On the contrary, I honour them for their patriotism, and for the admirable example they are setting to their apathetic fellow-countrymen. It is the voluntary system that I condemn, and the politicians who are hoodwinking this nation into the belief that that system is adequate and sufficient for our needs. And surely I need not apologize for examining the standard of training laid down for the Territorial Force. Lord Haldane himself, in 1906, declared, "It is preparedness for war which is the key to the sort of organization we ought to have in peace"; and on another occasion he said, "The contemplation of large numbers by the people of this country, who are unable to take into account questions of war efficiency and war organization, necessarily promotes dangerous national illusions." It is against such "dangerous national illusions" that I wish to warn my fellow-countrymen in the following analysis of the training of the Territorial Force.

The Territorial soldier can be enlisted at seventeen years of age, and the engagement is for four years. In the first year he must do a minimum of forty drills of an hour each, and a minimum of eight days or a maximum of fifteen days, in camp. In the next year he must do ten drills of an hour each, and the same camp training. The musketry standard can hardly be described as high, seeing that each man is only provided by the State with 90 rounds per annum, and in some cases this number is disposed of on an enclosed range on one day in the year. This is simply ludicrous, considering that, in modern war and with the modern rifle, the soldier who cannot use this weapon with skill and confidence is absolutely useless.[[1]]

Such is the minimum peace training laid down for the Territorial Force. It is less than the minimum training in any army or Militia in the world. I am aware that many officers and men do a great deal more as individuals. But what is far more important—and I ask you, my Lords and gentlemen, most earnestly to realize the fact—a large number do not reach even this minimum amount of training.

The proposal to give six months' training after war breaks out is so amazing as to be unworthy of consideration, and it is difficult to believe that it was made seriously by its talented author, seeing that readiness for war is the purpose aimed at by every European nation; and now-a-days, when war breaks out with the greatest suddenness, and the stake at issue between two great nations going to war would be so gigantic, the temptation to secure the advantage of the initiative and to commence hostilities without declaration of war could hardly be resisted.[[2]]

But it may be urged that, although the Territorial Force is evidently not fit to perform its functions without a proper course of recruit training, surely it would be possible to secure that training in time of peace, instead of postponing it until the outbreak of war, as Lord Haldane proposed. If the nation still hugs this delusion, I hope it will abandon it before it drags us down to disaster. For one hundred years the voluntary system for Home Defence has been tried and found wanting. Under it a sufficient number of men have never been forthcoming, and can never be forthcoming, to devote enough time in peace to render the Army fit for war. Discipline cannot be acquired by homeopathic doses; nothing but a considerable period of continuous training can give individual soldiers and military units that self-confidence and cohesion which are essential to success in war; and no modification of the voluntary system, no amount of lavish expenditure, no cajolery, no juggling with figures, will ever produce an adequate and efficient Home Army.

This truth was clearly expressed by the Duke of Norfolk when he said, with reference to the Report of the Royal Commission on the Auxiliary Forces, of which he was the President: "The breakdown is in almost every case attributed essentially to the nature of the voluntary system itself, which makes it impossible to demand a reasonable standard of efficiency without greatly reducing the forces."

Curiously enough, Lord Haldane, speaking of the Territorial Force, seems to have recognized the correctness of this conclusion, for in the House of Commons on March 9, 1908, he said: "Because it is a voluntary Army on a voluntary basis, you can only give it just so much training as volunteers are able and willing to take...." Can anything be more condemnatory of the value of a Force, which will assuredly be required the moment war breaks out? And to quote the Duke of Norfolk again: "If you trust the present organization ... you will be leaning on a prop which will fail when the day of trial comes."

What would be the result is simply this—for six months the striking force could not strike. The Regular Army could not leave these shores to assist our fellow-countrymen in India and the oversea Dominions, or to reinforce our friends and allies in accordance with the obligations of honour and mutual interest which we have undertaken. For six months the Navy would be hampered and shackled in performing its traditional duties of seeking out the enemy's fleets—it would, in fact, be deprived of that "greater freedom" which the Territorial Force was intended to give it.